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Abstract
The first chapter of this thesis develops a model where a number of new hedge funds
with unknown and varying ability compete to enhance their reputations by registering high
performance relative to their peers. The funds’ choice variable is their return distribution,
which financial engineering gives them complete control over subject to a constraint on
their means that proxies for ability. This approach has the advantage of not requiring
knowledge of fund moneymaking strategies. In all equilibria, funds play tail risk in ex-
pectation, and increasing the number of competitors causes tail risk and fund failure
rates to rise. This is because a higher number of competitors makes it more difficult
to stand out with high relative performance. In the second chapter, a variant of the
model where the fund with the greatest Bayesian probability of being a high ability type
wins the reputational boost is analysed as a robustness check. Funds still play tail risk,
but the results from chapter 1 are weakened by the existence a class of equilibria where
tail risk does not increase with the number of funds. Some equilibria of this new model
correspond to the setting of Foster and Young (2010), with low ability funds mimicking
high ability funds. This is because the more rational version is less like a Blotto Game
and closer to a pure signalling model. In the last chapter, an incentive bonus scheme
(2 and 20) commonly used in the hedge fund industry is added to the model. When
funds play probability mass above the bonus threshold, such a scheme raises failure risk
compared to the basic model from part 1 under some mild conditions. When financial
engineering that enables return manipulation is available and managers are constrained
by innate ability, such a bonus scheme gives funds incentives to play probability mass
at high return levels at the cost of tail risk. With the bonus scheme, funds play less
probability mass at higher variance above the bonus threshold. The model also returns
a restriction on the minimum amount of tail risk.
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CHAPTER 1
A Basic Model of Hedge Fund Competition
1.1. Introduction
In the last three decades, there has been an explosion in the level of complexity in financial
markets around the world. This has been bought about by a combination of deregulation
and (consequently) a very large amount of financial innovation. The most well known
example is the enormous growth in the number and sophistication of derivatives available
since the 80’s. Other types of financial product have also massively increased in variety
and complexity, with an example being the proliferation of mortgage backed securities
with complex tranching and CDOs of various types in the 2000’s. The value of this
increasing complexity has been debated, with a variety of arguments for and against it.
Generally, arguments for this development have focused on how the increased variety
of financial products completes markets and gives financial institutions better tools to
manage and spread risk, leading to more efficient allocations, with Alan Greenspan being
the most famous proponent of that line. Arguments against have focused on how in a
world of asymmetric information complexity can be used to hide leverage and risk taking
and how there can be severe mispricing of securities investors do not fully understand
(see the mortgage backed security bubble of the mid-late 2000s).
One particular setting in which complex financial instruments can be misused is in the
world of hedge funds. Due to their light regulation, they are free to execute intricate
trading and moneymaking strategies and are thus able to take maximum advantage of
the opportunities afforded to them by these products. In addition, hedge funds have few,
if any disclosure requirements. Consequently, the return characteristics of their portfolios
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are extremely difficult to unravel, and fund managers probably want it this way: this
prevents their highly proprietary trading strategies being copied by competitors.
Hedge funds have high attrition rates. This results in a fund population where many
funds are young, with only a few years of history (Fung and Hsieh, (2006)). Also,
there is evidence that strong performance relative to their competitors matters heavily
(Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2000)). If a new hedge fund outperforms its peers,
it can boost its reputation by ranking highly in performance standings and convince
investors that it has skilled managers. Even though there are no requirements to disclose
performance, a fund that performs well can choose to publish its performance when it
does well, which can be interpreted by investors as a signal that the fund has skilled
managers. As Foster and Young (2010) point out, when there is such a low degree
of transparency and limited sampling of return histories due to funds being young, it
is possible for low ability managers to use complex financial engineering to manipulate
return distributions to make themselves appear more skilled than they actually are, and
enhance their reputation by appearing to outperform their peers. An example they give is
when the fund manager writes and sells puts on some unlikely market event, and invests
the money gained from these puts in a risk free investment, giving the appearance of
being able to generate riskless returns above the risk free rate for a significant period of
time. In the case of the unlikely market event coming to pass, all their money is lost.
Although it may be easy to detect this specific strategy, they point out there are much
more complex and opaque trades that can give the same result. Other authors have
also pointed out this possibility too, an example being Weisman (2002), who calls these
trades “informationless” strategies and notes that they can be used to game performance
measures even though the expected return of such strategies may be low. This creates an
interesting set of incentives which are important to understand, since hedge funds play a
significant role in financial markets due to their significant investments in illiquid assets
and their high leverage. When there are so many young funds of unknown ability, a large
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proportion of them may be incentivised to disguise their ability using financial engineering,
which may have negative implications on their stability and survival rates. In addition,
with the aforementioned large number of young hedge funds seeking to register strong
relative performances, competition is clearly an important consideration when analysing
what may incentivise them to use financial instruments to distort return distributions.
This is not something considered in Foster and Young’s analysis, and is the main subject
of investigation in this paper: the effect of competition on hedge funds failure rates in
the environment of relative performance competition and high financial complexity.
This paper formalises the problem of return manipulation using opaque financial instru-
ments raised by the aforementioned authors in a simple theoretical model, using an
adaption of the models used in Spiegler (2006) and Myerson (1993) to consider prob-
lems in behavioural economics and political economy respectively. It is also related to
the all-pay auction, the models used in the sales literature started by Varian (1980),
and the literature on Blotto Games. This approach replicates some crucial features of
the problem at hand, while still being tractable. The key feature is that there is limited
return sampling in determining performance ranking, (only one sample for simplicity) and
that the choice variable for hedge funds is their return distribution, subject to a few con-
straints. This proxies for the ability of hedge funds to manipulate their return distribution
using complex financial products. Innate fund ability generates these constraints: it is
assumed that high ability funds can always achieve a higher expected return than low
ability funds, and the use of financial products cannot affect this. Such an approach has
the advantage of not requiring explicit modelling of hedge fund trading strategies, which
are incredibly diverse and complex. However, the framework includes a skill differential
between funds, while still allowing for an analysis of inter-firm competition.
The main result that comes from this model is that increasing the number of competing
firms raises the expected fund failure rate, which is directly related to the amount of tail
risk (risk of extreme losses) in the return distributions of each fund. This is despite the
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infinite number of pure strategy equilibria. Tail risk is played in every symmetric pure
strategy equilibrium, which is a prediction somewhat consistent with some empirical work
on hedge funds (Agarwal (2004)) and their observed short lifespans. This is due to it
being increasingly less likely for a single fund to outperform all its peers as the number
of competing funds increases. In the presence of ability constraints, incentives are thus
generated to distort return distributions to offer the chance of drawing very high returns
with a good chance to beating its competitors at the cost of there being significant
tail risk and therefore significant chances of firm failure. The ingredients critical to this
result are that the reputational benefit is only gained for the top few performers in the
population of funds, funds being ability constrained, and that the funds have some power
via complex financial engineering to alter their return distributions to respond to these
incentives. This effect persists in more complex distribution picking settings as long these
two features are present.
Trivially, it also follows that a policy implication of this result is that failure risk and tail
risk can be lowered by introducing a high cost to altering return distributions. Clearly,
imposing a high cost on shifting probability mass will make it unprofitable for a fund to
alter its return distribution in response to incentives provided by increased competition.
Introducing costs can be interpreted as adding regulation that makes it costly or difficult
to freely alter return distributions or imposing some sort of limitation on the complexity
of the securities available to the funds.
The two papers that are most closely related in modelling terms are Spiegler (2006) and
Myerson (1993). Spiegler considers the problem of firms selling a complex, multifaceted
product that has different prices and values in different world states to a consumer who
is boundedly rational and can only consider a single world state. Myerson uses a model
of this type to analyse electoral candidate behaviour when voters will prefer whoever
promises them more transfers out of a budget whose size is fixed by taxation constraints.
Both of these two papers have a continuous probability distribution as a choice variable,
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albeit with different interpretations in each paper. In Spiegler, the cumulative probability
distribution represents the probability that the world will be in a state where the product
has a price less than that number, while in Myerson, the cumulative probability distribu-
tion represents the probability that a randomly selected group of voters will be offered
transfers less than some value. This paper is more similar to Myerson in that there are
restrictions on the mean of the probability distributions, which are not present in Spieg-
ler. Where this paper differs is that the distributions clearly have different interpretations
(they are distributions of returns) and the introduction of different types of player with
different mean restrictions on their played return distributions, which is a new feature.
Clearly, the two different firm types end up playing different strategies in equilibrium,
while all players play the same strategy in symmetric equilibria in the two aforementioned
papers. This results in an infinity of symmetric equilibria, but with significant restrictions
on the played distributions. There are similarities between the predictions made by this
model and those made in Spiegler and Myerson: the variance of the distributions played
must increase with the number of players, and the linearity of the probability that a firm
that draws a return r will be picked are the two most important ones. In addition, this
paper is linked to a far older literature on Colonel Blotto games such as Wagner and Gross
(1950), since the problem of picking a continuous distribution subject to constraints is
somewhat analogous to a Colonel Blotto game over infinitely many battlefields.
The model is also related to the wider literature on price dispersion, namely the famous
model by Varian (1980), where shops face a population of customers where some search
and compare prices actively, while others do not exert effort in searching and pick a shop
at random. Their choice variable is a price distribution. The key methodological similarity
is that the choice variable of the economic agents is a probability distribution while being
subject to some constraints (reservation price and marginal cost in the case of Varian).
The distribution happens to be over prices in that case, and is over returns on a portfolio
in this model. In particular, some of the equilibria that are eventually found bear some
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resemblance to the continuum of asymmetric equilibria found in Varian’s model by Baye
and Kovenock et al. (1992), with mass atoms at extreme values of price (return in this
case). This is not entirely surprising, given the presence of two different types in this
model. The model is also related to the literature on all-pay auctions (Baye and Kovenock
et al. (1996)). In a first price sealed all-pay auction, the winner of the auction is clearly
determined by the highest bid, and every player will have to pay the same cost. This
is exactly analogous to the situation here, where the highest performing fund receives a
reputational gain and all funds have symmetric cost functions. It comes as no surprise
that some of equilibria of this model resemble some of those found in the all-pay auction.
However, the ability constraint in this model has no exact analogue in the all-pay auction.
Some other papers are related thematically, despite not being related methodologically.
There has been some theoretical work on actively managed funds, mainly in the area
of mutual funds. An example is Taylor (2001), who constructs a simple model of the
incentives mutual fund managers face when competing for cash inflows. That model
constructs a simple game in a tournament setting, where two managers who receive their
mid-year performance results compete for incoming investor funds at the end of the year,
and finds that managers in a stronger position in the middle of the year are more likely
to gamble due to the pressure exerted from their competition being likely to gamble too.
A feature that drives the results of that paper and this one is the tournament-like setting
- the money flows into the fund that shows the best returns performance by the end of
the year. This is a strong incentive to use riskier return distributions when faced with
competition. Taylor (2001) considers mutual funds however, which do not use many
complex financial instruments. Thus, it does not feature the much greater freedom to
manipulate returns that are allowed in this paper. Berk and Green (2002) is a well known
paper that is related because it features a market where mutual funds of differing skills
compete with each other for funding, and it features investors who try and put their money
into funds that are perceived to be higher skill. They use this framework to consider the
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problem of why the past performance of mutual funds is not a predictor of their future
performance and why actively managed funds do not outperform passive benchmarks,
and they explain this phenomenon by assuming that the funds have diminishing returns
to scale. Since they are focusing on a different problem, they do not consider any
return manipulation and simply assume that the funds generate a constant return per
period plus a mean zero error process. For the same reason, the decision variable for
the fund managers is also different - they decide the scale of their operation and what
proportion of funds are managed actively. In all, their model is markedly different from
the one presented here, since they are not concerned about return manipulation. Finally,
this paper is related to Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) which also makes the point that
increased competition and financial liberalisation increase bankruptcy amongst banks.
The mechanism in their model is different from the one presented here: competition and
liberalisation lower future profits, eroding the franchise value of said banks, making it
more likely that they will make very risky investments and fail. The mechanism in this
paper does not revolve around falling profits or franchise values, and so is significantly
different. However, their model is in some senses isomorphic to the one presented here:
banks choose between a risky investment which runs a significant risk of causing firm
failure and a less risky investment.
This paper has three main sections. The settings and assumptions of the model will be
laid out, and the equilibria will be solved for. Then the results and possible refinements
are discussed, and finally there will be a conclusion.
1.2. The Model
1.2.1. General Setting. There are N “new” risk-neutral hedge funds of unknown
ability. The funds can be of either high ability or low ability with prior probabilities β and
1−β respectively. The funds know their own type, but not the types of other competitors
in the market. Each of the funds has access to complex financial instruments that allow
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them to manipulate their return distributions as they see fit, subject to a mean return
constraint that is dependent on their type. This setup allows us to sidestep the issue of
modelling their money making strategies explicitly, while still allowing for a distinction
in hedge fund abilities. Once they have decided upon a return distribution, the funds
invest some of their own wealth, If , into their decided return distribution, generating
a draw from their return distribution that is observed. Since they are new hedge funds,
they are competing for publicity, and will derive some benefit by performing well relative
to their peers. To simplify things, it is assumed they get a payoff α from drawing the
highest return out of the group of competing funds. In reality, funds are often are aiming
to be at a high rank in a performance list. The assumption that they only derive benefit
from being first amongst their competitors is an extreme assumption, but simplifies the
analysis greatly while preserving the importance of strong relative performance. Firm
failure is modelled by there being an exogenous return threshold, rf > 0, below which
the firm fails. If a hedge fund draws a return below this threshold, the firm fails, and
is shut down by the manager and therefore cannot take a place on the performance list
even if it draws the highest return of all the observed funds. This can also be interpreted
as the existence of a safe outside option - if a fund draws less than some threshold level,
they can appear worse than a safe and known investment option, and registering strong
relative performance will not bring a benefit.
1.2.2. Game Structure. There are two time periods. To simplify analysis, there
is no discounting. The time structure of the game is as follows:
• t = 0. Fund types are drawn randomly and independently. They are either of
the H type with probability β or the L type with probability 1− β. They then
simultaneously pick their return distributions without knowledge of the types of
the other funds, and invest If of their own money into their picked distributions.
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• t = 1. The investment made by each fund matures, and generates a return
drawn from the distribution chosen in the previous phase. This return is drawn
independently for each fund. The return for fund i is denoted by riIf . The fund
that draws the highest return will receive some benefit (derived from reputa-
tional considerations) α, related to appearing to perform well. The fund keeps
the return generated from its own money (riIf ) regardless of whether it was
successful in gaining the benefit from drawing the highest return. If a fund
draws ri < rf , the fund fails and cannot gain any benefit from appearing to
outperform its competitors.
1.2.3. Constraints on Return Distributions. What we are interested in is how
the funds use their access to complex financial products to affect their return distributions.
Therefore, we assume that funds have a lot of power to shape their return distributions.
As stated, there are some restrictions on the distributions they can choose, and these
depend on the type of the fund in question. The pool of possible funds contains both
ones of high ability, the H type, and low ability funds, the L type. Explicitly, if fund i is
of the H type, then
(1.2.1) E(ri) ≤ rH
And if fund i is of the L type,
(1.2.2) E(ri) ≤ rL
These are the type constraints. And
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(1.2.3) rH > rL > 0
These constraints can be effectively interpreted as ability constraints - funds of lower
ability have a lower limit on the maximum expected return of their distributions than high
ability funds. This to some extent proxies for the situation in reality, where the difference
between the return levels of high and low ability funds arises from skill differences in
finding and executing trading strategies. Using these constraints, we can somewhat
sidestep the issue of explicitly modelling the moneymaking strategies used by different
funds, which are tricky to model due to their variety and complexity. The use of complex
financial products is assumed to change the shape of the return distributions.
A further restriction on the return distribution is required due to the limited liability of
the funds. Essentially, they cannot lose more money than they invest. Thus, if I units
of money in is invested in fund i, the investor will get riI in total when the investment
matures. Limited liability is represented by the following restriction:
(1.2.4) ri ≥ 0
This applies to funds of both types. There is no limit on the upper bound of the supports
of played return distributions.
1.2.4. Objective Functions. As stated, the fund that generates the highest return
at t = 1 without failing (drawing ri < rf ) gets to the top of something like a performance
list and gains α. If there are W funds tied at the highest return value, the winner is
drawn at random out of these W funds. In that case, the expected benefit to a firm that
ties for top performance is α
W
. Due to risk neutrality, this is equivalent to the benefit α
being split evenly amongst these funds. Before proceeding to write down the objective
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function, a key variable must be introduced: the probability that fund i gets to the top
of the performance ranking given the return that the firm draws at t = 1. Let this be
Pi(ri). As noted before, to simplify the analysis, there is no discounting. The ex-ante
objective function for the fund i is:
pii = E(ri)If + αE(Pi(ri))
They chose fi(ri) subject to the constraints (1.2.1 for H type, 1.2.2 for L type, and
1.2.4 for both) listed in a previous section to maximise the above function.
It is immediately obvious that the type constraints must bind. If they did not, it is
possible to shift probability mass in fi(ri) so that the average return E(ri) increases.
Given that the investor always picks the fund that generates the highest return, Pi is a
an increasing function of ri. One can always increase E(ri) by shifting some probability
mass to a higher ri. Given that. Pi is an increasing function of ri, this increases E(ri)
while leaves E(Pi(ri)) either unchanged or strictly higher, resulting in a strict increase
in pii. It follows that any fi(ri) which does not have binding type constraints will not be
a profit maximising return distribution.
It then follows that if the type constraints must bind, then maximising the objective
function is achieved as long as E(Pi(ri)) is maximised, since E(ri) is maximised as long
the type constraints bind. Thus the problem simplifies to:
maxE(Pi(ri))
(1.2.5) s.t. E(ri) = rH
for the H type, and
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maxE(Pi(ri))
(1.2.6) s.t. E(ri) = rL
for the L type.
1.2.5. Model Solution. We want to solve for symmetric pure equilibria where all
firms of the same type play the same distribution. This is natural, since all firms of the
same type face a symmetric problem. Although there appears to be a dauntingly large
range of possible probability distributions that can be played, a series of propositions
will be shown that narrow down the distributions that can result in an equilibrium. All
detailed proofs of the presented propositions are in the appendix. Note that due to
the requirement that ability constraints are binding, only deviations from equilibrium
that involve mean preserving probability mass movements need to be considered. This
is the main method used to deduce the following results: if the ability constraints are
binding for both types and no type can find a profitable mean preserving probability mass
movement, then that combination of return distributions is an equilibrium. The results
give conditions on the played return distributions for no profitable mean preserving mass
movements to be possible for any type.
Proposition 1.1. For either fund type, there can be no probability mass in the interval
(0, rf ).
Proof. See appendix 1. 
This is a fairly intuitive result. Since any return drawn between zero and rf can never
win the reputational reward, all funds avoid playing any probability mass there. Any
mass played there can be shifted down to ri = 0 with no effect on E(Pi(ri)), and mean
1.2. THE MODEL 18
preservation allows some mass elsewhere to be moved up, resulting in a strict increase in
E(Pi(ri)).
Proposition 1.2. In a symmetric equilibrium, no fund can play distributions with any
atoms of probability mass in the open interval [rf ,∞). All cdfs played must be continuous
within this range.
Proof. See appendix 1. 
This is a crucial step in deriving further results. A simple example will help clarify
the intuition for why this must be the case. Consider a scenario where there are only
two funds, and both fund types are playing an atom of probability mass at the same
return level, say r′. Due to the mass atom, both funds will draw r′ with some non-
zero probability. Recall that in the event of a tie on returns, the winner of the reward is
chosen at random out of the two funds. This gives an incentive for both funds to deviate,
since they can both make a mean preserving deviation (thus keeping the type constraints
binding) where all the mass played at r′ is shifted up by an infinitesimal amount. Due
to the infinitesimally small shift, only an infinitesimally small amount of mass must be
shifted to a lower return level elsewhere to preserve the mean. The latter only results
in a negligible decrease in Pi(ri), while the shift of all the mass at r′ upwards means
that the random tiebreaker between the two funds is avoided in the states of the world
where both firms draw the mass atoms (as mentioned before, these happen with non-zero
probability), giving a finite increase in Pi(ri). Effectively, if any fund plays a distribution
with mass atoms, it allows all other funds to make a deviation where an infinitesimally
small shift in mass locations gives a finite increase in winning probabilities.
To solve the model, we must calculate Pi(ri) in symmetric equilibrium. Given that
failure prevents the firm from winning the reputational boost, it is clear that Pi(ri) = 0
for ri ∈ [0, rf ). Calculating Pi(ri) in all other regions is simplified considerably by the
knowledge that there are no atoms in the interval [rf ,∞), since the probability that more
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than one firm ties for the highest return is now effectively zero. The firm that draws the
highest return at t = 1 will gain benefit α. The probability of being the top performer
depends on how many H and L types there are in the population of hedge funds.
Consider a return draw for firm i in the interval [rf , ∞). If out of the other N −1 funds,
there are m high type funds (obviously with N −1 ≥ m), then N −1−m funds must be
low type funds. In a symmetric equilibrium, all funds of identical type must be playing
the same return distribution. If FL is the return cdf of L type funds and FH is the return
cdf of all H type funds, then the probability of registering the strongest performance out
of all the young hedge funds is the probability that all other funds (N − 1 of them) draw
lower returns than ri. Due to the independent return draws, the expression for this is
simple:
FmH (ri)F
N−1−m
L (ri)
This is apparent from the definition of a cdf as the probability that a draw from the
distribution is below some value. The next question to ask is what Pi(ri), the ex-ante
probability of drawing the highest return is. We need to take into account how likely it
is that there are m high ability funds. Given that the probability of a fund being H type
is β and the probability of a fund being L type is 1 − β, it follows that, the probability
that there are m high ability funds out of N − 1 total funds is:
(N − 1)!
m!(N − 1−m)!β
m(1− β)N−1−m
and thus, assuming that the draws for fund types and returns are made independently,
the probability of there being m high type funds in the other N − 1 firms followed by a
draw ri being the winning one is
(N − 1)!
m!(N − 1−m)!β
m(1− β)N−1−mFmH (ri)FN−1−mL (ri)
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Finally, to find Pi(ri), we need to sum these probabilities over the different possible
compositions of fund types:
E(Pi(ri1)) =
N−1∑
m=0
(N − 1)!
m!(N − 1−m)!β
m(1− β)N−1−mFmH (ri)FN−1−mL (ri)
This can be simplified using the binomial expansion, giving the key result that
(1.2.7) Pi(ri) = (βFH(ri) + (1− β)FL(ri))N−1 for ri ∈ [rf , ∞)
Overall, this gives the following form for Pi(ri) in symmetric equilibrium:
(1.2.8) Pi(ri)

(βFH(ri) + (1− β)FL(ri))N−1
0
ri ∈ [rf , ∞)
ri ∈ [0, rf )
An important conclusion can be drawn from this:
Proposition 1.3. Pi(ri) is an increasing function of ri.
This is immediately apparent since it is an increasing function of two cdfs, which are
increasing functions themselves. It immediately follows that if fi(ri) is the return pdf
played by firm i, then
E(Pi(ri)) =
∞ˆ
rf
(βFH(ri) + (1− β)FL(ri))N−1fi(ri)dri
Proposition 1.4. Assume that the H type plays a return distribution with a support
upper bound of kH and that the L type plays a return distribution with a support
upper bound of kL. Let the greatest upper bound of the two different types be ku =
max[kH , kL]. For every ri ∈ [rf , ku], at least one of the two types must be playing
probability mass.
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Proof. See appendix 1. 
If there is a region within [rf , ku] where no firm type plays mass, it results in that entire
region sharing the same Pi(ri) - all return values drawn within that region share the same
probability of being the highest draw, since the next highest return value that any fund
can draw is not within the region where there is no mass. Consequentially, it is possible
to make a profitable deviation by moving mass from the upper edge of this region down
into the massless region while moving some mass elsewhere up, since the downwards
mass movement has no effect on E(Pi(ri)). Crucially, this logic relies on proposition
1.2, the continuity of the played cdfs in [rf , ku]. If there are mass atoms, then it is not
necessarily true that a mass movement from the next highest drawn return downwards
into the massless region results in no effect on E(Pi(ri)).
A direct consequence of this is the following:
Corollary. Pi(ri) is strictly increasing in ri ∈ [rf , ku].
Proposition 1.5. At least one of the firms must have an atom of probability mass at
ri = 0.
Proof. See appendix 1. 
This is an important result that generates some of the key predictions of the model.
It is derived from similar reasoning to that used in proposition 1.3. If neither fund is
playing probability mass at the greatest loss level, then profitable mean preserving mass
movements are possible: if mass is moved from the lowest return level where there is mass
down to zero, there is no negative effect on E(Pi(ri)), since by definition Pi(ri) = 0 at the
lowest return level where there is mass. The decrease in the mean from such a movement
means that there must be a movement of probability mass upwards somewhere else to
preserve the mean, which if picked appropriately will have a positive effect on E(Pi(ri)).
The net result is a strict increase in E(Pi(ri)). These kinds of deviation can be made
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non-profitable if at least one of the two types plays probability mass below return level
rf , since the next lowest return where there is mass will have Pi(ri) > 0. The only place
where it is possible to play mass below rf without violating proposition 1.2 is at zero.
There, the reasoning used in proposition 1.2 does not work since moving a finite amount
of mass upwards by an infinitesimal amount  from ri = 0 does not generate a finite gain
in E(Pi(ri)), since Pi() = 0 still due to firm failure.
Note that this immediately gives one of our key findings: there will always be hedge funds
that play probability mass at the highest possible loss level, ri = 0, which corresponds to
all investments being lost. The next proposition places strong constraints on the forms
of the distributions played, and is probably the most important in determining the key
results of the paper.
Proposition 1.6. Pi(ri) = Zri for ri ∈ [rf , ku], with Z > 0.
Proof. See appendix 1. 
The key point to realise here is that Pi(ri) being linear immediately makes all firms
indifferent to any mean preserving shift in probability mass within [rf , ku]. When this
proposition holds, any mass shift within the aforementioned region results in a linear
change in Pi(ri). Crucially, an innate property of the mean is that any shift in mass also
has a linear effect on it. The result is that when the mass shift is mean preserving (to
keep the type constraints binding), the the effect on Pi(ri) is zero since the linear changes
in Pi(ri) due to the mass movements in opposite directions cancel each other out. The
fact that Pi(ri) is directly proportional to ri (rather than just being linearly related) is
because funds must be indifferent to deviations that involve moving mass between the
mass atom at ri = 0 and the rest of the return distribution. This imposes an additional
condition which pins down Pi(ri) = Zri. Propositions 1.6, 1.5 and 1.1 determine the
form of the equilibria.
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With these key propositions stated, the form of the symmetric pure Nash Equilibria can
now be considered.
1.2.6. Form of Equilibria. It can be immediately seen that the support of both
return distributions must be finite. This stems from the fact that Pi(ri) is a probability,
and must be capped at 1. If Pi(ri) = (βFH(ri) + (1− β)FL(ri))N−1 = Zri, then unless
Z is infinitesimally small, then the support of both FH and FL must be finite.
Assume that the H type plays a return distribution with a support upper bound of kH
and that the L type plays a return distribution with a support upper bound of kL. As
before, let the greatest upper bound of the two different types be ku = max[kH , kL].
From proposition 1.6 and 1.2.7, it must be that for ri ∈ [rf , ku],
(1.2.9) (βFH(ri) + (1− β)FL(ri))N−1 = Zri
And that Pi(ri) must be of the following form:
Pi(ri)

1 ri ∈ [ku,∞)
Zri ri ∈ [rf , ku]
0 ri ∈ [0, rf )
From this we can deduce that if the H type is playing a return cdf of form G(ri), it must
be that the L type plays a cdf of the form of (Zr)
1
N−1
1−β − β1−βG(ri). Similarly, if the L type
is playing a cdf of form G(ri), it must be that the H type plays a return cdf of the form
(Zr)
1
N−1
β
− 1−β
β
G(ri). This result leads to four different cases for pure strategy equilibria,
which are given below. They vary depending on which of the two types plays the more
freely picked return distribution G(ri), and whether ku is equal to kH or kL. Both types
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could be playing mass atoms at ri = 0. Most of these forms are obtained by applying
proposition 1.6 together with 1.2.8.
Case 1. Here, ku = kH , i.e. kH ≥ kL. It is assumed that the L type plays a mass
atom of weight aL at ri = 0 and picks a cumulative density function G(ri) g(ri) for
ri ∈ [rf , kL] with G(rf ) = 0. Thus, FL is given by
FL(ri)

1
G(ri) + aL
aL
aL
ri ∈ [kL, ∞)
ri ∈ [rf , kL]
ri ∈ (0, rf )
ri = 0
To ensure that proposition 1.6 is satisfied, FH must be
(Zri1)
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
FL(ri). Assume
that aH is the mass atom played by the H type at ri = 0.
(1.2.10) FH(ri)

1
(Zri)
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
(Zri)
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
(G(ri) + aL)
aH =
(Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
aL
aH =
(Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
aL
ri ∈ [kH , ∞)
ri ∈ [kL, kH ]
ri ∈ [rf , kL]
ri ∈ (0, rf )
ri = 0
Both of these cdfs are consistent with propositions laid out above. The propositions laid
out previously ensure both types are indifferent to all mean preserving mass movements.
Case 2. Like in the first case, the L type picks a return cdf G and the H type plays
a cdf of the form (Zri1)
1
N−1
β
− 1−β
β
G(ri). However, we now assume that kH ≤ kL. The
forms of the played return cdfs are similar to the previous case, albeit with an alteration
for the L type. Recall that Pi(ri) linearity 1.2.9 is required for all values of ri, which
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in this case is guaranteed for ri ∈ [rf , kH ] due to the functional forms stated above.
However, to ensure this for ri ∈ [kH , kL] where the H type does not play any probability
mass, the L type must play (Zri1)
1
N−1
1−β − β1−β here as a return cdf (since FH = 1 for
ri ∈ [kH , kL]). This time ku = kL, i.e. kL ≥ kH . For the L type:
FL(ri)

1
(Zri)
1
N−1
1−β − β1−β
G(ri) + aL
aL
aL
ri ∈ [kL, ∞)
ri ∈ [kH , kL]
ri ∈ [rf , kH ]
ri ∈ (0, rf )
ri = 0
For the H type:
FH(ri)

1
(Zri)
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
(G(ri) + aL)
aH =
(Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
aL
aH =
(Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
aL
ri ∈ [kH , ∞)
ri ∈ [rf , kH ]
ri ∈ (0, kH)
ri = 0
Case 3. Here, the H type plays a pdf with a mass atom at zero aH and a continuous
density function g(ri) for ri ∈ [rf , rH ]. Thus, the L type must play a cdf of the form
(Zri1)
1
N−1
1−β − β1−βG(ri) to satisfy proposition 1.6. This time, we assume kL ≥ kH , so that
ku = kL. FLis of the form
(Zri1)
1
N−1
1−β − β1−β between ku and kH to satisfy proposition 1.6
because the H type does not play mass there. Let the mass atom at zero played by the
the L type be aL, and finally note that in this case ku = kL, i.e. kL ≥ kH . This gives
the following cdfs:
1.2. THE MODEL 26
FL(ri)

1
(Zri1)
1
N−1
1−β − β1−β
(Zri)
1
N−1
1−β − β1−β (G(ri) + aH)
aL =
(Zrf )
1
N−1
(1−β) − β1−βaH
aL =
(Zrf )
1
N−1
(1−β) − β1−βaH
ri ∈ [kL, ∞)
ri ∈ [kH , kL]
ri ∈ [rf , kH ]
ri ∈ (0, rf )
ri = 0
FH(ri)

1
G(ri) + aH
aH
aH
ri ∈ [kH , ∞)
ri ∈ [rf , kH ]
ri ∈ (0, rf )
ri = 0
Case 4. This is essentially the same as case 3, but with ku = kH , i.e. kH > kL
instead. The notation is the same as in the previous case. The played cdfs are:
FL(ri)

1
(Zri)
1
N−1
1−β − β1−β (G(ri1) + aH)
aL =
(Zrf )
1
N−1
(1−β) − β1−βaH
aL =
(Zrf )
1
N−1
(1−β) − β1−βaH
ri ∈ [kL, ∞)
ri ∈ [rf , kL]
ri ∈ (0, rf )
ri = 0
FH(ri)

1
(Zri)
1
N−1
β
− 1−β
β
G(ri) + aH
aH
aH
ri ∈ [kL, ∞)
ri ∈ [kH , kL]
ri ∈ [rf , kL]
ri ∈ (0, rf )
ri = 0
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Though there are some restrictions on the played distributions (see appendix), this clearly
results in an infinity of equilibria. However, it is still possible to extract some useful
information about the characteristics of the equilibria. Each case gives a set of four
simultaneous equations that must be satisfied. Two of these are obtained by imposing
the ability/type constraints 1.2.5 for the H type and 1.2.6 for the L type, while the
remaining two come from the fact that cumulative probability mass must integrate to 1
for a density function to be a valid pdf. Applying this to the H and L types individually
gives two more equations. There are also a number of continuity conditions between
different return regions to ensure that proposition 1.1 (cdf continuity except at zero)
hold. Despite the four separate cases, some critical features and variables are the same
for all of them:
Proposition 1.7. In all pure symmetric Nash Equilibria, the coefficient Z is given by
(1.2.11) Z =
1
ku
where ku is independent of the distributions played, and is given by the solution of the
equation
(1.2.12) r¯N + (
rNf
ku
)
1
N−1 = ku
where r¯ = βrH +(1−β)rL. It can be shown this equation (1.2.12) has a unique solution
for ku ≥ 0.
Proof. See appendix 1. 
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1.2.7. Comparative Statics of Fund Failure. Recall that from proposition 1.5
that in expectation (before type determination) funds play a mass atom at ri = 0, and
that the firm i fails when they draw a return ri ∈ [0, rf ). In addition, from proposition
1.1, no fund is playing mass in the interval (0, rf ). So, the probability of fund failure
is just the probability that a fund will draw ri = 0, i.e. the size of the mass atom
per firm in expectation before type determination. It is then clear that failure risk is
synonymous with tail risk in the context of this model. Let T denote this probability,
then T = βaH + (1− β)aL. The following can be proved about this probability T , and
is the key result of this paper.
Proposition 1.8. The average amount of mass at ri = 0 played by each fund before
type determination in equilibrium T = βaH + (1− β)aL is invariant of the exact played
distributions, and is given by (Zrf )
1
N−1 . Also, as long as rH > rL > rf , the probability
of fund failure T is increasing in N for all valid numbers of competing firms, i.e. dT
dN
> 0
for N > 2.
Proof. See appendix 1. 
This result implies that the risk of firm failure increases endogenously with the degree of
competition amongst these new hedge funds.
Although these results on comparative statics of N apply to all symmetric equilibria, it
needs to be verified that these symmetric equilibria actually exist. It is impossible to find
these equilibria for certain parameter combinations. This is easily illustrated by a case
where there are two funds, and rf is small compared to r¯. In addition, the H type is
very rare, but has a very high maximum return rH . The formula that determines ku is
mainly dependent on the term 2r¯, so it could give a value that is below rH , making it
impossible to choose a return distribution for the H type that keeps the ability constraint
binding while having a support that has an upper bound less than ku. It is difficult to
find necessary and sufficient conditions on the parameters that ensure the existence of
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these symmetric equilibria for all N ≥ 2. However, the critical comparative static result
on how N affects failure risk is independent of the exact functional forms of FH and
FL, and applies to all symmetric equilibria that might exist. Therefore, it suffices to find
parameter conditions that ensure the existence of equilibria for some functional forms for
all N ≥ 2 and for some rf > 0 (since fund failure is a key issue studied by the model).
This can indeed be shown, and leads to proposition 1.9:
Proposition 1.9. A sufficient parameter condition to guarantee the existence of sym-
metric equilibria of the form analysed for N ≥ 2 is
rf ≥ 2Mr¯ +M2
where
M =
(1− β)(rH − rL)
rH
This condition is not actually as restrictive as one might think. There are four variables
in the inequality: rf , rH , rL and β. Although there are a few restrictions on these
parameters, there is still a large amount of variation possible. We need 0 < rf < rL < rH ,
and β ∈ [0, 1]. Note that M < 1 since the denominator is always greater than the
numerator. Thus it is possible to find parameter values such that rf ≥ 2Mr¯ +M2.The
main way of finding parameters that guarantee equilibria forN ≥ 2 is to find combinations
of rH , rL and β that give small values of M (they definitely need to be less than 12).
M is just a product of the proportional difference between rH and rL, and the fraction
of funds that are of theL type. It is consistent with the example of a set of parameter
conditions with no symmetric equilibria given earlier: in that scenario, both (1− β) and
rH−rL
rH
were close to one. When the condition is not satisfied, either ku < rH , forcing
negative probability mass for the H type at zero and thus
´ ku
rf
fH(r)dr > 1 greater than
to make
´ ku
0
rfH(r)dr = rH , or rL is so low compared to rH that the L type must play
a mass atom CL >
(Zrf )
1
N−1
(1−β) to allow the L type to play probability mass up to ku. This
1.2. THE MODEL 30
also forces negative mass from the H type to keep the total expected probability mass
at zero equal to (Zrf )
1
N−1 .
.Fortunately, in reality, rH−rL
rH
is not very large. A very optimistic estimate for the returns
of the best managers is 1.4 (an incredible 40% interest rate), while low skill funds might
make slightly more than the risk free rate, say 1.05 or so. This tends to make M small,
even when H type funds are rare. In addition, rf tends to be surprisingly high in reality:
not only does this represent a failure threshold, but it can also be interpreted as being
related to an outside option for both the fund managers and investors. Thus, rf might
be close to the risk free rate, and is almost certainly close to 1. In these kinds of
conditions, there are actually no restrictions on the value of β, as long as it is a valid
probability - 2Mr¯ + M2 tends to a maximum of value around 0.5875 (when β tends
to zero) with rL = 1.05, rH = 1.4, which is considerably below a sensible value of rf
(around one). Thus, the conditions that ensure existence of equilibria for N ≥ 2 and
thus the conditions on the validity of comparative statics are not very restrictive. There
are plenty of examples of parameter values where proposition 1.9 holds. An example is
β = 0.25, rL = 1.05, rH = 1.2. With these values, rf ≥ 0.213 is sufficient to satisfy the
condition in proposition 1.9.
In addition, it is possible to show the following:
Proposition 1.10. For every value of the parameters that satisfy 0 < rf < rL < rH ,
there exists a sufficiently large value of N where equilibria exist.
Proof. See appendix 1. 
This means that even for extreme values of parameters where say, r¯ is much larger than
rf and rL, and β is also small, the comparative statics are still valid to some extent
since symmetric equilibria above a certain threshold for N will always exist, making the
increase of tail risk with the level of competition a meaningful result still. This is because
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ku increases almost linearly with N , and a large enough ku ensures it is possible to find
a valid pair fH and fLof the form used to prove proposition 1.9.
1.3. Discussion
1.3.1. Discussion of Results and a Trivial Policy Implication. As one might
expect, the high degree of freedom in picking return distributions for both types leads
to a vast number of possible equilibria. Despite this, the model produces the consistent
prediction that ex-ante firm failure risk increases with the number of competing firms
under some fairly mild assumptions: it is not unreasonable to assume that the returns
of low and high ability managers are both above the failure threshold. The intuition for
this result is that as the number of competitors increases, it becomes less and less likely
for a fund drawing a given return ri to be the highest performing fund in its peer group.
As N rises, there are more and more other funds that must be outdrawn by ri to win
the reputational reward. Essentially, increasing N increases the curvature of P , making
it increasingly convex in ri for a given pair of H and L type return distributions. This
generates incentives for funds to shift more probability mass to higher ri values, and
the only way this is possible while staying within the ability constraint is to move some
probability mass down to lower ri values, with the most efficient way of doing so being to
move mass from low values of ri to zero. Consequently, as competition increases, firms
are incentivised to play distributions with high failure risk and more mass at very high
values of ri. The introduction of more competing funds makes it increasingly difficult to
stand out as a strong performer, and this creates incentives to use financial engineering
to give a chance of generating exceptional returns at the cost of a significant chance of
firm failure.
Clearly, part of what is driving this is the extreme assumption that a new fund only gains
a benefit when it outperforms all its competitors, i.e. the probability of winning the
award α is tied to the Nth order statistic. This ensures that the addition of more firms
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makes P more convex, i.e. it increases more rapidly at higher values of r. However,
the result is more robust than it appears. Even if funds benefit from being in the top
performing M out of N funds rather than only from being the fund with the highest
return draw, the addition of competitors will still make P more convex for any given
played return distributions. This is because P in that case will depend on the sum of a
few order statistics, which are all become more convex as N rises. Thus, extending the
reward for high performance to the top few funds will generate the same incentives to
move probability mass upwards to high values of r at the cost of playing tail risk.
In the light of the mechanism described above, it is important to think about how
financial complexity affects the result. Recall that financial complexity is proxied in the
model by the immense freedom the funds have to change their return distribution. The
reasoning presented in the previous two paragraphs can be applied without complete
freedom to alter return distributions: consider the case when funds have control over
the mean and variance of the return distributions, but not their exact shape, which is
constrained by being in a certain family of distributions. N increasing will still raise the
convexity of the P function, and thus will still generate incentives to raise the variance of
returns. So, this result probably does not require the complete flexibility to engineer return
distributions they have here, but the funds certainly need some power to change their
return distribution shapes, since they must be able to shift probability mass to respond
to these incentives. What the complete flexibility to engineer return distributions does do
is ensure that all funds can increase variance while preserving return mean without limit,
which is impossible with some functional forms. It is also responsible for firms playing a
point mass at the r = 0, the maximum loss level allowed by limited liability, and gives
strong results about firm failure/tail risk. It allows funds to make the most efficient
mean preserving mass movements that raise E(Pi(r)), since moving mass to r = 0
gives the smallest amount of mass that has to be moved downwards to compensate a
given upwards mass movement elsewhere. In that sense, the effect of having almost
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total power to manipulate return distributions is somewhat ambiguous. It may actually
decrease failure risk for some functional forms, since in some special cases the loss of
the power to move probability mass to exactly r = 0 may cause funds to end up moving
more mass downwards into the failure region for every upwards mass movement.
A fairly trivial policy implication comes from the discussion on the effect of the power to
shape return distributions. It is clear that in the extreme case of all power to manipulate
return distributions being removed, it becomes impossible for funds of either type to
respond to the incentive to increase the spread and variance as competition increases.
This indicates that restrictions on the ability to alter return distributions can remove the
increase in failure risk with competition. One way of introducing these restrictions is
to introduce a cost for shifting probability mass from its initial location. If sufficiently
high, this will cause there to be no failure risk in equilibrium, since it is expensive to
create return distributions that with large amounts of mass at low r unless the initial
return distribution already has large amounts of mass in those regions already. The policy
interpretation of this is that restricting the use of complex instruments lowers failure risk,
making it difficult or costly to respond to the incentive to play more risky distributions as
competition increases. In a way however, the assumption of costly distribution alteration
somewhat forces the above conclusions.
This model is missing some features such as risk aversion or an explicit penalty for firm
failure. Adding these certainly makes the results weaker, with failure risk no longer
monotonically increasing in number of competing firms when there is a continuation
payoff if a fund does not fail. The results are weakened by the addition of these features,
since in both cases there will be a trade off to moving probability mass to below the
failure threshold in order to move some other mass upwards in pursuit of high relative
performance. The mechanisms that generate the increase in failure rate still exist if risk
aversion or continuation payoffs are considered, however.
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1.3.2. Limitations and Extensions. The assumptions used in this paper are quite
extreme: return manipulation using complex financial products is costless, and these
instruments serve no other purpose. In reality, skilful use of derivatives and other products
can be the source of the higher ability funds’ higher returns. As such, this paper only
looks at incentives to manipulate return distributions when faced with competition, and
does not capture the dependence of returns on the use of these complex securities in
the first place. On a related note, another criticism is that in reality leverage is a vital
part of the operation of hedge funds. Increasing leverage generally increases expected
return at the cost of increased downside risk. Due to the ability constraint limiting the
mean, it is difficult to see a return manipulation that is equivalent to increasing leverage.
This is the trade off for using this particular setting to bypass the complexity and variety
of hedge funds. An extension would therefore be to create a similar model but without
mean constraints. The issue then is that it is unclear how to distinguish between high
ability and low ability funds, although a differential cost of return distribution changing
may be one way of doing this.
Assuming that benefits go only to the firm with the highest return is in some sense
dubious. If a new hedge fund attains the highest return out of all its competitors,
the benefit that it obtains should be some sort of reputational boost. However, hedge
funds are assumed to have sophisticated investors rather than people who will always be
naively attracted to investing in the apparently highest performing new hedge fund. In
the context of the model, the main benefit to an investor of knowing fund performance is
as a signal of fund type. They would like to maximise the probability of selecting a fund
with a high ability manager to invest in. It follows that a reasonable extension of the
model is to evaluate the Bayesian probability of each fund being a H type, and to give
a reputational boost to the fund with the highest probability of being a H type. This is
done in the next chapter, and alleviates some of the concerns about the implied naivety of
investor behaviour in this model, as well as making the framing and interpretation more
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like a signalling game where firms are trying to deceive a rational investor of their skill.
This is more like the scenario described in Foster and Young (2010). The main results
of this paper mostly carry over in a slightly weakened form - there are some additional
restrictions on played distributions, and there are a class of equilibria with probability
mass atoms above the failure threshold the results in this paper do not necessarily apply
to.
Finally, a very interesting feature to investigate would be if there are any general results
in this setting on the effect of more financial complexity. This particular paper makes
the assumption of complete freedom to manipulate return distributions within ability
constraints, which is a scenario corresponding to an unrealistically high level of financial
engineering power. It would clearly be interesting to consider how risk taking and failure
rate behaves at a lower level of financial engineering power, and it would be even more
interesting to see if there are any general results on how varying the power of financial
engineering and complexity affects risk taking and failure rates. The issue is that in this
distribution picking environment, it is difficult to quantify the level of financial freedom
and complexity without introducing a cost to shifting probability mass, which produces
the fairly obvious result discussed in the policy implication. It may be better to start by
finding a result on risk taking and failure rate in this setting (new hedge funds) that is
unique to the scenario where funds are assumed to have maximum financial engineering
power, but does not apply when financial engineering power is restricted.
1.4. Conclusions
To sum up, this paper formalises the problem of new hedge funds of differing but unknown
ability levels competing to achieve strong relative performance in an attempt to improve
their reputation. They key features of the model are limited return sampling and a high
degree of power to manipulate return distributions, subject to ability constraints. The
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problem is formulated in a way that bypasses the need to explicitly model the money-
making strategies of the funds themselves, since doing so is problematic due to the
enormous variety of money-making strategies hedge funds employ.
Despite the wide variety of return distributions that can be played in equilibrium, this
paper predicts that each firm in expectation (before type is decided) will play some
probability mass at the worst possible return level (all initial investment lost due to
limited liability), which can be interpreted as tail risk and fund failure failure rate. This is
somewhat consistent with empirical evidence (Agarwal (2004), Fung and Hsieh, (2006)).
The model also predicts that fund failure risk or tail risk will increase with the number of
competitors under some mild assumptions, and is thus detrimental to financial stability
given the proportion of young hedge funds in the industry. This is because an increase
in the number of competitors makes it more difficult for a fund to outperform all of
them without using a return distribution that has the possibility of generating a very high
return. Given that ability constrains the expected return for the funds, the only way to
do that is to use financial engineering to balance out the high returns with tail risk. The
ability to use complex financial products to manipulate return distributions is required for
the result to some extent, since funds need the ability to change their return distribution
in response to the incentive to increase the probability of drawing a high return at the
cost of increased tail risk.
These incentives to increase failure risk/tail risk identified by this paper will exist as long
as new hedge funds are strongly rewarded for getting the top few highest returns amongst
their peers, and have the power to alter their return distributions in response to a change
in the number of competing firms. These identified incentives still persist even if features
like risk aversion and a continuation payoff for non-failure are added. Trivially, a policy
implication of this model is that a strong enough cost on return manipulation will remove
failure risk and tail risk.
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Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1.1. Assume that at least one of the fund types has some
probability mass δ in this interval in equilibrium, and that the fund i is of this type. The
contribution to E(Pi(ri)) from this probability mass is zero, since if the return draw ri
lands in (0, rf ), then Pi(ri) = 0 due to the return being below the failure threshold rf .
Any equilibrium distribution must have 1.2.5 and 1.2.6 binding. Consider an unilateral
deviation by fund i. It is always possible to move some of this mass in (0, rf ), say , up
to a r′ > rf for which Pi(r′) > 0, while also moving δ −  down to ri = 0. This shift
preserves total probability mass, and can always be made mean preserving by picking 
appropriately. Thus, this still satisfies 1.2.5 for the H type and 1.2.6 for the L type.
Given that at least one of the types is playing some probability mass in (0, rf ), moving
this mass  up to just rf makes the contribution to E(Pi(ri)) from this mass strictly
positive, since drawing rf can result in an investor pick if all the other funds are drawn
as the same type as i, and all draw a return in (0, rf ). So, a suitable r′ is any r ≥ rf .
The movement of the rest of the mass δ −  down to ri = 0 has no negative effect on
E(Pi(ri)), since Pi(0) = 0, the same as for any ri in the interval [0, rf ). Therefore, the
total contribution to E(Pi(ri)) from this mass δ is now strictly greater than zero, and
this deviation is strictly profitable for firm i, since E(Pi(ri)) has increased, while E(ri)
has remained constant. Hence any distribution with mass in (0, rf ) cannot be played in
equilibrium, since it is not profit maximising.
Proof of Proposition 1.2. Assume one of the types is playing a return cdf that is
discontinuous, with an atom of probability mass, say u, at r∗, where r∗ ≥ rf . Assume
that firm i is of this type. There will be a finite probability that some of the other N − 1
firms will be of the same type. In the event that a draw of r∗is made, it follows that
there is a finite probability that some other firms will also draw r∗. In such a case, if
r∗ is the highest drawn return, the winning fund is picked at random from the funds
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that draw r∗, meaning that fund i will be only be picked in a fraction, say 1
q
, of these
scenarios, which is a finite probability still. Consider a deviation in which firm i moves
u − δ of the mass at r∗ up to r∗ + , where  is arbitrarily small, while moving δ of it
down to ri = 0 so that E(ri) is preserved. Now, when fund i draws r∗ + , in the case
when the next highest draw is r∗ (occurs with some finite probability), firm i wins all
the time rather than merely 1
q
of the time, a finite increase in E(Pi(ri)). Given that  is
arbitrarily small, the amount of mass moved down, δ is also arbitrarily small. Thus, the
decrease in E(Pi(ri)) from moving δ down ri = 0 is infinitesimally small, while the gain
from moving u− δ up to r∗ +  is finite. There is therefore a net increase in E(Pi(ri)),
and the deviation is profitable. Thus, there can be no atoms of probability mass for
ri ≥ rf . Thus, in equilibrium, neither firm type can have atoms of probability mass in
ri ∈ [rf , ∞)
Proof of Proposition 1.4. Assume that there is a region, say ri ∈ (u1, u2) within
[rf , ku] where neither type is playing any probability mass. By propositions 1.2 and 1.3,
it follows that Pi(u1) = Pi(u2), since if there is no probability mass played from either
of the types and there are no discontinuities in FL or FH , FL(u1) = FL(u2) and likewise
FH(u1) = FH(u2). Consider a deviation of the following form: moving mass δ from a
small region around u2 down to a small region around u1, while moving mass  from a
small region around a location where there is mass x to a small region around a location
y > x. Recall again that we require the type constraints 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 to be binding
for any equilibrium to be optimal. This implies that the above variables must be picked
to preserve the mean return, and thus to first order:
(y − x) = δ(u2 − u1)
This becomes exact as the regions we move mass from become very small, and implies
that if  is positive, so must δ. To deduce whether this deviation is profitable or not,
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consider its impact on E(Pi(ri)), which is −δPi(u2) + δPi(u1) − Pi(x) + Pi(y) for
mass movements between very small regions. Since Pi(u1) = Pi(u2)i, the effect actually
becomes
(Pi(y)− Pi(x))
Given that Pi(ri) is an increasing function from proposition 1.3, Pi(y) ≥ Pi(x). As long
as x < ku, it is always possible to find a y for which y > x and Pi(y) > Pi(x). Thus,
this deviation is always profitable for either type, giving individual incentives to deviate
for all firms. Thus, choices of return distribution with no mass from either type in regions
ri ∈ [rf , ku] cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1.5. This is an extension of the reasoning used to prove
proposition 1.4. To satisfy proposition 1.4, at least one of the two types must be playing
mass at ri = rf . Consider the case when neither of the two types plays mass at ri = 0,
and a deviation by firms that are playing mass at ri = rf . Mass δ from the region around
ri = rf is moved down to ri = 0, and to preserve the mean so that the type constraints
bind, mass  is moved from a region x ≥ rf to a region y > x. Given that Pi(ri) is
continuous and strictly increasing in ri ∈ [rf , ku] from proposition 1.2 and the corollary
of proposition 1.4, it is always possible to find a x and y such that Pi(x) < Pi(y). Mean
preservation requires:
(y − x) = δ(rf )
The change in E(Pi(ri)) is (Pi(y) − Pi(x)) − δ(Pi(rf ) + Pi(0)). Crucially, no firm is
playing any mass at Pi(ri) = 0, and by proposition 1.1, no firm is playing any mass in
(0, rf ) either. In addition, there can be no mass atom at ri = rf . All of this implies
that Pi(rf ) = 0, so that the effect on E(Pi(ri)) becomes
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(Pi(y)− Pi(x)) > 0
Due to Pi(x) < Pi(y). Thus it follows that this type of deviation is always profitable if no
firms are playing probability mass at ri, and so these cannot be Nash Equilibria. In fact,
by the reasoning above, any distributions where Pi(rf ) = 0 cannot be Nash Equilibria.
Thus, at least one of the fund types must be playing mass below rf , so that Pi(rf ) > 0.
The only way this is possible without contradicting proposition 1.1 is for at least one firm
type to play an atom at ri = 0, where the reasoning used to prove proposition 1.2 does
not hold. In that proof, we considered a deviation where a mass movement upwards from
a mass atom from ri = 0 (in this case) to ri =  where  is infinitesimally small generates
a finite increase in E(Pi(ri)). This kind of deviation can never increase E(Pi(ri)) since
it would violate proposition 1.1, and firm failure means that Pi(0) = Pi() = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.6. For the distributions over ri played by the two fund
types to be an equilibrium, there must be no mean preserving shift in probability mass
that will result in an increase in E(Pi(ri)). Consider shifting the probability mass of either
of the two types. As stated, such a shift must be mean preserving to keep constraints
1.2.5 and 1.2.6 binding. There are two types of mean preserving deviation to consider:
one that involves moving mass around in the interval [rf , ku], and another type where
mass can be moved to and from ri = 0.
Let us examine the case of a general unilateral deviation in return distribution by firm i
where mass is moved around only in the interval [rf , ku]. If we move probability mass 
from a very small region around ri = x ≥ rf where there is probability mass, to a small
region around ri = x +4x ≤ ku, with 4x > 0. The resulting shift in E(ri) will be
equal to 4x, a strict increase in E(ri). Although this is first order, the assumption of
moving mass from a very small region around x to a very small region around x +4x
means that this is correct. Likewise, consider the effect of this shift on E(Pi(ri)), which
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will be Pi(x+4x)− Pi(x) to first order. To ensure mean preservation, mass δ must
be shifted from a point ri = y + 4y ≥ rf , where there is probability mass, down to
ri = y, with 4y > 0. This shift has an impact −δ4y on E(ri), and an effect of
δPi(y)− δPi(y +4y) on E(Pi(ri)). The mean preservation condition thus requires the
net effect of the two shifts in probability mass on E(ri) to be zero, which gives
(1.4.1) 4x = δ4y
For the deviation to be profitable, we require that the net impact on E(Pi(ri)) be positive.
This condition gives
(Pi(x+4x)− Pi(x)) > δ(Pi(y +4y)− Pi(y))
If we substitute in 1.4.1, we get
(1.4.2)
Pi(x+4x)− Pi(x)
4x >
Pi(y +4y)− Pi(y)
4y
This is an important condition. Consider the case when 4x and 4y tend to 0. From
proposition 1.1, Pi(ri) must be continuous in [rf , ku]. No atoms of probability mass
means that there are no discontinuities in FH and FL. 1.4.2 then becomes approximately
(1.4.3)
dPi
dri
|ri=x>
dPi
dri
|ri=y
Now assume that Pi(ri) is nonlinear. It must be continuous from proposition 1.2. Given
proposition 1.4 and continuity, both fund types must play probability mass in some
intervals above 0 so that 1.2.5 and 1.2.6 are met (type restrictions binding). Thus, in
regions where at least one of the two fund types is playing probability mass, the fund that
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is playing mass there can always find a x and y (recall that there must be probability mass
in these two locations) such that 1.4.3 is true, due to non-linearity implying that dPi
dri
is
not constant. Thus this contradicts the equilibrium condition that no unilateral profitable
deviations must be possible. It follows that dPi
dri
must be constant in regions where at
least one of the types is playing probability mass, and dPi
dri1
constant implies that Pi(ri) is
linear there, i.e. of the form Zri+c. This is a sufficient condition for all mean preserving
mass movements to be non profitable, since any mass movement can be broken down
into these infinitesimal mass movements. If there is indifference to any infinitesimal mean
preserving mass movement within [rf , ku], then there will be indifference to any mean
preserving mass movement within that range. This gives a partial result:
Lemma 1.1. In any Equilibrium, Pi(ri) = Zri + c for ri ∈ [rf , ku]
We can eliminate the need to consider deviations where firms move mass to ri > ku.
This is helpful in the next step. The linear form of Pi(ri) implies that the only case that
needs (due to the indifference to any mean preserving shift within 0 ≤ ri ≤ kupper and
the fact that other cases can be broken down into a shift of mass up to ku and a shift of
that mass beyond ku) to be checked is the case where mass is moved by a type from ku to
a r′ > kuabove it. Since Pi(ku) = Pi(r′) = 1 by proposition 1.3 and the definition of ku,
the movement of mass upwards has no positive effect on E(Pi(ri)), while a movement of
mass downwards somewhere else is required to preserve the mean. The downwards shift
always results in a negative effect on E(Pi(ri)), given the form of Pi(ri). This means
such deviations always have a net negative effect on E(Pi(ri)), which means that can
never be profitable, and thus deviations where mass is moved to ri > ku can be ignored.
Thus we can state
Lemma 1.2. Deviations where mass is moved to ri > ku can never be profitable, and
therefore can be ignored.
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Finally, we need to consider deviations where mass can be moved to and from ri = 0,
due to proposition 1.5. If at least one of the two firm types is playing mass at ri = 0,
then all types must be indifferent to a mean preserving mass shift to or from the atom
at ri = 0. We only need to consider a deviation where mass  is moved up from ri = 0
to r∗ ∈ [rf , ku] by lemma 1.2. To preserve the mean, mass δ must be moved down from
x ≥ rf to y < x. There are two cases here. Firstly, if y ≥ rf , mean preservation gives
r∗ = δ(x− y)
and the requirement for the fund to be indifferent to the deviation (net effect on
E(Pi(ri)) = 0) gives
(Pi(r
∗)− Pi(0)) = δ(Pi(x)− Pi(y))
Substituting in the mean preservation condition, Pi(ri) = Zri1 + c from lemma 1 and
Pi(0) = 0 gives
(1.4.4) c = 0
This is the the only value of c that will make funds indifferent to this deviation type for
general values of r∗, x and y. Secondly, consider the case when y < rf . By proposition
1.1, the only value y can take is 0. In that case, the mean preservation condition gives
r∗ = δx
while the requirement for fund indifference gives
(Pi(r
∗)− Pi(0)) = δ(Pi(x)− Pi(0))
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Once again, subbing in the mean preservation condition, Pi(ri) = Zri + c and Pi(0) = 0
gives
cx = cr∗
c = 0 makes this true for general x and r∗, and is thus a consistent condition on Pi(r1).
The conditions for indifference to deviations that involve moving mass down to ri = 0
from elsewhere are identical, since all one has to is to change the sign of both the mass
movements  and δ. These give exactly the same equations as above, and so c = 0
generates indifferences to all mass movements to and from ri = 0. So, this together with
lemma 1.1 gives the result we sought.
Proof of Proposition 1.7. The strategy to prove this is simply to go through the
cases one by one and solve the equations that determine some of the characteristics of
equilibrium.
Case 1. The cdfs played are:
FL(ri)

1
G(ri) + aL
aL
aL
ri ∈ [kL, ∞)
ri ∈ [rf , kL]
ri ∈ (0, rf )
ri = 0
FH(ri) +

1
(Zri)
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
(Zri)
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
(G(ri) + aL)
(Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
aL
(Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
aL
ri ∈ [kH , ∞)
ri ∈ [kL, kH ]
ri ∈ [rf , kL]
ri ∈ (0, rf )
ri = 0
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To close the solution, we need to ensure that total probability mass in both these two
distributions sum to 1, and that the type constraints are binding. This gives the following
equations:
For the L type:
(1.4.5) aL +G(kL) = 1
(1.4.6)
kLˆ
rf
rg(r)dr = rL
Where g = dG
dri
. For the H type:
(1.4.7)
(ZkH)
1
N−1
β
− 1− β
β
= 1
(1.4.8)
kHˆ
rf
r
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
β(N − 1) dr −
(1− β)
β
kLˆ
rf
rg(r)dr = rH
Using 1.4.7 gives
Z =
1
kH
=
1
ku
This previous result together with 1.4.6 and 1.4.8, allows us to deduce that
r¯N = kH − (
rNf
kH
)
1
N−1
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This equation, although not solvable analytically in the general case, will give upper
bound of the H type support and by extension the coefficient Z. Some conditions on G
must be imposed to ensure that FL and FH are valid cdfs - the pdf must be greater or
equal to zero everywhere for both the L and H types. For the L type:
g(ri) ≥ 0 for ri ∈ [rf , kL]
aL ≥ 0
Likewise, FH must be a valid cdf:
Z
(Zri)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1) − (1− β)g(ri) ≥ 0 for ri ∈ [rf , kL]
(Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1− β)
β
aL ≥ 0
fH =
dFH
dri
≥ 0 elsewhere already since Z (Zri)
1
N−1−1
(N−1) ≥ 0.
Case 2. The cdfs played are:
FL(ri)

1
(Zri)
1
N−1
1−β − β1−β
G(ri) + aL
aL
aL
ri ∈ [kL, ∞)
ri ∈ [kH , kL]
ri ∈ [rf , kH ]
ri ∈ (0, rf )
ri = 0
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FH(ri)

1
(Zri)
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
(G(ri) + aL)
(Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
aL
(Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
aL
ri ∈ [kH , ∞)
ri ∈ [rf , kH ]
ri ∈ (0, kH)
ri = 0
The same logic applies as before, total probability mass must sum to 1, cdfs must be
continuous, and the type (mean) constraints must bind, giving the following equations
that must hold. For the L type:
(1.4.9)
(ZkL)
1
N−1
1− β −
β
1− β = 1
(1.4.10)
kLˆ
rf
rg(r)dr +
kHˆ
kL
r
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
(1− β)(N − 1) = rL
(1.4.11) G(kH) + aL =
(ZkH)
1
N−1
1− β −
β
1− β
The first two are the probability mass and type constraints, while the the last equation
is cdf continuity constraint.
(1.4.12)
(ZkH)
1
N−1
β
− 1− β
β
(G(kH) + aL) = 1
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(1.4.13)
ˆ kH
rf
r
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
β(N − 1) dr −
(1− β)
β
kHˆ
rf
rg(r)dr = rH
1.4.9 immediately gives
Z =
1
kL
=
1
ku
Using this together with 1.4.10 and 1.4.13, we can deduce that
r¯N = kL − (
rNf
kL
)
1
N−1
There are a few conditions that must be applied to ensure that FH and FL are valid cdfs.
For the L type:
g(ri) ≥ 0 for ri ∈ [rf , kL]
aL ≥ 0
For the H type:
Z
(Zri)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1) − (1− β)g(ri) ≥ 0 for ri ∈ [rf , kL]
(Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1− β)
β
aL ≥ 0
Case 3. The cdfs played are:
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FL(ri)

1
(Zri)
1
N−1
1−β − β1−β
(Zri)
1
N−1
1−β − β1−β (G(ri) + aH)
(Zrf )
1
N−1
(1−β) − β1−βaH
(Zrf )
1
N−1
(1−β) − β1−βaH
ri1 ∈ [kL, ∞)
ri1 ∈ [kH , kL]
ri1 ∈ [rf , kH ]
ri1 ∈ (0, rf )
ri1 = 0
FH(ri)

1
G(ri) + aH
aH
aH
ri1 ∈ [kH , ∞)
ri1 ∈ [rf , kH ]
ri1 ∈ (0, rf )
ri1 = 0
Again, we require cdf continuity, total probability mass summing to 1, and the type
constraints to be binding. This gives the following equations. For the L type:
(1.4.14)
(ZkL)
1
N−1
1− β −
β
1− β = 1
(1.4.15)
kLˆ
rf
r
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
(1− β)(N − 1)dr −
β
1− β
kHˆ
rf
rg(r)dr = rL
For the H type:
(1.4.16) G(kH) + aH = 1
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(1.4.17)
kHˆ
rf
rg(r)dr = rH
Solving for critical variables is done using identical methods to the ones used previously.
1.4.14 immediately gives
Z =
1
kL
= ku
And this result together with 1.4.17 and 1.4.15 gives
r¯N = kL − (
rNf
kL
)
1
N−1
As before, there are restrictions that must placed on G to ensure that FH and FL are
valid probability distributions:
g(ri) ≥ 0 for ri ∈ [rf , kH ]
aH ≥ 0
and
Z
(Zri)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1) − βg(ri) ≥ 0 for ri ∈ [rf , kH ]
(Zrf )
1
N−1
(1− β) −
β
1− βaH ≥ 0
Case 4. The cdfs played are:
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FL(ri)

1
(Zri)
1
N−1
1−β − β1−β (G(ri) + aH)
(Zrf )
1
N−1
(1−β) − β1−βaH
(Zrf )
1
N−1
(1−β) − β1−βaH
ri ∈ [kL, ∞)
ri ∈ [rf , kL]
ri ∈ (0, rf )
ri = 0
FH(ri)

1
(Zri)
1
N−1
β
− 1−β
β
G(ri) + aH
aH
aH
ri ∈ [kL, ∞)
ri ∈ [kH , kL]
ri ∈ [rf , kL]
ri ∈ (0, rf )
ri = 0
As before, cdf continuity, probability mass summing to 1, and binding type constraints
give for the L type:
(1.4.18)
(ZkL)
1
N−1
1− β −
β
1− β (G(kL) + aH) = 1
(1.4.19)
ˆ kL
rf
r
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
(1− β)(N − 1)dr −
β
1− β
kLˆ
rf
rg(r)dr = rL
And for the H type:
(1.4.20)
(ZkH)
1
N−1
β
− 1− β
β
= 1
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(1.4.21)
kLˆ
rf
rg(r)dr +
kHˆ
kL
r
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
β(N − 1) dr = rH
(1.4.22) G(kL) + aH =
(ZkL)
1
N−1
β
− 1− β
β
As before, 1.4.20 implies that
Z =
1
kH
=
1
ku
And this with 1.4.21 and 1.4.19 once more give
r¯N = kH − (
rNf
kH
)
1
N−1
As before, there are restrictions that must placed on G to ensure that FH and FL are
valid probability distributions:
g(ri) ≥ 0 for ri ∈ [rf , kL]
aH ≥ 0
and
Z
(Zri)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1) − βg(ri) ≥ 0 for ri ∈ [rf , kL]
(Zrf )
1
N−1
(1− β) −
β
1− βaH ≥ 0
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In every one of these four cases, it is apparent that Z = 1
ku
, and also r¯N = ku−( r
N
f
ku
)
1
N−1 ,
which is what the proposition states.
We also need to prove that the equation r¯N + (
rNf
ku
)
1
N−1 = ku has a unique solution in
the region ku ≥ 0. Rearrange it into the form
r¯N = ku − (
rNf
ku
)
1
N−1
The solution to the equation is thus when the function ku−( r
N
f
ku
)
1
N−1 crosses the horizontal
line r¯N . It is clear that when ku ≥ 0, ku − ( r
N
f
ku
)
1
N−1 is strictly increasing in ku. Thus, it
will cross r¯N once only. For there to be a unique solution in the region ku ≥ 0, it only
needs to be verified that ku − ( r
N
f
ku
)
1
N−1 begins below r¯N at ku = 0. It is clear that for
any finite N , ku − ( r
N
f
ku
)
1
N−1 → −∞ as ku → 0. This is clearly below r¯N , which has
a lower bound of 2r¯ > 0. Thus, there will always be a unique, positive solution to this
equation for N ≥ 2.
Proof of Proposition 1.8. Denote the failure probability as T . From proposition
1.1, no fund will play any probability mass in the interval (0, rf ), and before type is
drawn, each firm will play a mass atom at ri = 0 in expectation. Thus, the only way a
firm will fail is if it draws ri = 0. In expectation (before type is drawn), this probability,
and thus the failure probability is equal to
T = βaH + (1− β)aL
Where aH and aL are the mass atoms played at zero by the H and L types respectively.
From the results obtained during the proof of proposition 1.7, we can calculate this on
a case by case basis, which gives βaH + (1− β)aL = (Zrf ) 1N−1 in every one of the four
cases examined there. Proposition 1.7 also finds that Z is a function of ku, and that ku
in turn depends only on the base parameters of the model. This immediately implies that
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βaH + (1− β)aL is independent of the shape of the played distributions in equilibrium.
Thus,
T = (Zrf )
1
N−1
Recall that
Z =
1
ku
(1.4.23) r¯N + (
rNf
ku
)
1
N−1 = ku
We can use these to write
T =
ku − r¯N
rf
To analyse how firm failure probability responds to N , the number of competing firms,
we can evaluate dT
dN
. By using implicit differentiation to find dku
dN
, it is possible to arrive
at the following expression for dT
dN
:
dT
dN
= (
rf
ku
)
1
N−1

(ln ku−ln rf )
(N−1)2 − r¯ 1ku(N−1)
1 +
r
1+ 1
N−1
f
(N−1)k1+
1
N−1
u

From this, it is straightforward to show that the conditions for dT
dN
> 0 are:
(1.4.24)
ku
r¯
ln
(
ku
rf
)
> N − 1
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Given equation 1.4.23 and that rf > 0 and ku > 0, it is clear that ku > r¯N . It follows
that
ku
r¯
ln
(
ku
rf
)
> N ln
(
r¯N
rf
)
since ku
r¯
ln
(
ku
rf
)
is increasing in ku. Thus if we can show that
N ln
(
r¯N
rf
)
> N − 1
Then 1.4.24 holds too. Consider the conditions required for N ln
(
r¯N
rf
)
> N − 1. It can
be shown that the both sides of this inequality increase with N , and also that the LHS
of this inequality increases more quickly with N than the RHS. Thus, we only need to
consider N = 2, the smallest possible value for N . This gives
2 ln
(
2r¯
rf
)
> 1
We can immediately see that if both rH > rf and rL > rf , then r¯ > rf , and this
inequality holds. Consequently, rH > rf and rL > rf implies that
ku
r¯
ln
(
ku
rf
)
> N ln
(
r¯N
rf
)
> N − 1 for all N ≥ 2 and thus that dT
dN
> 0 for all valid
numbers of competing firms.
Proof of Proposition 1.9. Consider the equations that specify equilibrium pairs
of distributions fL and fH in proposition 1.7. If fL is a valid pdf, has no mass in the
interval (0, rf ) and causes the L ability constraint to be binding, then the choice of Z
and kuwill ensure that the mass and ability constraint conditions are satisfied for the H
type. We just need to check that FH is a valid cdf, i.e. fH ≥ 0 for all ri. Since the
comparative static results over N are independent of the functional forms of the return
distributions, it suffices to show that there exists a functional form for which equilibria
exist for all N ≥ 2 and for some rf > 0.
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A convenient functional form for FL is:
FL(r)

1 r ∈ [ku, ∞)
A(Zr)
1
N−1 − A(Zrf ) 1N−1 + CL r ∈ [rf , ku)
CL r ∈ [0, rf )
Where A and CL are constants to be determined such that the ability constraint is
binding and total probability mass integrates to 1:
FL(ku) = 1
ˆ ku
0
rfL(r)dr = rL
Substituting the functional form in gives the two following equations:
(1.4.25) 1− CL = AZ 1N−1 (k
1
N−1
u − r
1
N−1
f )
(1.4.26) AZ
1
N−1 (k
1
N−1+1
u − r
1
N−1+1
f ) = NrL
Dividing the two gives an expression for 1− CL:
1− CL =
rLN(k
1
N−1
u − r
1
N−1
f )
(k
1
N−1+1
u − r
1
N−1+1
f )
And
A =
1− CL
Z
1
N−1 (k
1
N−1
u − r
1
N−1
f )
Substituting the expression for 1− CL gives:
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A =
rLN
Z
1
N−1 (k
1
N−1+1
u − r
1
N−1+1
f )
This can be greatly simplified by recalling that Z = 1
ku
⇒ (Zku) 1N−1 = 1, and using
ku = r¯N + rf (
rf
ku
)
1
N−1 = r¯N + rf (Zrf )
1
N−1 . This gives
(1.4.27) A =
rL
r¯
We can double check that FL is a valid cdf. Clearly the density for r > 0 is always
positive. It just needs to verified that 1 ≤ CL ≤ 0. Subbing in equation1.4.27 into
equation 1.4.25 and using equation 3.2.11 gives
1− CL = rL
r¯k
1
N−1
u
(k
1
N−1
u − r
1
N−1
f )
In chapter 1, I assumed that rH > rL > rf > 0. This clearly implies 0 <
(k
1
N−1
u −r
1
N−1
f )
k
1
N−1
u
<
1, and clearly 0 < rL
r¯
< 1 as well. So it follows that 0 < 1−CL < 1, and therefore that
CL is within the acceptable bounds for FL to be a valid cdf.
Now we need to find conditions such that fH ≥ 0 for all r. From equation 1.2.10, FH
must be of the following form to satisfy proposition 1.7 and be an equilibrium pair of
distributions with FL:
(1.4.28) FH(r)

1 r ∈ (ku, ∞)
(Zri)
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
[AZ
1
N−1 (r
1
N−1 − rf 1N−1 ) + CL] r ∈ [rf , ku]
(Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
CL r ∈ [0, rf )
Lemma. fH(r) ≥ 0 for all r ∈ (0, ∞).
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Proof. Consider the density in r ∈ (0, ∞). For now, ignore the density at zero.
We can just differentiate the expression for FH(r) for r > 0.
fH(r)

0 r ∈ (ku, ∞)
Z
1
N−1 r
1
N−1−1
β(N−1) − (1−β)β(N−1)AZ
1
N−1 r
1
N−1−1 r ∈ [rf , ku]
0 r ∈ (0, rf )
So, clearly we only require Z
1
N−1 r
1
N−1−1
β(N−1) − (1−β)β(N−1)AZ
1
N−1 r
1
N−1−1 ≥ 0 for r ∈ [rf , ku] to
complete the proof. Simplifying this gives:
A ≤ 1
1− β
Given A = rL
r¯
and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, it’s clear that this is always satisfied. 
Now we just need to find the parameter conditions that ensure the mass atom played by
the H type at r = 0 is between zero and one. From 1.4.28, this is:
0 ≤ (Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1− β)
β
CL < 1
The following lemma establishes the conditions required to fulfil this set of inequalities.
Lemma. rf ≥ 2Mr¯ +M2, where M = (1−β)(rH−rL)rH is a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for 0 ≤ (Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
CL < 1 for N ≥ 2.
Proof. First, consider the conditions required for (Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
CL < 1. Sub in
the expression for CL from 1.4.25 and use (Zku)
1
N−1 = 1 from 1.2.10to simplify, this
gives:
1 > (1− β)rL
r¯
+ (Zrf )
1
N−1 (1− (1− β)rL
r¯
)
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Note (Zrf )
1
N−1 = (
rf
ku
)
1
N−1 . Given equation 1.2.12, it is clear that (Zrf )
1
N−1 < 1 since
ku > rf . So, we can write:
1 = (1− β)rL
r¯
+ (1− (1− β)rL
r¯
) > (1− β)rL
r¯
+ (Zrf )
1
N−1 (1− (1− β)rL
r¯
)
Since 0 < (1 − β) rL
r¯
< 1. Thus, (Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
CL < 1 is always satisfied. This is
consistent with fH ≥ 0 for all r 6= 0.
Consider the conditions required for (Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
CL ≥ 0. Sub in the expression for
CL and use (Zku)
1
N−1 = 1 to simplify:
(Zrf )
1
N−1 − (1− β)(1− rL
r¯
(1− (Zrf ) 1N−1 ) ≥ 0
Let T = (Zrf )
1
N−1 , simplifying further:
T (1− (1− β)rL
r¯
) ≥ (1− β)(1− rL
r¯
)
Since 0 < (1 − β) rL
r¯
< 1 and T > 0, we can say that if this holds for the minimum
value of T , it must hold for all other values of T . Note that T is just the ex-ante fund
failure probability. In deriving proposition 1.8, it was shown that dT
dN
≥ 0 for N ≥ 2
when rL > rf . Thus, the minimum relevant of T is reached when N = 2. Using the
expression for ku equation 1.2.12, it can be shown that for N = 2
T|N=2 =
rf
r¯ +
√
r¯2 + r2f
Thus we require
rf
r¯ +
√
r¯2 + r2f
≥ (1− β)(1−
rL
r¯
)
1− (1− β) rL
r¯
This simplifies to
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rf
r¯ +
√
r¯2 + r2f
≥ (1− β)(rH − rL)
rH
To make things less cluttered, write the RHS as M , a constant. Rearranging:
rf −Mr¯ ≥M
√
r¯2 + r2f
If rf < Mr¯, then this inequality can never be satisfied. If rf ≥ Mr¯, we can proceed by
squaring both sides. Simplifying, we obtain:
(1.4.29) rf ≥ 2Mr¯ +M2
Where
M =
(1− β)(rH − rL)
rH
Since (Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
CL < 1 is always satisfied, the condition for
(Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
CL ≥ 0
is the required condition for 0 ≤ (Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
CL < 1 for N ≥ 2. This is the above
condition. 
0 ≤ M ≤ 1, so it is possible to set values of rf , rL, rH and β such that this inequality
equation 1.4.29 is satisfied. Together, these two lemmas ensure that fH(r) ≥ 0 every-
where. That will guarantee the existence of equilibria using these functional forms for
N ≥ 2.
Proof of Proposition 1.10. In the proof of proposition 1.9, the only condition
which required parameter restrictions to be fulfilled was
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(1.4.30) T (1− (1− β)rL
r¯
) ≥ (1− β)(1− rL
r¯
)
Where T = (Zrf )
1
N−1 . In proving proposition 8, it was shown that dT
dN
> 0 for N ≥ 2
if 0 < rf < rL < rH . So, in principle, it is possible for there to exist a large enough
N that results in a large enough T to always satisfy this inequality. The only thing that
may prevent this from being true is if T reaches an upper bound where this inequality
is not always satisfied. Clearly, the given dT
dN
> 0 for N ≥ 2, the maximum value of T
must be limN→∞ T . Let us evaluate this limit:
lim
N→∞
T = lim
N→∞
(
rf
ku
)
1
N−1
Given N ≥ 2, it is clear that limN→∞(rf ) 1N−1 → 1. To complete the calculation, we need
to find limN→∞(ku)
1
N−1 . Recall that ku = r¯N + rf (
rf
ku
)
1
N−1 . Because we can always pick
the unique positive solution to ku given by this equation, it is clear that 0 < (
rf
ku
)
1
N−1 < 1
since ku > r¯N > rf . This is because N ≥ 2 and rf < rL ≤ r¯. Using the fact that
0 < (
rf
ku
)
1
N−1 < 1, we can write
r¯N + rf > ku > r¯N
And since N ≥ 2,
(r¯N + rf )
1
N−1 > k
1
N−1
u > (r¯N)
1
N−1
We can evaluate the limits of the logarithms of these expressions more easily. limN→∞ ln(r¯N)
1
N−1 =
limN→∞
ln(r¯N)
N−1 . We can use L’Hôpital’s rule to evaluate this limit:
lim
N→∞
ln(r¯N)
1
N−1 = lim
N→∞
1
N
= 0
APPENDIX 1 62
Which implies that
lim
N→∞
(r¯N)
1
N−1 = e0 = 1
A similar method can be used to show that
lim
N→∞
(r¯N + rf )
1
N−1 = 1
Since r¯N + rf > ku > r¯N and limits of the expressions greater than and less than
kuconverge at N →∞, by the squeeze theorem it must be the case that
lim
N→∞
(ku)
1
N−1 = 1
Thus it is clear that
lim
N→∞
T = lim
N→∞
(
rf
ku
)
1
N−1 = 1
Note that when T = 1, inequality 1.4.30 is always satisfied for any valid values of rH ,
rL and β. Thus given that dTdN > 0 for N ≥ 2 and limN→∞ T = 1, there will always
be a value of N where T becomes large enough to assure the existence of a least one
symmetric equilibrium with the functional forms used to prove proposition 1.9.
CHAPTER 2
Robustness Check: Introducing Bayesian Type Evaluation
2.1. Introduction
Hedge funds are highly opaque entities with relatively high turnover and short average
lifespans. They are lightly regulated and have access to powerful financial instruments
that can manipulate their return distributions. New hedge funds strive for strong relative
performance (Brown, Goetzmann, Park (2001)), which is important to get them off
the ground. In such an environment, when funds can be of varying ability, they have
incentives to use their financial instruments to manipulate their return distributions in
order to compete for reputational benefits by attaining high returns relative to their peers.
This comes at the cost of tail risk, and is a point made by Foster and Young (2010). An
interesting question to ask in this setting is how differing levels of competition affects
these incentives and fund behaviour.
The previous chapter investigated the problem of new hedge funds of unknown ability
with access to complex financial instruments competing to improve their reputations by
achieving high returns relative to their peers. The framework used is related to the sales
literature on price dispersion (Varian (1980), Spiegler (2006), all pay auctions (Baye
and Kovenock et al. (1996)), Blotto Games (Gross and Wagner (1950) and formation
of favoured minority groups in electoral situations (Myerson (1993)). In the previous
chapter, hedge funds are randomly drawn as high ability or low ability, and their ability
level affects their maximum expected return, obviously with high ability types being able
to deliver higher returns than low ability types. There is limited return sampling, and the
fund that draws the highest return will gain a benefit. The benefit can be interpreted
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as the reputational gain from being able to appear high on performance rankings, or the
benefit from having a strong enough performance relative to its peers that the fund can
improve its reputation by choosing to disclose return numbers. Funds can use complex
financial instruments to manipulate their return distributions to improve their chances
of winning this benefit, which is proxied by the high degree of freedom the funds have
to manipulate their return distributions. Effectively, they choose any return distribution
as long as their expected returns stay within their ability constraints. The main finding
of the model is that increasing the number of competing firms in this scenario increases
the amount of tail risk played by the average fund and raises the firm failure rate. This
is because increasing the number of funds makes it more difficult for them to stand out
and win the reputational reward, since there are more funds they have to beat to win
it. Combining this with the ability for funds to shape their return distributions means
that incentives are generated to move probability mass up to high return levels, raising
the chance of winning the reputational reward. Given the ability constraint that limits
the mean return, the funds must counterbalance this upwards mass movement with a
movement of mass down to the largest loss level allowed by limited liability, raising tail risk.
Mathematically, this result is due to an increase in competition making the probability of
winning function, which is related to the highest order statistic, more convex. This gives
funds an incentive to move mass upwards to high levels of return, which in turn must be
compensated by mass movements downwards to zero to satisfy the ability constraint.
A major criticism of this model is the assumption that a reputational boost is gained by
the fund that has the best performance in the peer group of new funds of unknown ability.
Hedge funds are supposed to cater to smart, sophisticated investors - that is one of the
reasons they are so lightly regulated and so opaque. Their investors are assumed to be
smart and aware enough to be less susceptible to foul play, and are assumed to be able to
take responsibility for their own money. Related to this is the fact that most hedge funds
often have a minimum investment level that is set to be very high, so only very wealthy
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people who can be assumed to have some experience in investing their money in more
complex financial institutions can participate. This is at odds with the way reputational
gain is awarded in the model in chapter 1, which is somewhat naive and simplistic. This
calls into question whether that assumption is suitable given the context and setting of
the model. More sophisticated investors will not blindly consider the new fund that draws
a high return to automatically be a good investment prospect.
Obviously, an adjustment to the model that can be made in light of this criticism is to
make the awarding of the reputational gain more sophisticated and rational, and this is
what this chapter attempts to do. A natural way of doing this is to assume that more
sophisticated observers will be interested in knowing what new funds have the highest
chance of being run by high ability managers, preferring those with the highest chance.
However, we still want to keep the feature of rewarding strong performance relative to
the peer group. To implement reputationally rewarding the funds judged to have the
highest ranked probabilities of being a high ability type, a rational observer who records
the performance of each fund and uses this to calculate the Bayesian probability of each
fund being a high ability type is introduced. The observer ranks the funds in order of
these probabilities, and the fund that is the most likely to be a high ability type gains
a reputational boost. Only if this procedure does not produce a clear winner does the
reputational boost go to fund that draws the highest return. The other assumptions of
the model are mostly unchanged from the previous chapter.
The question to be answered is if the main results from chapter 1 hold when rational
evaluation of type probabilities, a more sophisticated method of deciding which fund
gains a boost to their reputation is used as the primary method of choosing the best
fund, rather than an algorithm that picks the fund that draws the highest return. This
is a pertinent question to ask, since this alteration to the model radically changes the
way the reward mechanism is evaluated, and the solution concept changes. After this
change, the model bears more resemblance to a signalling scenario than before, and the
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beliefs of the rational observer must be taken into account. Due to the latter fact, we
need to solve for a modified symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria, which is a significant
departure from the original model.
The main findings of this analysis is that although the resulting model superficially re-
sembles the model in chapter 1, the results from it are significantly weaker. The new
rational model resembles the non-rational one due to the derived requirement that the
played return distributions fH and fL, of the high and low ability types respectively, must
have a monotone likelihood ratio property, which causes the probability of being judged
most likely to be a high ability type to be increasing in ri. Thus the probability of win-
ning the reputational boost is related to the highest order statistic, like in the model from
chapter 1. In addition, like in the previous chapter, at least one fund plays a mass atom
at the zero return level, leading to every equilibrium having tail risk and fund failure. The
two models thus unsurprisingly share some of the same equilibria where the played return
distributions are continuous above rf , and the results on the positive relation between
the number of competing funds and the amount of tail risk/probability of fund failure
apply exactly to these equilibria. Also, because of the way the equilibrium distribution
shapes still depend on the order statistic, the same mechanism that causes this result in
the previous chapter still applies to many other equilibria types as well.
The big difference is that in this model, equilibria where both types play a mass atom
anywhere above the fund failure threshold are possible. This is important since this it
means that equilibria exist where the link between competition and fund failure probab-
ility does not apply. In particular, the result does not apply when both fund types play
probability mass atoms at two points only. In these equilibria, the number of competing
funds has no effect on tail risk because the ability constraint must be binding in equi-
librium, making the mean return constant for both fund types. There is only one way
of reaching this required mean when funds play mass at only two points. In addition, in
equilibria where there are a lot of mass atoms, the upper bounds of their supports are
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exogenously determined, unlike in the continuous equilibria. This is another reason why
raising competition does not raise the fund failure rate in some of these mass atom equi-
libria. Some of these mass atom equilibria also resemble the return mimicking scenario
described by Foster and Young, and were not present in the original non-rational version
of the model. This is not surprising, since this version of the model bears more resemb-
lance to a Bayesian signalling model, although the monotone likelihood ratio property of
the equilibrium distributions means that the highest order statistic in still important in
determining equilibria, giving them some characteristics like that of a Blotto Game with
spread out probability mass and different types playing contrasting equilibria. The two
point equilibria are the most like Bayesian signalling equilibria out of all of them.
Section 2 details the model and its setup in detail, and proceeds to derive a number key
restrictions on the form of the equilibria and some other key results needed to analyse the
equilibria of the model, section 3 discusses whether the results from the previous chapter
hold in detail, and section 4 concludes.
2.2. The Model
2.2.1. Model Description. N new risk neutral hedge funds of unknown ability,
each of which is run by a high ability manager (H type) with probability β or a low
ability manager (L type) with probability 1 − β, compete to try and enhance their
reputations. Each of the funds has access to complex financial instruments that they
can use the alter their return distributions as they see fit, subject to constraints on their
means that are imposed by manager ability. A H type fund will be able to deliver a higher
expected return than a L type fund. A rational, sophisticated observer records the funds’
performance and evaluates the Bayesian probability that each fund is a H type, albeit
with the restriction of limited sampling of return histories. It is assumed for simplicity that
the funds all invest their own funds to generate one return from their picked distributions,
and that the observer can see each fund’s draw. Reputational benefit is then gained by
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the fund that is evaluated as being the most likely to be a high ability H type fund. In
the event of several funds tying for the highest probability of being a H type, the fund
that draws the highest return out of the tying funds gains the reputational benefit. Firm
failure is incorporated into this model using an exogenous threshold rf . If a fund draws
a return r < rf , then the firm fails and cannot claim the reputational reward for being
judged the most likely to be a high ability type. The solution concept to be used is a
refinement of a symmetric Bayesian Equilibrium.
2.2.2. Bayesian Type Probabilities and the Awarding of Reputational Re-
ward α. When the observer see that fund i draws return ri, then the probability that
fund i is a H type can be calculated. The assumption that the observer is sophisticated
and rational means that it knows the structure of the game and is therefore able to
predict what distributions H and L types play, and in equilibrium calculates the Bayesian
probability of fund i being a H type upon seeing a return ri assuming that H types play
fH and L types play fL.
In a symmetric equilibrium, all H type funds play the same return distribution as each
other, and all the L type funds play the same distribution as each other too. Let fL
be the return pdf selected by the L type and fH be the return pdf selected by the H
type. In equilibrium, the observer beliefs match the equilibrium distributions. Let  be
a very small interval around ri. If a fund i draws a return within this interval, then the
probability of that fund being a H type, φi(ri) is approximately
(2.2.1)
prob(H|fH , fL, β, ri) = φi(ri) = βfH(ri)
βfH(ri)+ (1− β)fL(ri) =
βfH(ri)
βfH(ri) + (1− β)fL(ri)
Where  is the width of the interval. Consider the case when  → 0. This gives the
exact probability of fund i being an H type when it draws ri. We also need to consider
what happens to φi when there are probability mass atoms, since they are not excluded
from existing. At a return r∗ where there are mass atoms, if the size of the atom played
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by the H type is aH and the size of the atom played by the L type is aL, then if firm i
draws r∗,
(2.2.2) φi(r∗) = βaH
βaH + (1− β)aL
If one of the types is not playing a mass atom at r∗ while the other is, clearly φ(r∗) = 1
if the type playing a mass atom is the H type, and φ(r∗) = 0 if the L type is the one
playing a mass atom there while the H type is not.
Upon observing the return draws by all the firms, the following procedure is used to pick
which fund the award α is given to:
• Funds that draw returns which give φi = 0 cannot gain reputational benefits,
since they are judged to be low ability types. So, if all funds draw returns that
give φi = 0, then no fund gains a reputational boost.
• If there are no funds tied for the highest value of φi(ri) and maxφi(ri) 6= 0,
then the reward α is given to the unique fund with the highest φi(ri).
• If there are several funds tied for the highest value of φi(ri) and maxφi(ri) 6= 0,
then α is awarded to the fund that has the highest return ri out of the funds
that are tied for the highest φi(ri).
• If there are M funds tied for highest φi(ri), all with the same return r∗ and
φi(r∗) 6= 0, each of the M funds with the return r∗ has a 1M change of getting
the reputational benefit, i.e. the winner is picked at random out of the tied
funds.
The refinement to use returns as a tie-breaker if φi does not produce a unique winner is to
simplify the analysis. There is also a lot of empirical evidence that investors do pick funds
heavily based on past performance. Effectively, the funds are sorted lexicographically -
funds that have the highest probability of being a H type φi(ri) are always preferred. If
there is a tie in that, the next tie breaker is to pick the highest return fund out of all
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the ones that are tied with the highest φi(ri). If that criteria does not produce a unique
winner, the observer picks a fund with tied highest φi and ri at random.
2.2.3. Model Timing and Objective Functions.
• t = 0 : The type of each fund is drawn randomly and independently (H with
probability β or L with probability 1 − β), and all funds simultaneously pick a
return distribution subject to the appropriate ability constraints. All funds invest
If of their own money into this.
• t = 1 : Each fund independently realises a return from the distribution they
picked in t = 0. It is kept by the fund, and noted by the observer. If the
return ri < rf , the failure threshold, then the fund closes and cannot claim
the reputational reward for being the most likely to be a high ability type. A
fund that is judged to have φi = 0 can also never claim the reputational reward
either. The observer ranks the funds in order of φi for each, excluding the ones
that draw returns that indicate φi = 0. The one that draws ri ≥ rf (and thus
does not fail) and also gets the highest φi in this ranking obtains a reputational
gain α. If several funds tie for highest φi, then the fund with the highest return
out of them gets the award α. If there is a further tie, winner is picked at
random between the funds tied with the highest return and φi(ri) (in this case
it is the same as the reward being split evenly between them).
As in the last chapter, there are constraints on return means to proxy for differences in
ability between the H and L types:
(2.2.3)
ˆ
sH
rfH(r)dr ≤ rH
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(2.2.4)
ˆ
sL
rfL(r)dr ≤ rL
Where the integrals are over SH , the support of fH , and SL, the support of fL. In
addition, ri ≥ 0, which is an assumption of limited liability. Also, assume that both fund
types can in expectation make more than the failure threshold, i.e.
(2.2.5) rH > rL > rf
There is no discounting to simplify the analysis. To write down an objective function for
each fund, a function Pi(ri) needs to be introduced. This is the probability that firm
i gets the highest φi(ri) and wins the reputational benefit when it draws a return ri.
Then, the objective function for a fund is:
pii = E(ri)If + αE(Pi(ri))
All funds maximise this subject to either 2.2.3 if the fund is H type, or 2.2.4 if the fund
is L type.
2.2.4. Equilibrium Properties.
2.2.4.1. Off Equilibrium Path Assumptions. When reputational rewards were based
on the highest return level, there is no need to consider what happens off equilibrium
path since the fund that gains reputational benefit is simply decided by an algorithm.
However, when a rational observer gives the reputational award to the firm most likely to
be a H type, what happens off equilibrium path must be considered. A particular issue
is that it becomes impossible to exclude the possibility of funds playing mass atoms in
equilibrium in ri ∈ [rf ,∞) unless very particular and strong assumptions are made about
how the observer evaluates φi when a firm draws a ri value off the equilibrium path.
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Unfortunately, there is not an intuitive or natural way of evaluating φi off equilibrium
path. For example, it is not possible to apply the intuitive criterion, the benefit of moving
mass out of the supports of fH and fL is entirely dependent on how φi is evaluated there.
This is because it is costless move to probability mass, and so it is impossible to rule out
mass movements for one of the types as unprofitable. In fact, the marginal benefit/loss
of moving some probability mass out of the region of the equilibrium supports of fH and
fL is symmetric for both types, making it difficult to deduce what type a deviating firm
is likely to be.
In such a circumstance, it seems to reasonable to assume that the observer uses prior
probabilities when it sees a return value not in the equilibrium supports of fH and fL.
This implies that:
(2.2.6) φi(ri) = β for ri /∈ SH
⋃
SL
Where SH is the support of fH and SLis the support of fL. This is a somewhat extreme
assumption, but is not a entirely contrived one. From this, a number of results that
narrow down the range of equilibria can be derived.
2.2.4.2. Equilibrium Restrictions. In this section, a number of propositions important
to determining the form of the equilibria and the key results will be derived using the above
assumption on how φi is determined off-equilibrium path. Each one places restrictions
on the form of the equilibria, and will be needed to prove some of they key results of this
paper and to describe the equilibria of the model. Following this, we will use some of
these results to calculate Pi, which is needed to determine some features of the equilibria.
Proposition 2.1. In equilibrium, no funds play any mass in the interval ri ∈ (0, rf ).
Proof. The proof is almost identical to that of a similar result in chapter 1. If a fund
type is playing mass at a point r′ ∈ (0, rf ) in equilibrium, it can make a mean preserving
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deviation by moving some mass from r′ upwards to a r∗ ≥ rf , while simultaneously
moving some mass from r′ downwards to ri = 0. φi(r∗) ≥ β can be obtained due to
2.2.6 by picking r∗ to be either off equilibrium path or at point where the H type is
playing more density than the L type. The net effect of this deviation on E(Pi(ri)) is
unambiguously positive, since Pi(r′) = Pi(0) = 0 due to firm failure, and Pi(r∗) > 0
since drawing r∗ will always win the reputational benefit if all other funds draw r′. The
mean preserving feature of the mass movement means that it can be done even if the
type constraints 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 are binding, and does not affect E(ri), which implies it
will definitely increase utility. Thus, at least one of the fund types will find it profitable
to make this unilateral deviation and any fH and fL that has probability density in
ri ∈ (0, rf ) cannot be played in equilibrium. 
Crucially, note the logic used to prove proposition 2.1 does not apply to probability mass
at ri = 0, since moving probability mass from that point only in a mean preserving way
is not possible because mass cannot be moved downwards from ri = 0 due to limited
liability. This will turn out to be important later on. The second proposition eliminates
equilibria where fH is a single point mass at a return level r∗ and fL is a single point
point mass also at r∗, with r∗ ≤ rL to meet the type constraints 2.2.3 and 2.2.4. If
such a equilibrium existed, it would make some of the later proofs much more difficult or
impossible to execute, since the existence of equilibria where the union of the supports
of fH and fL consists of a single value ri invalidates arguments involving mass shifting
while staying on equilibrium path.
Proposition 2.2. fH = δ(ri−r∗) and fL = δi(r−r∗) cannot be an equilibrium, where
δ is the delta function. Therefore the union of the supports of fH and fL must contain
at least two different points.
Proof. There are two cases to consider, r∗ ≥ rf and r∗ = 0. All cases with
r∗ ∈ (0, rf ) are eliminated by proposition 2.1.
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Case 1. Consider the case when r∗ ≥ rf . If fH = δ(ri− r∗) and fL = δi(r− r∗), then
there is only one mass atom with weight 1 at r∗ for both fH and fL. Thus we
need to use equation 2.2.2 to calculate φi(r∗), which gives φi(r∗) = β. Note
this is equivalent to φi(ri) when ri ≥ rf from assumption 2.2.6 on how φi is
evaluated off equilibrium path. Also, recall that given rH > rL, it must the case
that r∗ ≤ rL, otherwise 2.2.4 is violated. Therefore, the type/ability constraint
is not binding for at least the H type. It follows that given φi(ri) = β away
from r∗, at least the H type can move mass from r∗ upwards, which does not
affect E(Pi(ri)) but increases E(ri), which unambiguously increases utility.
Thus at least the H type has an incentive to unilaterally deviate, which means
that fH = δ(ri − r∗) and fL = δi(r − r∗) cannot be an equilibrium.
Case 2. Consider the case where r∗ = 0. We do not need to calculate φi here, since
r∗ = 0 implies that both types will always fail, i.e. Pi(r∗) = 0. The type
constraints are not binding for either type, and so both types can move mass
upwards to any r′ > 0 and the effect on E(Pi(ri)) will be zero or positive,
while E(ri) rises. The same logic that prevents this from being an equilibrium
from the previous case carries through.

This eliminates equilibria where ri is completely uninformative about the type of the
fund. Such combinations of return distributions must mean that the type constraints
are not binding, and so at least one of the fund types can just shift mass upwards to
increase their expected return without harming their expected chances of winning the
reputational reward, since ri is uninformative about the type. The next proposition
eliminates equilibria where the L type plays mass in areas where the H type does not.
Proposition 2.3. Any return distributions where there is a r′ ≥ rf with fL(r′) > 0
and fH(r′) = 0 cannot be an equilibrium.
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Proof. If there exists a r′ ≥ rf in equilibrium where fL(r′) > 0 and fH(r′) = 0 then
φi(r
′) = 0. If r∗ ≥ rf with φi(r∗) > 0 does not exist, fH = δ(ri) to satisfy proposition
2.1, i.e. the H type plays all its probability mass at ri = 0. In that case, apply the
same logic as in case 2 of proposition 2.2 to show that the H type can always move
probability mass upwards from ri = 0 and be strictly better off. Therefore, there must
be a r∗ ≥ rf where fH 6= 0 and thus φi(r∗) > 0. It follows that Pi(r∗) > Pi(r′) = 0,
since a fund drawing r∗ will always be ranked as more likely to be a high ability fund
than a fund that draws r′, even if φi(r∗) is lower than φi for all other ri but r′. It is then
always possible for the L type to make a mean preserving mass movement where some
mass is moved to r∗, i.e. where the H type is actually playing mass. The movement
of mass to r∗ will increase E(Pi(ri)) since Pi(r∗) > Pi(r′), and any counterbalancing
mass movement will at worst be made to a r− where Pi(r−) = 0, which has no effect
on E(Pi(ri)) since Pi(r′) = Pi(r−) = 0. Thus such a deviation will unambiguously raise
E(Pi(ri)), and its mean preserving nature implies that it can always be made even if the
type/ability constraint 2.2.4 is binding, and will also not affect the E(ri) component of
utility. Consequently, such a deviation is always welfare increasing, and implies that the
L type will always have a unilateral incentive to deviate if there exists a r′ in equilibrium
where fL(r′) > fH(r′) = 0, meaning that such a case cannot be an equilibrium. 
This is related to the fact that moving mass is costless. When this is true, the H and L
types cannot be fully separated, since the L type can costlessly move some probability
mass (using a mean preserving mass movement) to regions where the H type is playing
mass and increase their chance of gaining the reputational reward. Importantly, proposi-
tion 2.3 implies that in [rf , ∞), either no type plays mass, both types play mass, or just
the H type plays mass. There can never be a region where only the L type is playing
mass.
Finding solutions for the model is still somewhat problematic. Unlike in the previous
chapter, the form of Pi(ri) cannot be immediately deduced from the assumptions of the
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model. For any given ri drawn by a fund, the probability of winning the reputational
reward is the chance that all other N−1 funds draw returns that with lower values of φi.
Therefore the form of Pi is dependent on how φi varies over ri, which in turn depends
on the ratio of fH to fL at any given point. It is necessary to place some restrictions on
the form of Pi to get an idea of what the equilibria of this model look like. This is what
the next proposition does, and it is vital to the key results of the chapter.
Proposition 2.4. Pi(ri) must be a strictly increasing function of ri over SH
⋃
SL the
union of the supports of fH and fL.
Proof. See appendix 2. 
This is a key result for simplifying equilibrium analysis. It immediately follows that if
the probability of winning the reputational reward is strictly increasing, it must be based
on the Nth order statistic (i.e. highest ri draw). This is the reason why many of the
results from the previous chapter carry over to the fully rational version of the model.
The reason this proposition must hold is because if Pi is non-monotonic, then there will
be areas where Pi will either be at a local maximum or minimum. Consider the case
of a local maximum, which must be surrounded by regions where Pi is lower. If that is
the case, it will always be possible to make a profitable mean preserving deviation that
moves probability mass from above and below the local maximum towards from the local
maximum of Pi. In the case of local minima, just reverse the direction of these mass
movements.
Recall that the funds are ranked by the observer in order of the φi values that result from
their return draws. If Pi is strictly increasing over SH
⋃
SL , the union of the supports
of fH and fL, then φi must also be increasing over SH
⋃
SL. This imposes a strong
restriction over the form of fH and fL:
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Corollary. fH and fL must have a monotone likelihood ratio in ri over SH
⋃
SL at
all points other than ri = 0, i.e.
fH(r
′)
fL(r′)
≥ fH(r)
fL(r)
where r′ > r, r′ ∈ SH
⋃
SL and r ∈ SH
⋃
SL, and r > 0.
This naturally follows from the requirement that φi =
βfH(ri)
βfH(ri)+(1−β)fL(ri) be increasing for
ri ∈ SH
⋃
SL. The likelihood ratio does not need to be strictly increasing over SH
⋃
SL
since the tie-break procedure will automatically select higher draws of ri when there are
ties for the highest φi, ensuring that Pi(ri) is still strictly increasing over SH
⋃
SL even
if the likelihood ratio is only weakly increasing. There is an exception for ri = 0, since
fund failure implies that Pi(0) = 0 regardless of what φi(0) is there . We can use this
to calculate Pi, which is needed to obtain the equilibrium conditions. This will be done
later.
Proposition 2.5. In all equilibria, there must be at least one type playing a mass atom
at ri = 0.
Proof. See appendix 2. 
This proposition is also vital for the results of the paper. It ensures that every fund has
a chance to fail in expectation and that there will always be tail risk in equilibrium. It
is due to similar reasons for the analogous result in the previous chapter. Essentially,
there must be a mass atom at zero to ensure that the next highest point in SH
⋃
SL
has Pi > 0, otherwise a mean preserving deviation that moves mass down to zero from
the next highest point in SH
⋃
SL while moving some other mass upwards will always
be profitable. This requires that the lowest point in SH
⋃
SL be a mass atom, and the
possibility that this is above rf is excluded using the assumption of φi = β off equilibrium
path and propositions 2.3 and 2.4. Proposition 2.4 requires fH
fL
to be increasing, which
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causes a contradiction with proposition 2.3 unless φi < β at the lowest point in SH
⋃
SL.
This is however itself not an equilibrium due to incentives to move mass from the lowest
point in SH
⋃
SL off equilibrium path.
Proposition 2.6. The type/ability constraints 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 must be binding for
both types in equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix 2. 
This is somewhat intuitive, since Pi is strictly increasing, so if the type constraints are
not binding, then a fund can always move mass upwards to increase the mean return as
well as E(Pi). However, we need the assumption that φi is constant off equilibrium path
to prove this in the special case where a fund type plays mass at only a single point.
Proposition 2.7. When SH
⋂
SL includes more than one point,Pi(ri) = Zri, with
Z > 0 for all ri ∈ SH
⋃
SL.
Proof. See appendix 2. 
This is analogous to the result that allows the form of the equilibria to be calculated in
chapter 1, and is simply an extension of the result to allow for the fact that there can be
a finite number of points in SH
⋃
SL. The logic is very similar, and enshrines the fact
that all equilibria must be robust to mean preserving mass movements, since proposition
2.6 must hold. It will determine the shape of the return distributions in equilibrium.
Proposition 2.8. If there is a mass atom played by either fund at a point r∗, then the
points r∗ −  and r∗ +  where  → 0 must be off equilibrium path, i.e. fH = fL = 0
there.
Proof. See appendix 2. 
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So, any mass atoms must be separated from the rest of SH
⋃
SL by regions that are off
equilibrium path where fH = 0 and fL = 0. Now, we can use some of these propositions
to calculate Pi.
2.2.4.3. Calculating Pi(ri). Proposition 2.4 and its corollary force Pi to be strictly
increasing in ri when ri ∈ SH
⋃
SL. If we ignore the case when several funds tie for the
highest return draw, given a return draw ri, a fund i will win the reputational reward if
all its N − 1 competitors draw returns lower than ri, since those will be either be less
likely to be H types due to increasing φi, or will be selected over other return draws
with the same φi by the tie-breaking mechanism of choosing the highest return fund.
Therefore, when there is no chance of tie for top return, we can write for ri ∈ SH
⋃
SL
in symmetric equilibrium:
(2.2.7) Pi(ri) = (βFH(ri) + (1− β)FL(ri))N−1
Where FH and FL are the cdfs of the H and L types respectively. The procedure for
obtaining this is the same as used in the previous chapter, and the expression obtained is
identical. It can be rationalised by observing that the probability of one particular fund
drawing less than ri is βFH(ri) + (1−β)FL(ri), and that type determination and return
draw is independent for every fund. Thus, the probability that the N − 1 competitors all
draw worse than ri is simply the product of N − 1 funds all individually drawing lower
than ri. However, the expression for Pi is not complete: it is not possible to exclude
return distributions with probability mass atoms in the model with the rational observer.
When there are mass atoms, there is the possibility that several funds tie for the highest
return. In this case, the reputational reward is randomly given to one of the top funds
(risk neutrality implies that this is equivalent to the reputational gain being split evenly
between them).
Assume that there is a mass atom at return level ra ≥ rf so that Pi(ra) is not trivially
zero due to firm failure, and that no fund has deviated from the equilibrium path. Let
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the probability of the H type drawing ra be aH and the probability of the L type drawing
ra be aL. Consider the probability of fund i winning the reputational reward by obtaining
the highest φi when it draws return ra. Clearly, we don’t need to consider a scenario
where at least one other fund draws more than ra due to proposition 2.4. So, there are
two scenarios to consider: one where every other fund draws less than ra, and a second
where all the other funds draw ra or less, with at least one other fund drawing ra. The
latter scenario forces a random tiebreaker between the firms that drew ra.
Consider the first scenario. All other N − 1 funds must draw less than ra We need to
obtain the probability of a fund drawing less than ra before type determination. Denote
this as u(ra). This is:
(2.2.8) u(ra) = β(FH(ra)− aH) + (1− β)(FL(ra)− aL)
FH(ra) is the probability that the H type draws less than or equal to ra, so we need
to subtract aH , the probability of drawing ra, from this to get the probability that they
draw strictly less than ra. Similar logic applies to the L type’s chances of drawing less
than ra. The type and return draw of each fund is determined independently, so we can
write the probability of the first scenario happening as
(u(ra))
N−1
Now, consider the second case. Assume that W other funds draw ra, while the rest of
the other funds (N − 1−W of them) draw less than ra. Using the fact that the types
and draws are independently determined again, the probability of this happening must
be
(N − 1)!
(N − 1−W )!(W !)(βaH + (1− β)aL)
W (u(ra))
N−1−W
To further simplify the expression, we can define a = βaH + (1 − β)aL, which is the
expected probability of drawing ra before type determination, so that the above expression
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can be written as
(N − 1)!
(N − 1−W )!(W !)a
W (u(ra))
N−1−W
(βaH +(1−β)aL)W (u(ra))N−1−W only gives the probability that the firstW funds draw
ra. Since the order of the funds that draw ra does not matter, it is functionally identical
to any other combination of fund drawing ra. Thus, we need to adjust the probability by
the binomial coefficient to account for the number of combinations of W out of N − 1
funds drawing ra.
In the first scenario, the probability of fund i winning with a draw of ra is one. In the
second scenario, it is 1
W+1
due to the random tiebreaker between those that draw ra -
fund i draws it, and W of the other funds also do it. To calculate Pi(ra), we need to
sum over W , the number of funds that draw ra. This gives
(2.2.9) Pi(ra) =
W=N−1∑
W=0
(
1
W + 1
)
(N − 1)!
(N − 1−W )!(W )!a
W (u(ra))
N−1−W
This can be written in a more condensed form by factorising:
Pi(ra) =
1
aN
W=N−1∑
W=0
N((N − 1)!)
(N − 1−W )!(W + 1)!a
W+1(u(ra))
N−1−W
Noting that N((N − 1)!) = N ! and relabelling using W + 1 = K gives
Pi(ra) =
1
aN
K=N∑
K=1
N !
(N −K)!(K)!a
K(u(ra))
N−K
Now, the binomial theorem states that
∑K=N
K=0
N !
(N−K)!(K)!a
K(u(ra))
N−K = (a+u(ra))N ,
and so we can write
Pi(ra) =
1
aN
[
(
K=N∑
K=0
N !
(N −K)!(K)!a
K(u(ra))
N−K)− (u(ra))N
]
which gives as a final result for mass atoms on equilibrium path in symmetric equilibrium:
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(2.2.10) Pi(ra) =
1
aN
(
(a+ u(ra))
N − (u(ra))N
)
for return values ra where there are mass atoms. This is a general expression that holds
when both types play mass atoms at ra, or just when one type plays mass atoms there.
If one type is not playing mass atoms at ra, simply set the appropriate aH or aL to zero.
Note that as expected, this is finitely greater than the probability that all funds draw less
than ra, since that isW = 0 term in the sum
∑W=N−1
W=0 (
1
W+1
) (N−1)!
(N−1−W )!(W )!a
W (u(ra))
N−1−W ,
but finitely less than the probability that every other fund draws ra or less, which is given
by the sum
∑W=N−1
W=0
(N−1)!
(N−1−W )!(W )!a
W (u(ra))
N−1−W .
Finally, we need to consider what Pi is off equilibrium path, assuming other funds stay
on equilibrium path. From the assumption on how φi is calculated off equilibrium path,
φi = β when ri /∈ SH
⋃
SL. Let ro be the highest value of ri ∈ SH
⋃
SL for which
φi(ro) ≤ β. If φi > β for all SH
⋃
SL, then by proposition 2.5, ro = 0 since there must
be at least one fund type playing mass at zero, and fund failure means that drawing
zero leaves firms unable to get the reputational reward anyway. Firstly, consider when
ro = 0. If any fund draws r′ 6= 0 and r′ ∈ SH
⋃
SL, then due to proposition 2.1, a fund
drawing ri /∈ SH
⋃
SL will not win since if ro = 0, then φi(ri) = β < φi(r′). Then,
ri /∈ SH
⋃
SL will only win the reputational reward if all other funds draw zero. So, for
ri /∈ SH
⋃
SL, Pi(ri) = (βFH(0) + (1− β)FL(0))N−1.
When ro 6= 0, then by proposition 2.1, ro ∈ [rf , ∞). In this case, if ro is at a point
where there are no probability mass atoms, then the probability of a random tiebreaker
if ri /∈ SH
⋃
SL is zero. The draw ri when off equilibrium path will win if all other
funds draw less than it. So, in that case Pi(ri) = (βFH(ro) + (1− β)FL(ro))N−1 when
ri /∈ SH
⋃
SL.
If ro is at a point where there is a mass atom, then drawing ri /∈ SH
⋃
SL gives an
identical φi to actually drawing from the mass atom at ro, and whether it wins or not
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depends on ri > ro or not. It will win if against firms that draw ro if ri > ro, and lose if
ri < ro (ri = ro is impossible since ri is off equilibrium path). Effectively, when ro > ri,
the off equilibrium path draw will only win if all other funds draw returns in SH
⋃
SL
less than ro, and if ri > ro, it will win if all other funds draw returns from SH
⋃
SL that
are equal to or less than ro.
To summarise, Pi is a complex function that takes different forms in different regions. In
SH
⋃
SL, the union of the supports of the H and L types, it takes the following form:
Pi(ri)

(βFH(ri) + (1− β)FL(ri))N−1 no atom at ri
1
aN
(
(a+ u(ri))
N − (u(ri))N
)
atom at ri
With the size of the mass atom at ri being aH for the H type and aLfor the L type,
a = βaH+(1−β)aL and u(ra) defined by 2.2.8. Off equilibrium path (not in the support
of the return distribution of either type), i.e. ri /∈ SH
⋃
SL, it takes the following form:
Pi(ri)

(βFH(ro) + (1− β)FL(ro))N−1 no atom at ro
(βFH(ro) + (1− β)FL(ro))N−1 atom at ro and ri > ro
(β[FH(ro)− aH ] + (1− β)[FL(ro)− aL])N−1 atom at ro and ri < ro
With ro being the maximum value of ri in SH
⋃
SL for which φi(ro) ≤ β or ro = 0 if
such a value does not exist. The size of the mass atom at ro being aH for the H type
and aLfor the L type and other symbols are defined as before. Of course,
Pi(ri) = 0 for ri ∈ [0, rf )
due to firm failure when ri < rf .
There are an infinity of equilibria. Unfortunately, unlike when the reputational reward is
automatically obtained by the fund with the highest return, the common properties of
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these equilibria cannot be described succinctly. Instead, some equilibria types important
to the results shall be characterised and discussed.
2.3. Results and Discussion
2.3.1. Equilibria Shared with the Model from Chapter 1. There are many
equilibria in this variant of the model that are not equilibria in the non-rational version
and vice-versa, mainly due to the lack of a proposition that excludes the existence of
equilibria with mass atoms at or above the failure threshold rf . This allows there to be
a whole range of equilibria that involve mass atoms in the interval [rf , ∞) that would
not have been equilibria when the winner of the reputational benefit was decided solely
by the highest return draw. However, some of the equilibria from the non-rational model
still hold, and therefore the results from that model apply to these equilibria exactly. To
see this, we need to recall some of the properties of the equilibria in the non-rational
version of the model. In the non-rational model, all equilibria have return distributions
with a mass atom in expectation at ri = 0, and have continuous cumulative distribution
functions in the range [rf , ∞). In that model, Pi takes the same form as it does here
on equilibrium path (when ri ∈ SH
⋃
SL). The similarity is forced by the fact that Pi
must be increasing in ri on equilibrium path (proposition 2.4). Proposition 2.5 means
that like in the non-rational case of the model, every fund plays mass at ri = 0 in
expectation before type determination. Proposition 2.6 also applies in the non-rational
model, making the type constraints binding, and proposition 2.7 is a version of the
result that forces Pi to be linear in the non-rational version of the model generalised
to a scenario where there may be mass atoms. Analogous or identical results (though
requiring different proofs) that restrict the form of the equilibria apply in both models,
and so it is apparent that finding equilibria that have mass atoms in expectation at ri = 0
and have continuous cdfs elsewhere will give at least some of the same equilibria. There
are some restrictive conditions from the mechanics of the non-rational model that remove
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some of the equilibria from the non-rational model, however. The next step is to describe
the equilibria common to both the rational and non-rational model.
As stated, the equilibria both models share have continuous cdfs everywhere but at ri = 0.
By proposition 2.6, both type/ability constraints must be binding, and by proposition 2.5,
at least one of the two fund types must be playing a mass atom at ri = 0. Since cdfs
of both types are continuous everywhere but at ri = 0, there are no mass atoms for
ri ≥ rf , and proposition 2.6 excludes equilibria where a fund type only plays mass at
ri = 0. Given both these facts and the assumption that both types can in expectation
make more than the failure threshold 2.2.5, both types must have non-zero pdfs in regions
where ri ≥ rf , and not just single points there. Let kH and kL be the upper bounds of
the supports of fH and fL respectively, and the let the upper bound of the two supports
be ku = max(kH , kL). Assume that FH(ri) and FL(ri) are the cdfs of the H and L
types respectively. Now, note that ku = kH , since if this is not the case, there will be a
region (or point) in ri ∈ [rf ,∞) where fL > 0 and fH = 0, which violates proposition
2.4 - Pi will not be strictly increasing in riover SH
⋃
SL. If there are no mass atoms
above or at rf , proposition 2.3 and proposition 2.4 force the H type to be playing mass
at every point in the interval [rf , ku]. Since the L type must be playing mass in some
interval in ri ∈ [rf ,∞), this will force SH
⋂
SL to contain more than one point. Thus,
proposition 2.7 must apply to all of SH
⋃
SL, forcing Pi to be the same linear function
over the supports of both fH and fL. We can then write some equations that most hold
in symmetric equilibria down in a similar manner to chapter one. Assume that FH is
given by the following:
FH(ri)

1
(Zri)
1
N−1
β
− 1−β
β
G(ri) + aH
aH
ri ∈ [ku, ∞)
ri ∈ [kL, ku]
ri ∈ [rf , kL]
ri ∈ [0, rf )
2.3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 86
Where G(ri) is a strictly increasing, continuous function with G(rf ) = 0 and G(kH) =
1− aH . It is playing a mass atom at ri = 0. Thus, FLmust be
FL(ri)

1
(Zri)
1
N−1
1−β − β1−β (G(ri) + aH)
aL =
(Zrf )
1
N−1
(1−β) − β1−βaH
aL =
(Zrf )
1
N−1
(1−β) − β1−βaH
ri ∈ [kL, ∞)
ri ∈ [rf , kL]
ri ∈ (0, rf )
ri = 0
So that proposition 2.7 holds. We can also formulate an equilibrium where the L type
has a more free choice over its equilibrium distribution:
FL(ri)

1
G(ri) + aL
aL
aL
ri ∈ [kL, ∞)
ri ∈ [rf , kL]
ri ∈ (0, rf )
ri − 0
Locking in the following form for FH to ensure that proposition 2.7 holds:
FH(ri)

1
(Zri)
1
N−1
β
− 1−β
β
aH =
(Zri)
1
N−1
−β − 1−ββ (G(ri) + aL)
aH =
(Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
aL
ri ∈ [ku, ∞)
ri ∈ [kL, ku]
ri ∈ [rf , kH ]
ri ∈ [0, rf )
These are clearly a special case of the equilibria in the non-rational version of the model,
and like in that model, the same equations will determine Z, aH and aL. To recap,
using these forms for FL and FH with the fact that the type/ability constraints 2.2.3 and
2.2.4 are binding gives the following equations regardless of which type is playing the G
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function:
Z =
1
ku
r¯N + (
rNf
ku
)
1
N−1 = ku
βaH + (1− β)aL = (Zrf ) 1N−1
where r¯ = βrH + (1 − β)rL. The procedure to obtain these is identical to that used
in the non-rational version of the model. The result from chapter 1 on fund failure rate
before type determination, T = βaH + (1 − β)aL, applies identically - it can be shown
that dT
dN
> 0 since we assumed that rH > rL > rf 2.2.5. So the results from the previous
chapter hold identically in this class of equilibria. There are identical restrictions on the
choice of G, aH and aL due to the requirement that fH ≥ 0 and fL ≥ 0 at all points -
there cannot be negative mass in a pdf. These state that the function g needs be picked
so that Z (Zri)
1
N−1−1
(N−1) − (1− β)g(ri) ≥ 0 or Z (Zri)
1
N−1−1
(N−1) − βg(ri) ≥ 0 in the second case
for all ri ∈ [rf , ku], and that aH ∈ [0, 1) and aL ∈ [0, 1). This is related to the fact
that Z and ku are independent of the choice of g, and choosing a g function too steep
makes it impossible for comply with proposition 2.7 without needing negative mass.
In addition, there are a number of extra restrictions that apply to this class of equilibria
here, so clearly the results are not as strong as they are in the non-rational case - not
all the equilibria which the failure rate result applies to in the non-rational model exist in
the rational case. The additional restrictions are:
• As stated above, ku = kH .
• φi(ku) ≥ β. This is to ensure that there are no incentives to move probability
mass off equilibrium path. If this does not hold, then funds will find it profitable
to make mean preserving deviations that include a mass movement to ri ≥ ku,
i.e. a movement off equilibrium path.
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• d(
fH
fL
)
dri
≥ 0 for all ri ∈ [rf , ku]. This is imposed by proposition 2.4 and its
corollary, which says that Pi must be strictly increasing over SH
⋃
SL, which in
turn implies that φi must be (weakly) increasing over SH
⋃
SL. Consequently,
we get the condition that fH and fL must have the monotone likelihood ratio
property in ri, and this can be written in derivative form since fH and fL are
continuous in [rf , ku] for these types of equilibria. Writing out the conditions,
we get
(
Z
1
N−1 r
2−N
N−1
i
(1− β)(N − 1) −
βg
(1− β))g
′ − ((2−N)Z
1
N−1 r
1
N−1−2
i
(1− β)(N − 1)2 −
βg′
(1− β))g ≥ 0
in the case where the H type picks g. Something similar is obtained when the
L type picks g. This imposes a further condition on the shape of g due to the
requirement of a monotone likelihood ratio.
The last extra restriction is particular noteworthy, since it imposes strong restrictions
in on the shape of the possible return distributions, invalidating a number of equilibria
from the non-rational model where the ratio of fH and fL did not necessarily increase
in the interval [rf , ku]. This is due to proposition 2.4, the requirement that Pi be
monotonically increasing in SH
⋃
SL, which exists due to the ability constraints. In a
setting where there is distribution shifting subject to mean constraints and risk neutrality,
non-monotonic Pi cannot exist since any equilibria must be robust to a mean preserving
mass movement, which requires all points in SH
⋃
SL to be on a straight line.
So to summarise, a restricted subset of the equilibria from the non-rational version exist,
to which the results on the effect of competition from chapter 1 apply exactly. Again,
we need to consider whether these equilibria exist or not. Fortunately, the functional
forms for FH and FL used to prove propositions 1.9 and 1.10 conform with the three
extra conditions stated above: ku = kH , and the ratio
fH(ri)
fL(ri)
= rH
rL
for ri ∈ [rf , ku], a
constant. This satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property required by proposition
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2.4, and also ensures that fH(ku)
fL(ku)
> 1 so that φi(ku) ≥ β as well. Thus for these
continuous equilibria, we can just perform the same proofs to show that propositions
1.9 and 1.10 still hold. Therefore, the same sufficient conditions on parameters for
equilibrium existence for N ≥ 2 (and thus the validity of any discussion on comparative
statics) apply for these equilibria too. For a discussion on these parameter restrictions,
refer to chapter 1.
2.3.2. Other Equilibria and the Results from Chapter 1. After determining
that the results from the non-rational model apply to a subset of the equilibria of the
rational model, a relevant question to ask is whether they also apply to the other equilibria
in the rational model. A fairly obvious observation is that proposition 2.5 implies that
there must always be a mass atom at ri = 0, which implies that there is always be
a possibility that a particular fund will fail in expectation, i.e there will always be tail
risk played in equilibrium. This is a result that carries over from the previous chapter.
However, we need to consider if the result that failure rates increase with competition
applies to these other equilibria.
Section 2.3.1 described the equilibria that correspond to the ones present in the non-
rational version of the model, and the key feature of these is that return cdfs are con-
tinuous in the interval [rf , ku]. The other equilibria in the model all have mass atoms
in this interval, which mean that ku is not just a function of exogenous parameters,
but also depends on where the mass atoms in [rf , ku] are located. Therefore, these
other equilibria do not have common values of ku. Consequently, common values of
T = βaH + (1− β)aL, the size of the mass atom at ri = 0 that is also the ex-ante fund
failure probability, will also not exist. It will still be useful to consider the exact form of
these other equilibria, and it is still possible to make some generalisations about their
features.
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Collecting the conditions that must be satisfied in equilibrium, we can verbally describe
these equilibria that have mass atoms above zero:
• To comply with proposition 2.5, at least one of the two fund types must play a
mass atom at ri = 0.
• Pi(ri) = Zri with Z > 0 for all points in SH
⋃
SL if there are at least two
points in SH
⋂
SL. This also applies trivially to when there are two points in
SH
⋃
SL. This is due to proposition 2.7.
• Any r∗ ≥ rf where there is a mass atom must be separated from the rest of
SH
⋃
SL by regions above and below r∗ that have fH = fL = 0, i.e. are not
in SH
⋃
SL.
There are some additional requirements so that there are no incentives for funds to move
mass off equilibrium path, often involving conditions that make sure that both types are
indifferent to mean-preserving mass movements from ri = 0 up to rf while moving some
other mass from ku downwards to rf , which puts some limits on how high ku can actually
be. These equilibria can have both regions where FH and FL are continuous, punctuated
by mass atoms where both fH and fL are delta functions, as long as these are surrounded
above and below by regions that are not in SH
⋃
SL. There is in principle no limit on
the number of mass atoms above rf . This is what makes it very difficult to derive a
general result on if fund failure rates increase with competition.
2.3.2.1. Equilibria where the results from Chapter 1 do not apply. A place to begin
is to find some equilibria in the fully rational model where the results from chapter 1 do
not hold. In particular, there is an entire class of equilibria for which fund failure and tail
risk are unaffected by the number of competing funds.
Because mass atoms can be played anywhere in this model, it is possible to have equilibria
with a only a finite number of points in SH
⋃
SL. This is done by having both types play
only mass atoms at certain values of ri, while still complying with propositions 2.5, 2.6
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and 2.7. So, most importantly, at least one type must play a mass atom at ri = 0, and
both type/ability constraints must be binding. A trivial way of doing this is to consider
a scenario where SH
⋃
SL consists only of two points, ri = 0 and ri = r∗ ≥ rH so it is
possible to satisfy proposition 2.6. Proposition 2.5 is satisfied by this, and proposition 2.4
will be too. Given that there are only two points in SH
⋃
SL, proposition 2.7 is trivially
satisfied - if there are only two values of Pi to consider, there will always be a straight
line that goes through both. Thus all types are indifferent to mean preserving mass
movements where mass is around moved only within SH
⋃
SL. To satisfy proposition
2.6, there is only one possible fH and fL that can be played: if we let the probability of
the H and L type drawing r∗ be tH and tL respectively, tH = rHr∗ and tL =
rL
r∗ , and the
consequently the probability of the H and L types drawing ri = 0 must be 1 − rHr∗ and
1 − rL
r∗ respectively. This is the only combination of mass atom probabilities that make
the ability/type constraints binding. Since proposition 2.7 is satisfied trivially, the only
thing to check is if there is an incentive to move mass to a point off equilibrium path.
This will be the case as long as Pi(rf )
rf
=
(β(1− rH
r∗ )+(1−β)(1−
rL
r∗ ))
N−1
rf
≤ Pi(r∗)−Pi(rf )
r∗−rf so that
no fund type finds it profitable to move mass from r∗ down to rf while moving mass up
from zero to rf .
The key thing to note is that increasing the number of competitors does not increase
the probability of fund failure, since the probabilities of the H and L types drawing r∗
or zero are locked in by the requirement that the type/ability constraints 2.2.3 and 2.2.4
are binding, and cannot vary as the number of funds increases. The results from chapter
1 do not apply to this class of equilibria.
In addition, there is one other case where the results from the non-rational model do
not apply fully. Note that Pi need not be a single linear function over SH
⋃
SL when
there are only three points in it. This special case is when the three points are ri = 0,
ri = rm and ri = rt. The L type plays mass only at zero and rm, and the H type
only plays mass at rm and rt. Thus, this requires rt > rm > rL, and rt > rH for
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proposition 2.6 to be satisfied. There are some additional requirements for there to
be no incentive for there mass to be moved off the equilibrium path, which are that
φi(rm) > β and
Pi(rf )
rf
≤ Pi(rt)−Pi(rf )
rt−rf . In a way, this is related to the special case of
SH
⋃
SL only containing two points, since SH and SL both only contain two points
each. What makes this equilibrium special is that if there is no incentive to move mass
off equilibrium path, then there are only two possible mean-preserving mass movements
by either type that change E(Pi). One of these is a movement of some mass from rm
up to rt, while moving some mass from rm down to zero for either type. This is never
profitable as long as Pi(rt)−Pi(rm)
rt−rm ≤
Pi(rm)
rm
. The other one is the H type moving mass
from rt down to zero, while moving mass from rm up to rt, which is never profitable as
long as Pi(rt)−Pi(rm)
rt−rm ≤
Pi(rt)
rt
. Pi(rt)−Pi(rm)
rt−rm ≤
Pi(rm)
rm
is actually sufficient for both mass
movements to be unprofitable, since if it holds, Pi(rm)
rm
≥ Pi(rt)
rt
. Note that proposition
2.7 does not need to hold here, since SH
⋂
SL contains only one point. Due to the
lack of a binding constraint on Pi over SH
⋃
SL, although increasing N does change
Pi by raising Pi(rt) − Pi(rm) relative to Pi(rm), it may not cause the violation of the
inequality required to hold for it to be an equilibrium until N is sufficiently large, and
the played distributions will not change. Thus, for some N < N ′ (N ′ depending on the
parameters), there will be no change in the amount of mass played at ri = 0 and thus no
change in the fund failure rate. Once this N ′ is exceeded, this equilibrium can no longer
hold with the parameters rt and rm. The fact that SH and SL are individually two points
each means that both funds are trivially indifferent to mass movements within SH and
SL when N changes - the two point support will always be on the same straight line in
Pi(ri) and ri space even when N changes.
2.3.2.2. Other Equilibria where the results from Chapter 1 apply. However, the result
of increasing fund failure probability with the number of competitors still holds in a lot of
equilibria with mass atoms, because the same incentive to move probability mass upwards
when competition increases from chapter 1 still exists in them. Consider the case when
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are at least three separate points, rb < rm < rt in one of SH or SL. Assume that the
model is in equilibrium. To create indifference to mean preserving mass movements, fH
and fL will be picked so that Pi = Zri over the support of the type that has at least three
points in its support. Now, consider increasing the number of competing funds from N
to N + 1. It is clear from 2.2.10 and 2.2.7 that the expression for Pi is decreasing in N
for a given fH and fL, regardless of whether there is a mass atom at that point or not.
This is because there will be more fund returns that the draw must be higher than to
win the reputational boost, with lower ri seeing larger falls in Pi due to the increasing
the power index N making Pi more convex - low draws will experience bigger falls in
winning probabilities, since increasing N will make it comparatively much more likely
that at least one out of the other funds will beat a low draw, compared to when the fund
draws high. Pi will no longer be linear, and the model will not be in equilibrium. Due to
the convex nature of Pi after the increase in competition, all fund types have incentives
to make mean preserving deviations that move mass from rm the upwards to rt while
moving some mass from rm downwards to rb, since the convexity of Pi means that the
downwards movement of mass from the middle of the support to the lower end of the
support decreases E(Pi) less than the increase from moving mass from the middle to the
top.
This mechanism will increase the fund failure rate when competition increases as long as
ri = 0 is in the support of a fund type that has at least three points in its support, and
therefore applies to a very wide range of return distributions. It automatically applies
to any equilibrium where fH and fL are continuous in some regions since that implies
that both fH > 0 and fL > 0 there due to propositions 2.3 and 2.4, and so both SH
and SL will have more than three points, and at least one of them must include ri = 0.
Consider a scenario when there are at least four points in SH
⋃
SL. Propositions 2.3 and
2.4 require SH to contain every point in SH
⋃
SL apart from ri = 0. If SH contained
ri = 0, the above mechanism will cause the fund failure rate to rise. In the case when
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ri = 0 is not in SH , as long as SL has at least three points in it, (this must include
ri = 0), increasing competition will cause the L type to move mass down to ri = 0,
raising the fund failure rate. Given the incentive to move mass to extreme values as
competition rises, no type will move mass away from ri = 0 as competition rises. Thus
this mechanism will cause the size of the mass atom at ri = 0 to rise, and thus the fund
failure to increase with competition when there are at least four points in SH
⋃
SL.
There is a caveat to this though. When probability mass is played entirely in the form
of atoms at exogenously picked points, then this mechanism only increases fund failure
rate up to a point. As the number of competing funds rises, more and more probability
mass is moved towards extreme values, and there will be a level of competition where
there is no more mass left to move to extreme values. In such a case, both types will
be playing distributions where they are playing mass at only two points, at zero and at
one other point above rH , like in the equilibria described in 2.3.2.1. Once this level
of competition is reached, increasing competition no longer increases the fund failure
rate, since if the points at which they can play mass are exogenously picked, then both
fund types are already playing the maximum mass that can be played at zero without
violating proposition 2.6. The logic from 2.3.2.1 then applies to explain why increasing
competition even further has no effect on failure rates.
2.3.3. Discussion. At some level, the results from chapter 1 still apply. This is
due to propositions 2.4 and 2.5. Proposition 2.5 in particular is a direct analogue of a
result from the non-rational model, and critically, it implies that in expectation (before
type determination), all funds play probability mass at zero. This guarantees that ri = 0
is always in the support of at least one of the fund types, and therefore some of the
implications for fund failure and financial stability still hold. Proposition 2.4 is also
vital, since it forces Pi to be monotonically increasing in ri, which together with the
reputational reward only being given to the fund that has the strongest return relative
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to its competitors, causes Pi to be related to the Nth order statistic when there are
N competing funds. This means that the mechanism driving the results in the previous
chapter, which is detailed in section 2.3.2.2., is also in effect here. Like in the non-rational
model, the order statistic nature of Pi means that increasing N increases its convexity,
giving an incentive to move probability mass to high return levels while moving mass
downwards to ensure that the played distribution still satisfies the ability/type constraint.
This can be interpreted as it being increasingly difficult to stand out with the highest
return and appear to be the most likely to be a high ability type as there are more funds
in the market. The fact that Pi is increasing in ri forces a monotone likelihood ratio
property on fH and fL, and makes the model superficially resemble the non-rational
version.
Proposition 2.5 is true for the same reasons in the non-rational case - the assumption
of fund failure together with a degree of freedom to move probability mass. Proposi-
tion 2.4 is due to the ability constraints together with the ability to move probability
mass around. Effectively, non-monotonic Pi cannot exist in the environment of return
distribution picking subject to mean constraints, since mean preserving mass movements
where mass is moved from above and below local peaks in Pi towards said peaks would
always exist if Pi were non-monotonic, with the opposite applying for local minima in
Pi. This will still be the case as long as there is some restriction on
´
g(r)fH(r)dr and´
g(r)fL(r)dr , where g(r) is some increasing function of r, so this is somewhat robust
to functional form assumptions.
However, the importance of how φi is calculated off equilibrium path, as stated in section
2.4.1, is somewhat troubling. It is required to prove proposition 2.5 in particular, and
is require to show that Pi must be monotonically increasing rather than decreasing in
ri, although an assumption that φi is merely constant off equilibrium path suffices to
some extent for proposition 2.4. Without this assumption, proposition 2.5 may not hold
and a mass atom at ri = 0 need not be in every equilibrium. It is however difficult to
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propose an alternative, more rational equilibrium refinement in this setting, and may be
something that can be improved on in future work.
The results from the previous chapter are undoubtedly weakened here, since they only
apply to a restricted subset of the equilibria. Changing the model to be something closer
to a signalling model where the observer rationally deduces which fund is most likely
to be of a high ability type means that equilibria with mass atoms above rf are no
longer excluded. Allowing equilibria with mass atoms above rf means that the range (in
particular the maximum return value) of the supports of equilibrium return distributions
can be arbitrarily determined. Contrast this to how they were always endogenously
determined by the parameters in the non-rational model. This is a major reason why
increased competition does not necessarily increase fund failure and tail risk in this model.
In the extreme case where the entirety of SH
⋃
SL consists of a finite number of points,
(incidentally the strongest exceptions to the results from chapter 1 all fall into this
category), the supports of the return distributions are determined entirely exogenously.
Raising competition has less of an effect in cases like this, since the maximum value in
SH
⋃
SL, ku, is exogenously fixed. In the non-rational version of the model and in the
continuous equilibria of this model, the rise in ku with competition means that more
mass is played at higher return levels, and so to preserve the mean, more mass must
also be played at zero. This mechanism does not operate in some scenarios with mass
atoms, where return supports are exogenously picked. This is most clearly seen in the
scenario where there are just two points in SH
⋃
SL, and the return distributions are
decided by needing the type/ability constraints to be binding. The exogenous support
there forces the played distributions to take a certain form that is invariant of the number
of competitors.
An interesting feature to note is how some of the equilibria in this model (in particular
the two point equilibrium of section 2.3.2.1) strongly resemble the story laid out by
Foster and Young (2010), much more so than the non-rational version of the model. In
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their setting, low ability managers essentially write disaster insurance using a put option
on an unlikely market event and obtain a return that is high and stable most of the
time, but occasionally causes the total loss of the investment. This corresponds exactly
to a two-point equilibrium where the L type plays mass at zero and rH , while the H
type plays mass only at rH . There is no possibility of fund types playing distributions
with mass in different regions, which is possible in the non-rational version. Why this
happens is an interesting question to ask, and almost certainly has to do with the fact
that this incarnation of the model is more like a Bayesian signalling game, which Foster
and Young’s story has more in common with. The non-rational version of the model is
more like a Blotto Game, where different fund types try to spread out their probability
mass and can to some extent play return distributions in which there are regions where
one type is playing mass, but the other is not. In a signalling game with costless return
distribution manipulation, equilibria where the L type is playing mass but theH type does
not cannot exist, since the L type can always move some of that mass to where φi > 0.
The equilibria of the rational model have some characteristics of the non-rational version
due to Pi being identical on equilibrium path and the presence of the same mean/ability
constraints, while still having some of the constraints you would expect from a Bayesian
signalling equilibrium imposed. The continuous equilibria detailed in section 2.3.1 are
most like the Blotto Game ones, and exist in both models. Equilibria that are entirely
mass atoms are the most unlike the Blotto Game type equilibria, and are most like
Bayesian signalling equilibria, and are unsurprisingly the ones most similar to the scenario
detailed in Foster and Young.
2.4. Conclusions
In this paper, a possible criticism of chapter 1 was addressed. Hedge funds in reality
service sophisticated investors. This makes the assumption that new funds gain a boost
to their reputation by posting high returns seem somewhat naive. To address this, a
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version of the model from chapter 1 with the reputational reward falling to the fund that
is evaluated as having the highest Bayesian probability of being a high ability type is
analysed, which addresses criticism of naive behaviour to some extent.
Although the model is different in essence from the case when all funds are racing for
the highest return, a number of results can be derived that make the rational version
of the model behave in a superficially similar way. The probability of winning of the
reputational boost is decided in an identical way to chapter 1, by a function related to
the highest order statistic. There are however substantial differences in the restrictions
on the equilibria allowed. Crucially, in the fully rational model, equilibria with mass atoms
at arbitrary return levels are allowed. This means that there are a much larger variety of
equilibria with different features, making it much more difficult to derive general results,
unlike in the non-rational model.
The main finding of this analysis is that some of the key results from the previous chapter
carry through in a weakened form, with some reliance on how fund type probabilities are
calculated off equilibrium path. In expectation, all funds play distributions where they
can draw a return of zero and fail, a result that is shared in common with the non-
rational model. The result that increasing the number of competing funds raises the
expected amount of probability mass played at zero and thus the fund failure rate holds
in a substantially weaker form. This is in particular due to a class of equilibria where
there are no mass atoms above the failure threshold existing in both the rational and
non-rational versions of this model. The mechanism of competition raising the convexity
of the probability of winning function operates in the rational model too, making an
increase in competition still raise the probability of fund failure in a considerable number
of cases up to a limit. This mechanism gives funds an incentive to move mass to extreme
values as competition increases, but there will be a level of competition where mass is
only being played at extreme values, meaning that there will be no mass left to move
from intermediate values. Then, the return distributions become two point, at which
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point raising competition has no effect any more. This is the main exception to the
results from chapter 1. When funds play mass at two points only, at zero and some
other exogenously defined point, there will only one be a single way of making the ability
constraint binding. Thus, such equilibria will be invariant to the number of competing
funds. This invariance is also related to the fact that the supports of such equilibria
are exogenously determined: the upper bound of the supports of the return distributions
does not rise with competition, which would have raised the amount of mass played at
zero.
These equilibria bear some resemblance to the return mimicking scenario described in
Foster and Young (2010), and this is not really surprising because the model appears
more like a signalling game than the non-rational version does, and these two point
equilibria are the most signalling-like equilibria. The equilibria where the results from
chapter 1 still apply have signalling elements in some of the restrictions on distribution
shapes (monotone likelihood ratios are required), but retain a lot of the Blotto-game like
character of the equilibria in the non-rational model, where funds try to spread out their
probability mass and can play distributions that are differentiated from each other.
Appendix 2
Proof of Proposition 2.4. The strategy to proving this has several steps. Firstly,
prove that Pi must be monotonic over the supports of both types. Then, show that φi
cannot be a decreasing function of ri. These two steps will show that Pi must be an
increasing function of ri over SH
⋃
SL. Then, it can be shown that can be no interval
[r′, r′′] in SH
⋃
SL where Pi is constant, which will force Pi to be strictly increasing over
SH
⋃
SL.
Lemma. Pi must be monotonic over the support of the H type and the L type.
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Proof. Consider a case where Pi is non-monotonic over the supports of fH and fL.
For Pi to be non-monotonic over the supports of both fH and fL, there must be at least
3 points in the supports of both types, which holds true even if both fH and fL consist
entirely of probability mass atoms. Let these 3 points be labelled dl, dm and du, with
dl < dm < du. Given that Pi is non-monotonic, it is always possible to pick dl, dm and
dh such that either
(1) Pi(dl) < Pi(dm), Pi(dm) > Pi(du)
(2) Pi(dl) > Pi(dm), Pi(dm) < Pi(dl)
It can be shown that in both cases, it is possible for at least one of the fund types to make
a profitable mean preserving mass movement. A mean preserving mass movement will
always be possible to execute regardless of whether the ability/type constraints (2.2.3
and 2.2.4) are slack or binding. In addition, they will not affect the expected return
component of the funds’ objective function. So, if a mean preserving deviation unam-
biguously increases E(Pi(ri)), then it will also unambiguously increase utility. Thus, if
a profitable mean preserving mass movement by one of the types is possible under some
conditions, then a combination of return distributions where these conditions can never
be an equilibrium.
Case 1. In case 1, the L type must be playing probability mass at dl and du, otherwise
φi = 1 at both aforementioned points, and Pi(dl) < Pi(dm) is impossible.
Consider moving mass  upwards from dl to dm. To preserve the mean, mass
δ can be moved down from du to dm. The overall effect on E(Pi(ri)), ∆P is
∆P = (Pi(dm)− Pi(dl)) + δ(Pi(dm)− Pi(du))
From the conditions on this case Pi(dl) < Pi(dm), Pi(dm) > Pi(du), it is clear
that ∆P > 0. To preserve the mean, we can adjust the relative size of  and
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δ, imposing the following the condition:
δ = 
(dm − dl)
(du − dm)
Given that the L type must be playing mass at dl and du, at least the L type
can always make this deviation, and so case 1 cannot be an equilibrium.
Case 2. In case 2, the L type must be playing mass at dm, otherwise φi(dm) = 1 and
Pi(dm) < Pi(dl) is impossible. Consider moving mass  downwards from dm
to dl. To preserve the mean, simultaneously move mass δ upwards from dm to
du. The effect on E(Pi(ri)), ∆P is:
∆P = (Pi(dl)− Pi(dm)) + δ(Pi(du)− Pi(dm))
From the conditions on this case Pi(dl) > Pi(dm), Pi(dm) < Pi(dl), it must
be the case that ∆P > 0. To preserve the mean, again adjust the relative sizes
of δ and  according to the following condition:
δ = 
(dm − dl)
(du − dm)
Given that the L type must be playing mass at dm, at least the L type can
always make this deviation, and so case 2 cannot be an equilibrium either.
It follows that any case where Pi is non-monotonic in ri cannot be an equilibrium, at
least one of the firm types will have an unilateral incentive to deviate. 
Lemma. Assuming φi is constant off equilibrium path, Pi must be increasing over the
support of the H type and the L type.
Proof. Again, the proof is by contradiction. Given that Pi must be monotonic over
regions where at least one type is playing mass, it must be either a decreasing or an
increasing function of ri over the supports of both types. Let kH be the upper bound
of the support of fH and kL be the upper bound of the support of fL. Then, designate
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ku = max(kH , kL) as the greatest support upper bound of either fund type. Assume that
Pi is a decreasing function of ri over the supports of both the types. From proposition
2.2, there must be at least two points in the supports of both types. Let these two points
be ku and dl. Given that Pi(ri) is decreasing in ri, it should always be possible to find
two points that satisfy dl < ku and Pi(dl) > Pi(ku). There are two cases to consider:
(1) φi(r′) = β > φi(ku) for r′ ∈ (ku, ∞)
(2) φi(r′) = β ≤ φi(ku) for r′ ∈ (ku, ∞)
This is due to the assumption on how φi is calculated off equilibrium path, although this
proof does not require this assumption to work. Again, we are looking for the existence
of profitable mean preserving derivations to rule out each case as an equilibrium.
Case 1. At least one of the fund types can make a profitable mean preserving deviation.
The funds (be they H or L type) that are playing probability mass at ku can
move mass from a small region around there  upwards to a small region around
r′ ∈ (ku, ∞), while simultaneously moving mass δ from a small area around
ku to a small area dl. The overall change in E(Pi(ri)) that results from this,
∆P , is:
∆P = (Pi(r
′)− Pi(ku)) + δ(Pi(dl)− Pi(ku))
It is clear that ∆P > 0. Given that the observer ranks funds in order of φi for
each fund, φi(r′) > φi(ku) ⇒ Pi(r′) > Pi(ku). Pi(dl) > Pi(ku) then ensures
that ∆P > 0. The deviation can be made mean preserving using
δ = 
(r′ − ku)
(ku − dl)
Thus case 1 cannot be an equilibrium.
Case 2. Consider a similar deviation to the previous case, with the fund types that are
playing probability mass at ku moving mass from ku up to some r′ > ku, and
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some mass downwards from ku down to dl. Mean preservation again gives
δ = 
(r′ − ku)
(ku − dl)
Substituting this into the expression for the overall change in E(Pi(ri)), ∆P ,
gives
∆P = (Pi(r
′)− Pi(ku)) +  (r
′ − ku)
(ku − dl)(Pi(dl)− Pi(ku))
Although φi(r′) ≤ φi(ku)⇒ Pi(r′) ≤ Pi(ku), making the first part of the ex-
pression negative or zero, the second part is positive due to Pi being decreasing
in ri. Note that ∆P can always be made positive by picking a sufficiently large
r′ to make the second term dominate the first term. Thus case 2 cannot be
an equilibrium either.
There are always unilateral incentives to make a mean preserving derivation when Pi is
decreasing over the supports of fH and fL. 
If Pi must be monotonic and not decreasing over the supports of fH and fL, it must be
that Pi is increasing over the supports of both types. To complete the proof, we need to
show that Pi is strictly increasing over SH
⋃
SL by excluding the possibility of intervals
in SH
⋃
SL existing where Pi is constant.
Lemma. There can be no interval [r′, r′′] in SH
⋃
SL the union of the supports of fH
and fL, where Pi is constant.
Proof. The tie-breaking procedure that selects the top fund as the one that draws
the highest return ensures that this is impossible. For Pi(ri) to be constant in the interval
[r′, r′′], then φi(ri) must be constant within this interval, since if it is increasing then
Pi(r
′′) > Pi(r′). Even if it is constant, Pi(rb) > Pi(ra) where ra ∈ [r′, r′′], rb ∈ [r′, r′′]
and rb > ra. This is because the tie-breaking procedure will always select rb over ra
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(higher return) if they are drawn by two different funds. Hence Pi(rb) > Pi(ra) for any
rb and ra, making it so that Pi is always strictly increasing within SH
⋃
SL. 
Together, these three lemmas force Pi to be strictly increasing over SH
⋃
SL, the union
of the supports of fH and fL.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. Firstly, define b as the lower bound of the union of the
supports of fH and fL. In other words, b = min(bH , bL), where bL is the lower bound
of the support of fL and bH is the lower bound of the support of fH . Proposition 2.1
implies that that b cannot be in the interval (0, rf ). Therefore, b must either be at
ri = 0 or in [rf , ∞). Obviously, we need to eliminate the second case as a possibility.
Firstly, consider the case when there is no mass atom at b, and b ∈ [rf , ∞). It can be
shown that this is never an equilibrium.
Lemma. If b ∈ [rf , ∞), there must a mass atom played by both types at b.
Proof. Assume that there is no mass atom at b. There must therefore be a r′ > b
where both types are playing probability mass. By proposition 2.4, Pi(ri) is an increasing
function of ri over the union of the supports of fH and fL. Thus Pi(b) = 0, since if
Pi is an increasing function of ri and b is the lower bound of the union of the supports
of fH and fL. Pi(b) = 0 may not be the case if there are mass atoms at b, but this is
excluded by our initial assumption. By proposition 2.3, both fund types must be playing
mass at b. Both types can always make the following mean preserving deviation that
will increase welfare: take mass from b and move it downwards to ri = 0, while moving
mass from b upwards to r∗ > b but still within SH
⋃
SL, which is possible given that
there must be at least one other point in SH
⋃
SL above b by proposition 2.2. Given
that Pi(b) = 0 and Pi(0) = 0, the downwards mass movement will not affect E(Pi(ri)),
but given the requirement that Pi(ri) must be strictly increasing over SH
⋃
SL, the
upwards mass movement will raise E(Pi(ri)). Thus, this deviation will be profitable for
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both types by raising E(Pi(ri)) while leaving E(ri) unaffected, and can be executed
even if type/ability constraints are binding due to mean preservation. Thus it is not an
equilibrium if b ∈ [rf , ∞) and there is no mass atom there. 
Lemma. If b ∈ [rf , ∞) and both types play a mass atom there, it is also not an
equilibrium.
Proof. By proposition 2.3, it must be the case that both types are playing mass
atoms at b. If only the H type was playing a mass atom, Pi cannot be strictly increasing
over SH
⋃
SL since φi(b) ≈ 1, and must have the highest Pi in all of SH
⋃
SL. This
violates proposition 2.4. A scenario where only the L type is playing mass is ruled out
by proposition 2.3, since φi(b) = 0 if that is the case.
Let the size of the mass atoms played by theH and L types at b be aH and aL respectively.
There are a number of scenarios to consider: firstly, the case where aH < aL, and secondly
the case where aH ≥ aL. It can be shown that both cases cannot be an equilibrium.
Case 1. When aH ≤ aL, φi ≤ β from using 2.2.2. Consider Pi(b+ ), where → 0. If
b+ is on equilibrium path, then given that Pi must be increasing on equilibrium
path (i.e. within SH
⋃
SL), then φi(b+) ≥ φ(b) (the tie-breaking rule selects
φi(b+) in case of equality). If b+ is not on equilibrium path, our assumption
that φi = β off equilibrium path 2.2.6 also ensures that φi(b+ ) ≥ φ(b), and
a fund that draws b +  will always win over a fund that draws b (via the
tiebreaker if aH = aL). Given that there are mass atoms at b and that it is the
lowest point in SH
⋃
SL, Pi(b) must be equal to 1N (βaH+(1−β)aL)N−1 since
winning the reputational reward is only possible if all other firms draw b and
the winner is drawn at random. Note that Pi(b+ ) ≥ (βaH + (1− β)aL)N−1
since φi(b + ) ≥ φ(b) and drawing b +  will always beat every other fund if
they all draw b. Crucially, Pi(b + ) is finitely larger than Pi(b). This allows
both firms to make a profitable mean preserving deviation by moving mass
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δ from b upwards to b +  while moving some mass w from b downwards to
ri = 0. Mean preservation implies
w = δ

b
Thus the overall effect on E(Pi(ri)) of this deviation, ∆P , has to be
∆P = δ(Pi(b+ )− Pi(b))− δ 
b
(Pi(b)− Pi(0))
Given our above statements, Pi(b+ )− Pi(b) ≥ N−1N (βaH + (1− β)aL)N−1,
and using Pi(0) = 0 and → 0 gives
∆P ≥ δ(N − 1
N
(βaH + (1− β)aL)N−1)
This is clearly always finite and positive for finite N , and so gives an unam-
biguous increase in welfare. Thus the case where aH ≤ aL cannot be an
equilibrium.
Case 2. When aH > aL, φi > β. This means the logic from the previous case does
not work. However, given that Pi must be strictly increasing in SH
⋃
SL, φi
must be (at least weakly) increasing in ri on equilibrium path. This implies
that fH > fL for all other points in SH
⋃
SL. However,
´ kH
b
fH(r)dr = 1
and
´ kL
b
fL(r)dr = 1, where kH and kL are the upper bounds of the support
of the H type and L type respectively. It follows that kH < kL due to the
requirement that fH > fL for all other points in SH
⋃
SL, which violates
propositions 2.3 and 2.4. The only way of avoiding kH < kL is to have some
regions in the interval [b, max(kH , kL)] where fL < fH , but this violates
propositions 2.3 and 2.4 as well. Thus this means that this case cannot be an
equilibrium either.

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So, we have shown that if b ∈ [rf , ∞), it cannot be an equilibrium regardless if fH and
fL are continuous there or not. Therefore, only b = 0 can be an equilibrium. This implies
that at least one of the fund types plays mass there at equilibrium.
To show that there must be a mass atom at ri = 0, define b′, the next highest point in
SH
⋃
SL after b = 0, i.e. the second lowest point in the union of the return distribution
supports. Clearly from the two lemmas above, b′ ≥ rf . If there is no mass atom at b
and there is no mass atom at b′ either, then Pi(b′) = 0 = Pi(b) in equilibrium if it exists,
which means that the logic used to prove the first lemma in this section can be applied
to show that this cannot be an equilibrium. If there is a mass atom at b′ but no mass
atom at b, then the logic from the second lemma in this section can be applied, since the
integrated probability at b is effectively zero if there are no mass atoms there. If bH and
bL are the size of the mass atom played at b′ by the H type and the L type respectively,
then if bH > bL, then propositions 2.3 and 2.4 cannot be satisfied, and bL < bH means
that there will always a profitable deviation by any type that plays mass at b′ by shifting
mass from there infinitesimally upwards. This completes the proof by showing that there
must be a mass atom at ri = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.6. The strategy is to split the proof into two lemmas.
First, show that the ability constraints must be binding for any type when their support
has at least two different points in it. Then, show that the ability constraints must be
binding for a fund type when there is only one point in their return support.
Lemma. The ability constraint must be binding for the H type fund as long as there
are at least two points in the support of its return distribution. The same applies to the
L type fund.
Proof. Assume that the type/ability constraint is slack for the H type, and that the
support of fH , SH , has at least two points in it. Given that the type/ability constraint
is slack, the H type can move some mass from the lower of the two points to the higher
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of the two points. Because Pi strictly increases with ri over SH
⋃
SL, this deviation
strictly increases not only E(ri) but E(Pi(ri)), and is therefore always profitable. The
same deviation can be done if there more than two points in SH . Therefore the if the
H type ability/type constraint is slack and there are at least two points in SH , then
it cannot be an equilibrium. Similarly, it is also not an equilibrium if the type/ability
constraint is slack for the L type and there are at least two points in SL. 
Lemma. The ability constraint must be binding for the H type when there is only one
point in its return distribution. The same applies to the L type.
Proof. First, assume that the H ability constraint is slack, and that there is only
point in SH , the support of fH . If SH only has one point in it, then it must be at
the highest point in SH
⋃
SL, otherwise Pi cannot be strictly increasing over SH
⋃
SL
as required by proposition 2.4. Let this point be at r∗ < rH . Given that the H type
constraint is not binding, consider moving mass  upwards from r∗ to a point r′ > r∗.
The effect on the utility , ∆pi, of this movement is:
∆pi = (r′ − r∗) + α(Pi(r′)− Pi(r∗))
Crucially r′ is not on equilibrium path (since r∗ is the highest point of SH
⋃
SL), by our
assumption that φi(ri) = β off equilibrium path, it follows that Pi(r′) is constant for all
ri > r
∗. Therefore, although Pi(r′)− Pi(r∗) < 0, note that it is constant for r′ > r∗. It
follows that we can always pick a r′ large enough so that (r′− r∗) > α(Pi(r∗)−Pi(r′)),
making this upwards mass movement profitable. Although we need to satisfy the ability
constraint,  can always be picked so that it is satisfied. Using the assumption that there
is only point in SH and rearranging the ability constraint 2.2.3 gives:
rH − r∗
r′ − r∗ ≥ 
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Thus this deviation is always feasible and profitable, and a scenario where SH is a single
point and the H ability constraint is slack cannot be an equilibrium. Consequently, from
this conclusion and the previous lemma, the H ability constraint must be binding. Now,
consider the case when the L ability constraint is slack and the support of fL, SL, consists
of a single point. Let this be r∗ again. Clearly r∗ < rL. However, given that the H ability
constraint is binding, the H type must be playing mass at r′ ≥ rH . Given proposition
2.4, Pi(r′) > Pi(r∗) since r′ > r∗. Thus, given the L type’s slack ability constraint, it is
always profitable for it to move mass up to r′ since it raises both E(ri) and E(Pi(ri)).
Therefore, it is not an equilibrium when the L type has a slack ability constraint and SL
consists of one point. 
The two lemmas together imply that the ability constraint must be binding for both types
at all times in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.7.
Lemma. If there are at least three points in SH , the support of fH , then Pi must be
linear over all of SH in equilibrium. Likewise, if there are at least three points in SL, the
support of fL, then Pi must be linear over all of SL in equilibrium.
Proof. Given proposition 2.6, we only need to consider mean preserving deviations
in equilibrium. Consider the case when Pi is not linear over all of SH . If Pi is not linear
over all of SH and there at least three points in SH , we can always find at least three
points in SH over which Pi is not linear. Label these three points rb, rm and rt, with
rb > rm > rt. If Pi is not linear over all of SH , we must be able to find a set of points
in SH such that either
(2.4.1)
Pi(rm)− Pi(rb)
rm − rb >
Pi(rt)− Pi(rm)
rt − rm
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or
(2.4.2)
Pi(rm)− Pi(rb)
rm − rb <
Pi(rt)− Pi(rm)
rt − rm
These conditions imply that the chord joining the point (rb, Pi(rb)) and (rm, Pi(rm))
does not have the same gradient as the chord joining (rm, Pi(rm)) and (rt, Pi(rt)), which
must be the case if rb, rm and rt have been picked so that Pi is not linear over them.
Consider making a mean preserving mass movement, moving mass  from rm upwards
to rt while moving mass δ from rm downwards to rb. Mean preservation means that
δ = 
(rt − rm)
(rm − rb)
using the above result, the effect on on Ei(Pi(ri)) of this deviation, ∆P , is
∆P = (rt − rm)
(
Pi(rt)− Pi(rm)
rt − rm −
Pi(rm)− Pi(rb)
rm − rb
)
Given 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, it follows that ∆P 6= 0. If ∆P > 0 (when 2.4.2 is true), then the
deviation is profitable, and Pi being nonlinear with SH containing at least 3 points cannot
be an equilibrium. If ∆P < 0 (when 2.4.1 is true), then the reverse movement is profitable
(moving mass  from rt down to rm and mass δ from rb up to rm), and this scenario is
also not an equilibrium. Thus, Pi must be linear over SH since if Pi(ri) = Zri + c, then
Pi(rm)−Pi(rb)
rm−rb =
Pi(rt)−Pi(rm)
rt−rm = Z for all possible combinations of rb, rm and rt, and the
H type is indifferent to such a deviation. Identical logic can be applied to the case for
the L type to give the result that Pi must be linear over SL when there at least three
points in SL. 
If there are at least two points in SH
⋂
SL, there must be at least two points in SH
⋃
SL.
When there are exactly two points in SH
⋃
SL that are both in SH
⋂
SL, then the result
trivially applies since a straight line can be drawn through any two points. Note however
that the straight line must pass through Pi(0) = 0, since one of the two points in
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SH
⋃
SL must be ri = 0 by proposition 2.5, resulting in the form Pi(ri) = Zri over
SH
⋃
SL.
When there are three points in SH
⋃
SL, there are two points above or at rf and one
point at zero (by propositions 2.1 and 2.5). The two points above rf must be in SH
by propositions 2.3 and 2.4. If ri = 0 is also in SH , we can use the previous lemma to
show that Pi must be linear over all three points in SH
⋃
SL. Given that it must pass
through Pi(0) = 0, its form is clearly Pi(ri) = Zri over ri ∈ SH
⋃
SL. If ri = 0 is in
SL only, all three points in SH
⋃
SL must be in SL, since there are at least two points
in SH
⋂
SL. We can therefore use the lemma in the same way on the L type to deduce
that Pi(ri) = Zri over ri ∈ SH
⋃
SL (no constant as it has to pass through zero again).
When there are at least four points in SH
⋃
SL, note that all but one of the points
must be in ri ∈ [rf ,∞) by proposition 2.1 (the other one must be ri = 0 by proposition
2.5). Consequently, all but one of the points (ri = 0) must be in SH due to propositions
2.4 and 2.3. We can apply the previous lemma to deduce that Pi must be of the form
Pi = ZHri + cH over SH . If the final point ri = 0 is also in SH , then the proposition
will clearly hold. If ri = 0 is on SL only, then for SH
⋂
SL to have at least two points,
SL must include at least two other points out of the ones in ri ∈ [rf ,∞). Then we can
apply the lemma to show that Pi = ZLri + cL over SL. However, if there are at least
two points in SH
⋂
SL, then to make the previous lemma apply to both the H and L
types simultaneously over SH
⋂
SL, Pi must be the same linear function over SH and
SL, i.e. ZL = ZH and cL = cH .
Furthermore, cH = cL = 0 since the point ri = 0 must in SH
⋃
SL, and the linear
function that is Pi must pass through Pi(0) = 0.
Finally, in all cases, clearly Z > 0 to satisfy proposition 2.4, and clearly Z 6= 0 in
equilibrium since probability mass is being played in ri ≥ rf . This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.8.
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Proof. Assume that at least one fund type is playing mass at r∗ − . Consider a
mean preserving deviation by that type from point r∗−  that consists of moving mass δ
from there down to ri = 0 and mass m from there up to r∗. Mean preservation implies
δ = m
(r∗−) . Using this and the fact that Pi(0) = 0 gives the total effect on E(Pi), ∆P ,
which is
∆P = m(Pi(r
∗)− Pi(r∗ − ))− m
(r∗ − )(Pi(r
∗ − ))
Crucially, from the result 2.2.9, Pi(r∗) =
∑W=N−1
W=0 (
1
W+1
) (N−1)!
(N−1−W )!(W )!a
W (u(r∗))N−1−W ,
where a is the size of the mass atom in expectation at r∗. One can see that Pi(r∗− ) ≤
(u(r∗))N−1, i.e. the W = 0 term of the sum (when all funds draw less than r∗). Thus,
Pi(r
∗) is finitely greater than Pi(r∗ − ) as long as N is also finite, even if  → 0.
Given the mean preservation requirement, δ = m
(r∗−) → 0 also and so there is effectively
no loss in Pi from this mass movement, while the part of the expression containing the
gain in Pi does not tend to zero due to Pi(r∗) being finitely greater than Pi(r∗ − ).
Therefore this deviation is always profitable, and no fund type can play mass at r∗ − .
Assume that at least one type plays mass at r∗+. Consider a mean preserving deviation
by that type that involves moving mass δ from r∗ down to zero, and an upward movement
of mass m from r∗ to r∗ + . Crucially, note that
Pi(r
∗ + ) ≥
W=N−1∑
W=0
(N − 1)!
(N − 1−W )!(W )!a
W (u(r∗))N−1−W
by definition, since a draw of r∗ +  will always win when all other funds draw r∗ or less.
Every term of this sum is greater than or equal to
Pi(r
∗) =
W=N−1∑
W=0
(
1
W + 1
)
(N − 1)!
(N − 1−W )!(W )!a
W (u(r∗))N−1−W
Therefore, Pi(r∗ + ) is finitely greater than P (r∗) even if → 0. Then, we can apply
similar logic to the previous case to show that the net effect on E(Pi) is always positive,
since there is a finite gain in E(Pi) by moving mass upwards by an infinitesimal amount
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while the amount of mass that needs to be moved downwards to compensate, δ, tends
to zero as → 0. So this deviation is always profitable, and no fund type can play mass
at r∗ +  either.
The logic used in these arguments do not apply to r∗ < rf , but no fund type plays mass
there except at ri = 0 anyway by propositions 2.1 and 2.5. Although proposition 2.5
states there must be a mass atom at ri = 0, this proposition applies to it given that no
mass is played in (0, rf ). 
CHAPTER 3
Model with Incentive Bonuses
3.1. Introduction
Real life hedge funds are heavy users of high powered incentive schemes. A particular one
that is very common is known as the 2 and 20 scheme. Abstractly, schemes combine a
flat fee for funds under management with a bonus scheme that allows the fund to keep a
significant cut of any profits above a certain threshold. In practice, the 2 and 20 scheme
involves a flat 2% of funds under management fee and a 20% bonus fee for any returns
above the risk free threshold.
There are clear benefits to using a high powered incentive scheme like this. The most
obvious one is that it if the fund manager is able to exert variable effort and returns
depend on this, the bonus scheme helps to align the interests of the manager and the
investors by incentivising effort. This is especially important given the existence of the
flat management fee, which might otherwise cause issues by allowing managers to collect
a large payoff while exerting little effort. Often the bonus scheme is combined with
other measures such as forcing the manager to invest a significant amount of their own
money into the fund, which is another method of incentivising effort and decreasing
moral hazard. Some other less obvious benefits to these bonus schemes have also been
suggested, for example by Arya and Mittendorf (2005) who point out that high powered
incentive schemes can be used as a signalling device by high ability managers, who are
more inclined to take these bonuses because they are more likely to be able to trigger
them. Das and Sundram (2002) show theoretically that funds with stronger incentive
fees should exhibit better performance in general.
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However, the empirical evidence on this is mixed, and this casts some doubt on claims
that these bonus schemes actually improve performance. Some studies find that these
bonuses are indeed linked with better performance (Ackermann McEnally and Ravenscraft
(1999)), while some other studies (Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999)) find that
there is no link between performance and incentive schemes. At the very least, the link
between the two is somewhat tenuous. One of the reasons this may be the case is that
there incentive bonus schemes may have also have detrimental effects that mitigate their
positive effects. Some theoretical literature that points out unexpected negative effects
of these bonus schemes. An example is Hodder and Jackwerth (2005), who examine
the dynamic risk taking decisions of a utility maximising manager. They use numerical
simulations to show that the fine details of the incentive schemes can have drastic effects
on managerial risk taking, and under such incentive schemes fund managers do not
behave in way desired by investors at all. Incentive schemes like the 2 and 20 one used
by a lot of hedge funds are effectively like out of the money options, and this can distort
fund manager behaviour as it may cause them to take extreme risks to push the incentive
bonus into the money.
This chapter contributes to the latter strand of literature by highlighting a possible
negative effect of these incentive bonuses. It considers the consequences of using bonuses
like the “20” portion of the commonly used 2 and 20 scheme, i.e. when a fund manager
keeps a cut of all profits above a certain threshold in the setting of the model in part 1,
where new hedge funds of unknown ability with access to complex financial engineering
compete to enhance their reputation by performing well relative to their peers. The
model is kept simple to isolate potential negative effects, and therefore some features
like variable effort are not included, since that will not change the potential negative
effects of incentive bonuses while adding modelling complexity.
The main finding is that as one might expect, incentive bonuses encourage risk taking
in such a setting. Comparing the tail risk and fund failure rates in equilibria where mass
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is played above the incentive bonus return threshold in this model with the equivalent
equilibria from the model in chapter 1 shows that adding bonuses increases failure prob-
abilities and tail risk under mild conditions. When funds have the ability to manipulate
return distributions via financial engineering and are incentivised to do so by a bonus
scheme, they will use the tools at their disposal to move probability mass into return
regions where they gain a bonus. If their innate ability constrains them from generating
high return investment strategies, then moving mass to bonus regions will result in higher
failure risk and tail risk.
In addition, with this setup, funds actually play less total probability mass above the
bonus threshold than without it. The probability mass they do play above the bonus
threshold is higher variance, however. Intuitively, this is because the bonus scheme
rewards high return values that are delivered by having high variance above r′. Again,
this is also related to the assumption that funds are constrained by their innate ability:
to run expected return and variance above r′, they must offset this with more probability
mass below r′ in total to keep the mean return within their ability constraint. A second
interesting finding is that this setting imposes a minimum amount of tail risk per fund.
This is due to the combination of the freedom to pick return distributions with the bonus
and the chasing of relative performance. Funds must be indifferent to moving mass above
r′, and therefore the loss from moving mass downwards in the region below r′ must be
as high as the gain in bonuses from moving mass upwards in the region above r′, and
the only way of achieving this is to have funds play steep cdfs below r′, so the reduction
in the probability of winning the reputational boost offsets this.
This part is organised in the following way: section 2 introduces the model and analyses
some of the features of the equilibria, and derives the key equations necessary for the
results. Section 3 discusses and explains these results, and section 4 is a brief summary
and conclusion.
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3.2. The Model
3.2.1. Model Setup. The model is very similar to the one from chapter 1. N
hedge funds of unknown ability level and financial engineering powerful enough to allow
them to pick their return distributions with complete freedom subject to an ability con-
straint compete to win a reputational boost, with the winning fund decided by strong
performance relative to its peers. Unlike in the model in part 1, they have some of their
own funds If but also have funds I from another source, e.g. from investors. The key
addition to this model is the effect of a compensation scheme like the 2 and 20 scheme
commonly used by hedge funds. This states that funds keep a cut s of all returns on the
money they manage (i.e. money that is not their own) above a certain threshold r′. In
practice this threshold is the risk free return rate, effectively stating that a fund keeps
20% of any returns it can make in excess of it.
Otherwise, the funds have the same options and payoff structure as they do in part 1.
They are risk neutral, and consider the returns on their own money, the odds of winning
the reputational boost, and the cut of the return they make above r′ due to the incentive
scheme. The timing of the game is as follows:
• t = 0 : Nature draws the types of the N funds independently, with each fund
being a H ability type with probability β and a L ability type with probability
1−β. Each fund knows its own type, but not the types of its competitors. Each
fund picks a return distribution subject to an ability constraint that allows the
H type to play a distribution with a greater mean than the L type, and invests
If of its own funds and I funds from other investors into it.
• t = 1 : The investment matures, paying out ri(I + If ) in total for fund i,
following the distribution picked at t = 0. The fund keeps its own investment
riIf , and as a consequence of its incentive scheme, it also gets a share s(ri−r′)I
of the profits on the investors’ funds if ri is greater than some threshold r′.
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The winner of the reputational boost is the fund that shows the best relative
performance in its peer group, and therefore the fund that draws the highest
return out of the N competing entities gets this award. Like in part 1, if a fund
draws a return below an exogenous threshold rf , it fails. If it fails, it cannot
win the reputational boost.
Assume for simplicity that there is no discounting. Given this setting, we can write the
objective function for each fund:
pii = E(riIf ) + αE(Pi(ri)) + L(ri)I
With the special function L defined to replicate the incentive scheme described previously:
L(ri)

L = s(ri − r′) for ri ≥ r′
L = 0 for ri < r
′
Where s, I and α are all positive numbers. As before, Pi is the probability of winning
the reputational boost given a return draw ri, and α is a parameter that determines the
size of the reputational boost. The type constraints, or ability constraints the funds are
subject to are the same as in part 1:
(3.2.1) E(ri) ≤ rH for H type
(3.2.2) E(ri) ≤ rL for L type
And to give the H type higher “ability” than the L type,
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rH > rL
A number of other assumptions are also made. Firstly, rf < rL < rH , i.e. both fund types
can produce mean returns above the failure threshold. Secondly, r′ > rf . Intuitively, the
bonus threshold should be above the failure threshold. Limited liability, i.e. ri ≥ 0 is
assumed. Also, sIr
′
α
< 1. The last assumption is so that there are equilibria where mass
is played above r′ exist.
Pi is unchanged from part 1 since the way the winner of the reputational reward is
determined is unchanged, and so is given by the probability that a draw of ri is the
highest return draw out of the N funds. Thus, it is given by
(3.2.3) Pi(ri) = (βFH(ri) + (1− β)FL(ri))N−1
This is obtained using the same reasoning as for the model in part 1.
3.2.2. Limits on the Form of the Equilibria. This section contains a number
of propositions that restrict the form of the equilibria.
Proposition 3.1. The ability constraints 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 must be binding for both
types.
Proof. This proof is very similar that of the analogous result in the first section. If
the type constraint is not binding for one type, then it will always be possible to move
probability mass upwards, which is a deviation that raises the expected return. Since
Pi must be an increasing function of ri, this deviation must either raise E(Pi) or keep
it the same. Thus, this deviation must be strictly welfare increasing since it increases
the expected mean return while at least keeping E(Pi) constant, and so it cannot be
an equilibrium if any fund has a slack ability/type constraint. Thus the type constraint
must be binding for all funds in equilibrium. 
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The implication of this is that if the type/ability constraints bind, then funds in equilibrium
only need to be indifferent to mean preserving mass movements. There can be no mean
preserving mass movements that raise E(Pi), which gives us a useful method for finding
the equilibria.
Proposition 3.2. No fund types play mass in the interval (0, rf ).
Proof. The proof of this is extremely similar to that of the analogous results from
the previous sections. Given proposition 3.1, we only need to consider mean preserving
deviations. Assume that in equilibrium, a fund plays probability mass in this interval. It
can always move some mass upwards to any ri ≥ rf while simultaneously moving mass
downwards to ri = 0 to preserve the mean return. Such a deviation will always strictly
increase E(Pi) since Pi = 0 for ri ∈ [0, rf ) and Pi > 0 for ri ≥ rf since we have
assumed that funds play probability mass in (0, rf ). Therefore, there will be incentives
for unilateral deviation if funds play probability mass in (0, rf ), and this will not happen
in equilibrium. 
This must be true because moving mass from that interval downwards has no effect on
E(Pi) since the contribution to E(Pi) from mass in [0, rf ) is always zero. If this can be
done, mean preservation allows some other mass to be moved upwards to where Pi > 0.
Proposition 3.3. No fund type can play a mass atom in the open interval [rf , ∞).
Proof. This is identical to the proof for the analogous result for the model in
chapter 1. Assume that one of the fund types is playing a mass atom at a point r′. This
cannot be an equilibrium since a profitable deviation is always possible: a fund that is
playing mass at point r′ can move mass upwards from there to r′+ , where → 0, while
preserving the mean by moving mass downwards elsewhere. The gain in E(Pi) from
moving mass upwards infinitesimally is finite, which can be deduced using the formula for
Pi at a mass atom from chapter 2 (2.2.10), or by noting that drawing r′+  will beat any
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draw of r′ or less compared to before the mass movement, when other funds drawing r′
can only be beaten by winning a random tiebreaker. The effect of the downwards mass
movement on E(Pi) tends to zero due to  tending to zero, making this deviation always
profitable. This applies both for ri < r′, and ri ≥ rf , since the extra payoff gained by
moving mass upwards is continuous in both ri ≥ r′ and rf ≤ ri ≤ r′. 
The winner of the reputational boost is determined by the highest order statistic. When
there is a mass atom, moving a finite quantity of probability mass infinitesimally upwards
from the mass atom gives a finite gain in E(Pi), and because of the infinitesimally small
size of the upwards movement, only a correspondingly small amount of mass needs to
be moved downwards to preserve the mean. The effect on E(Pi) of the downwards
movement thus tends to zero, and this deviation is overall always profitable.
Proposition 3.4. At least one of the two fund types must play a mass atom at ri = 0.
Proof. This proof is identical to the proof for proposition 1.5 in chapter 1. Let
b be the lower bound of the union of the supports of fH and fL. If there are no
mass atoms at ri = 0, then Pi(b) = 0, since by propositions 3.2 and 3.3 Pi must be
continuous above ri = 0. It is then always possible to make a profitable mean preserving
deviation: move some mass from ri = b down to ri = 0, while moving some probability
mass from b upwards. The downwards mass movement does not decrease E(Pi) due to
Pi(b) = Pi(0) = 0, and the upwards mass movement will increase E(Pi). Thus there
must be a mass atom at ri = 0. 
Proposition 3.4 follows a similar logic to proposition 3.2. If there is no mass atom at
ri = 0, then the lowest bound of the union of the supports of the two different fund
types, b, has Pi(b) = 0 due to the winner of the reputational boost being decided by the
Nth order statistic. It is then possible to move mass downwards from b without incurring
any losses to E(Pi), while keeping mean preservation with a strictly profitable upwards
mass movement. This result ensures that there will be failure/tail risk.
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Proposition 3.5. Mass must be played for all ri ∈ [rf , ku], where ku is the greatest
upper bound of the union of the supports of fH and fL.
Proof. If there is an interval (b1, b2) in which no fund type is playing mass within
[rf , ku], then Pi must be constant within (b1, b2). Then it is always possible to make a
profitable mean preserving mass movement: move some mass from b2 downwards to b1
and some mass upwards elsewhere from r′ to r′′, where r′ < r′′ and Pi(r′) < Pi(r′′). Such
a r′ and r′′ will always exist due to propositions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. The first movement has
no effect on E(Pi) due to Pi being constant here, while the second movement strictly
improves E(Pi). Hence this cannot be an equilibrium. 
This follows similar logic to the previous proposition. If no fund plays mass in some regions
within [rf , ku], then Pi is constant there, allowing the same type of mean preserving
mass distribution to be always profitable.
3.2.3. Calculating Equilibria. Like in the basic model presented in chapter 1, we
can use the previous propositions to narrow down some of the properties of the equilibria.
Although there are an infinity of equilibria, they share a number of common properties
relating to failure risk/tail risk that can be calculated. We are looking for symmetric
equilibria where at least one of the funds has the possibility of being affected by the
incentive scheme, i.e. at least one of the funds is playing mass above r′.
Given proposition 3.1, all fund types must be indifferent to a mean preserving shift of
probability mass in equilibrium, while obeying the propositions detailed in the previous
subsection. So, in equilibrium, to obey proposition 3.1, we must have
´
rfHdr = rH and´
rfLdr = rL. There must also always be a mass atom in expectation at ri = 0, while
fH = fL = 0 in ri ∈ (0, rf ), and both FH and FL must be continuous in ri ∈ [rf , ∞).
We need to set out the conditions for all fund types to be indifferent to mean preserving
mass shifts in equilibrium. The bonus for drawing ri > r′ means that there are two distinct
regions of ri draws with differing payoffs, giving rise to a number of different combinations
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of mass movements between regions that must be considered. In equilibrium, both fund
types must be indifferent to all these different combinations of movements. Let ku be
the greatest upper bound of the supports of fH and fL. Since we only want to consider
equilibria where ku > r′, this can be assumed.
Firstly, consider making a mean preserving deviation in which mass  is moved upwards
from x to x + ∆x and mass δ down from y + ∆y to y. For now, assume that this
mass movement only involves moving mass around in the interval [rf , r′], i.e. rf ≤ x <
x+ ∆x ≤ r′ and rf ≤ y < y + ∆y ≤ r′. There are no conditions on the levels of y and
x relative to each other. The effect of such a movement on the utility of a fund is
∆pii = ((x+∆x)If−xIf+αPi(x+∆x)−αPi(x))+δ(yIf−(y+∆y)If+αPi(y)−αPi(y+∆y))
Mean preservation gives:
δ[(y + ∆y)− y] = [(x+ ∆x)− x]
δ = 
∆x
∆y
Setting ∆pii = 0 and substituting the mean preservation condition into ∆pii gives
Pi(x+ ∆x)
∆x
=
Pi(y + ∆y)
∆y
The analysis can be simplified by only considering this condition when ∆x → 0 and
∆y → 0. This can be done without loss of generality because Pi must be continuous in
this region due to proposition 3.3. The effect of any mean preserving mass movement
can be broken down into the effects of a series of smaller ones, and this takes that logic
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to the extreme to simplify matters. Like in the previous sections, the result is a condition
on the derivative of Pi:
dPi
dri
|ri=y =
dPi
dri
|ri=x
This must hold for every y ∈ [rf , r′] and x ∈ [rf , r′]. If ∆pii < 0 anywhere then it is
possible to possible to reverse the directions of the mass movements while still preserving
the mean to get a profitable deviation. Recall that Pi must be an increasing function. The
above condition together with the requirement that Pi be continuous from proposition
3.3 implies that Pi must be linear in [rf , r′], since that is the only functional form for Pi
that has a constant derivative over the interval. If dPi
drI
is not constant over this interval,
then it is always possible to find a mean preserving mass movement such that ∆pii > 0.
Thus Pi(ri) = Zri + c for ri ∈ [rf , r′].
The value of c can also be found by considering a mean preserving deviation that moves
mass from rf down to zero while moving some mass up. Due to proposition 3.2, there is
no incentive to move mass downwards to (0, rf ), and there is no need to consider mass
movements from some other ri > rf downwards to zero since such a movement can
be decomposed into two separate mean preserving mass movements: firstly a movement
where mass is moved to rf , and then a further movement where this mass is moved
down to zero. The linear form of Pi in [rf , r′] means funds will be indifferent to the first
of the two mass movements, and so only the second movement needs to be analysed.
Consider a mass movement where mass  is moved from r∗ ∈ [rf , r′] to a return level
r∗∗, where r∗∗ ∈ [rf , r′] and r∗∗ > r∗, while mass δ is moved downwards from rf down
to zero. The effect on the objective function ∆pii is
∆pii = [If (r
∗∗ − r∗) + α(Zr∗∗ + c− (Zr∗ + c))]− δ[Ifrf + α(Zrf + c)]
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Mean preservation gives
δ = 
(r∗∗ − r∗)
rf
Substituting this, using Pi(0) = 0 in and requiring that ∆pii = 0 gives
c
r∗∗ − r∗ =
c
rf
This can only satisfied for all r∗∗ and r∗ only if c = 0. Intuitively, Pi(0) and Pi(rf ) must
be on the same straight line for funds to be indifferent to this deviation, giving c = 0.
Thus
(3.2.4) Pi(ri) = Zri for ri ∈ [rf , r′]
This must be the case for funds to be indifferent to mean preserving deviations that move
mass around within [0, r′].
However, given that ku > r′, funds must also be indifferent to mean preserving mass
movements that shift mass only in the interval [r′, ku]. Consider the effect on the
objective function of such a movement.
∆pii = [(x+ ∆x)If −xIf +αPi(x+ ∆x)−αPi(x) + sI((x+ ∆x)− r′)− sI(x− r′)]
+ δ[yIf − (y + ∆y)If + αPi(y)− αPi(y + ∆y) + sI(y − r′)− sI((y + ∆y)− r′)]
Using mean preservation and setting ∆pii = 0 as before gives:
Pi(x+ ∆x)
∆x
=
Pi(y + ∆y)
∆y
Using similar reasoning to before, it follows that Pi is linear for this region too. Let
(3.2.5) Pi(ri) = Z ′ri + c′
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for ri ∈ [r′, ku], with Z ′ and c′ denoting the possibility that these coefficients are different
from Pi in ri ∈ [rf , r′]. So, Pi must be linear in both [rf , r′] and [r′, ku], although the
same linear relation does not need to hold in both regions.
We also need to make funds indifferent to mean preserving mass movements that move
mass in both regions simultaneously. Consider a mass movement where some mass is
moved from x upwards to x + ∆x within [r′, ku], i.e. r′ ≤ x < x + ∆x and mass δ
is simultaneously moved downwards from y + ∆y to y within [rf , r′], i.e. rf ≤ y <
y + ∆y ≤ r′. The effect of this on the objective function of a fund is
∆pii = [(x+ ∆x)If −xIf +αPi(x+ ∆x)−αPi(x) + sI((x+ ∆x)− r′)− sI(x− r′)]
+ δ[yIf − (y + ∆y)If + αPi(y)− αPi(y + ∆y)]
Setting this to zero for indifference and using mean preservation gives
α
Pi(x+ ∆x)
∆x
+ sI = α
Pi(y + ∆y)
∆y
Using the result on Pi in [rf , r′], 3.2.4 and the general linearity of Pi in [r′, ku] 3.2.5,
a relation between Z, the gradient of Pi in [rf , r′] and Z ′, the gradient of Pi in [r′, ku]
can be obtained:
(3.2.6) Z ′ = Z − sI
α
It is immediately possible to deduce the value of c′ and thus the form of Pi in [r′, ku].
Recall that due to proposition 3.2, Pi must be continuous in this interval. A continuity
argument then implies that the expression for Pi(r′) in the lower region must be equal to
the expression for Pi(r′) from the upper region, i.e. that Zr′ = Z ′r′ + c′. Using 3.2.6,
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this gives
(3.2.7) c′ =
sIr′
α
From this , we can obtain a complete expression for Pi(ri):
(3.2.8) Pi(ri)

Pi = 0 ri ∈ [0, rf )
Pi = Zri ri ∈ [rf , r′]
Pi = (Z − sIα )ri + sIr
′
α
ri ∈ [r′, ku]
Pi = 1 ri ∈ [ku, ∞)
Clearly the probability of gaining a reputational boost is zero below rf due to the fund
failure, and will be 1 above ku, the upper bound of the union of the supports of both
the types. To complete the calculation of Pi, it needs to be verified that fund types
are indifferent to mass movements where mass is moved between the two regions as
well. An example of this is a mass movement where mass is moved upwards within
[r′, ku] but some mass is moved downwards from the upper region into the lower region
to maintain mean preservation. Fortunately, this step can be skipped by noting that
any pair of mass movements that involves shifting mass between the two regions can be
broken down into a series of smaller movements that do not cross the boundary between
the two regions. For example, a movement of mass upwards in the upper region only
coupled with a downwards movement from the upper region into the lower region can
be broken down into a movement of the same mass upwards by a smaller distance in the
upper region and a downwards movement of mass in the upper region to the boundary
r′, followed by a downwards movement in the lower region only from r′ downwards, and
a mass movement in the upper region only. Indifference to movements between regions
can also be simply verified using the same method used to consider movements that do
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not cross boundaries by calculating the effect on objective functions of all the different
possible mass movements across the boundary r′, and finding that any mean preserving
movement gives ∆pii = 0.
Note that Z ′ = Z − sI
α
means that Z > sI
α
, since Z ′ > 0 by definition. If this is
not true, then it is always possible to find profitable mean preserving deviations where
mass is simply moved to above r′ to take advantage of the bonus. This shows why the
assumption sIr
′
α
< 1 is necessary to ensure equilibria where mass is played above r′ exist.
If the lowest Z can be is sI
α
, then the assumption is necessary to ensure that Pi(r′) < 1
so that mass is still played above r′.
3.2.4. Tail Risk and Failure Risk. Like in the model in part 1, there are an infinity
of equilibria. However, the form of Pi can still be used to deduce a number of important
equilibrium properties, namely failure probabilities, which are equivalent to tail risk due
to proposition 3.4. These end up being independent of the exact return distributions
played in equilibrium. The results calculated in the previous section apply to symmetric
equilibria where ku > r′, which are the ones of interest.
3.2.4.1. Calculating Z and its Relation to Failure Rate. If it is assumed that one
of the fund types chooses a return distribution with a mass atom of size aH or aL at
zero and a probability density function g elsewhere, then the form of Pi, given by 3.2.8,
together with the expression for Pi in terms of FH and FL, 3.2.3, dictates what the
return distribution of the other type must be in equilibrium. Like in the model in part 1,
the exact form of FH and FL varies according to if ku is kH or kL, which of the two types
has a (relatively) free choice of pdf by playing the g function, and if the support upper
bound of the type that is not determining ku is less than r′. This creates a multitude of
different cases each with a slightly different form for FH and FL. The details of what
these are and how they are derived are contained in appendix 3.
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From the cdf forms mentioned before, pdfs and thus expressions for E(ri) can be found,
and because proposition 3.1 states that the type constraints must bind in equilibrium,
these expressions for E(ri) can be substituted into the ability/type constraint equations
(3.2.1 and 3.2.2) to generate two equations that give relationships between the key
endogenous variables. These can be used to eliminate the free pdf component g, resulting
in a single equation derived from every different form of FH and FL. Like in the analysis
in chapter 1, every different form of FH and FL ends up generating the same key relation
between the parameters of the model, Z, Z ′ and ku:
(3.2.9) r =
ˆ r′
rf
r
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1) dr +
ˆ ku
r′
r
Z ′(Z ′r + c′)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1) dr
Where r = βrH + (1 − β)rL, and Z ′ and c′ are given by the results derived previously:
3.2.6 and 3.2.7 respectively. The details showing this calculation are contained within
appendix 3.
Given that the relation between Z ′ and Z is known, only ku needs to be eliminated to
give an equation in one variable. To do so, consider the nature of Pi - it is a probability,
the probability of winning the reputational boost. Given that there are no mass atoms,
Pi must be equal to one at the upper bound of the union of the supports of fH and fL,
which is ku. This is because if there is no mass atom at ku, then drawing ku means that
the reputational boost is always won - by definition a draw higher than ku in equilibrium
is impossible, and another draw equal to ku happens with zero probability due to the lack
of mass atoms. Thus we can write:
Z ′ku + c′ = 1
Subbing in Z ′ = Z − sI
α
from 3.2.6 and c′ = sIr
′
α
from 3.2.7 gives an expression for ku
in terms of Z and the parameters:
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(3.2.10) ku =
1− sIr′
α
Z − sI
α
This can be used to eliminate ku from 3.2.9 to give an expression for Z, which is the
most important variable for determining failure rate and tail risk. Simplifying 3.2.9 by
performing the integrals gives:
r = [
Z
1
N−1 r
1
N−1+1
N
]r
′
rf
+ [r(Z ′r + c′)
1
N−1 ]kur′ − [
(N − 1)(Z ′r + c′) 1N−1+1
NZ ′
]kur′
Noting that Z ′ku + c′, Z ′ = Z − sIα , c′ = sIr
′
α
, using 3.2.10, and simplifying gives the
final result of:
(3.2.11) Z =
sI
α
+
1
rN + (ZrNf )
1
N−1
[1 + (N − 1)sI
α
Z
1
N−1 r′
1
N−1+1 − NsIr
′
α
]
Given equation 3.2.10, it is clear that Z > sI
α
for ku to be a valid upper bound for the
return distributions of the H and L types. Although it is not clear that the equation for
Z (3.2.11) produces Z > sI
α
, the following proposition can be proved:
Proposition 3.6. 2r¯ ≥ r′ > rf and sIr′α ∈ (0, 1) are sufficient to ensure that equation
3.2.11 gives a unique Z > sI
α
for N ≥ 2.
Proof. See appendix 3. 
These are necessary assumptions to ensure that the equations governing symmetric equi-
libria are well behaved. What remains to be done is finding the failure rate and tail risk
in terms of Z and the parameters. This is done in an identical fashion to chapter 1.
Assume that the H type fund plays an atom of size aH . Due to 3.2.8 and cdf continuity
for ri ≥ rf , aL = (Zrf )
1
N−1
1−β − β1−βaH . Likewise, if the L type is playing aL, then by
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identical reasoning aH =
(Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− 1−β
β
aL. Because funds do not play any mass below
the failure threshold except for a mass atom at zero, the failure probability and tail risk
per fund is given by the expected size of the mass atom at zero before type determination,
a = βaH + (1 − β)aL. Both the expressions previously listed give the same expression
for this:
(3.2.12) a = (Zrf )
1
N−1
This is precisely same expression as the corresponding one in part 1. However, the value
of Z is clearly different here.
3.2.4.2. Comparative Statics and a Parameter Condition on Higher Failure Rates.
To isolate the effect of introducing an incentive scheme like the 2 and 20 used by a
lot of hedge funds, the fund failure probability here needs to be compared to the failure
probability for the same model without the incentive scheme. Fortunately, this has already
been analysed in chapter 1. As stated before, the expression for failure rate in the model
without the incentive scheme is identical to the one obtained in this chapter, and is
a = (Zrf )
1
N−1 . This only depends on one endogenous variable, Z. Therefore, the only
factor that determines which failure risk is higher is Z. The higher Z is, the higher the
failure/tail risk.
Let Z∗ be the expression for the equivalent endogenous variable in the model in part 1.
Although chapter 1 does not derive an expression for Z, it is straightforward to derive it
from the relation 1
ku
= Z and the equation relating ku to the exogenous parameters. Z∗
is given by:
(3.2.13) Z∗ =
1
rN + (Z∗rNf )
1
N−1
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To recap, failure/tail risk is greater when there is an incentive scheme if Z > Z∗, with Z
given by 3.2.11 and Z∗ given by the above equation. Although it is difficult to analyse
which is greater exactly due to lack of closed forms for Z and Z∗, it is possible to get
concrete conditions on when Z > Z∗.
Proposition 3.7. If sIr
′
α
r′ + sIrf
α
rf ≥ r′, 2r¯ > r′ is a sufficient condition for Z > Z∗.
If sIr
′
α
r′ + sIrf
α
rf < r
′, 2r¯ + sIr
′
α
r′ + sIrf
α
rf > 2r
′ is a sufficient condition for Z > Z∗.
Under these conditions, failure/tail risk is always greater in symmetric equilibria where
at least one type is playing mass above r′ when there is an incentive scheme that gives
funds a cut s of profits above r′.
Proof. See appendix 3. 
However, like in chapter 1, it must be shown that symmetric equilibria actually exist.
A similar strategy to that employed in chapter 1 is used: a computationally convenient
functional form for FL is selected, and the equilibrium is computed. From this, sufficient
conditions on the parameters are obtained for the equilibria to be valid. The following is
proved in the appendix:
Proposition 3.8. Under the conditions required for proposition 3.6 to hold, the con-
dition
sIrf
α
≥ (1− β)(rH − rL)
rH
on the exogenous parameters is sufficient to ensure existence of equilibria for all N of
interest, i.e N ≥ 2.
Proof. See appendix 3. 
This condition is not inconsistent with the assumptions needed for proposition 3.6. The
expression (1−β)(rH−rL)
rH
∈ (0, 1), and sIrf
α
∈ (0, 1) since sIr′
α
∈ (0, 1) and rf < r′. Thus
it is possible to pick parameter values such that this holds, since sI
α
is a free variable.
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In reality, one might expect the potential future gains from outperforming all competitors,
α, to be larger than a fraction s, which is around 0.2, of investor money now for a new
fund of unknown reputation (I will not large). Thus, sI
α
∈ (0, 1) is not a particularly
extreme assumption. Given that r′ is going to be around the risk free rate and is this only
slightly greater than one, sIr
′
α
< 1, a required assumption, does not seem unreasonable.
Also, (1−β)(rH−rL)
rH
, the right hand side of the inequality that ensures the existence of
symmetric equilibria for N ≥ 2 in proposition 3.8 is low in reality. This is because rL
and rH are not likely to be extremely far apart in absolute terms, rH might be something
like 1.4, while rL might be something like 1.07 or so. This is still a huge 33% difference
in interest rates (probably smaller in reality), but also ensures that (1−β)(rH−rL)
rH
is small
even for relatively low values of β. For example, with rL = 1.07, rH = 1.40 and a small
value of β such as 0.01, the expression is still small (0.233). This eases the restrictiveness
of the inequality in proposition 3.8 by allowing for a larger range of values for sIrf
α
. Given
that rf is not much lower than r′ due to its interpretation as an outside option,
sIrf
α
will
only be slightly smaller than sIrf
α
. However, we are still restricted in what values of I
α
we can take if we want to ensure existence of equilibria for N ≥ 2. This cannot be too
small and cannot be too large (we require sIr
′
α
∈ (0, 1)). Note that these conditions are
only sufficient, and sIrf
α
being only slightly less than (1−β)(rH−rL)
rH
might still be enough
for equilibria for N ≥ 2.
3.3. Discussion
The conditions that ensure higher tail risks in symmetric equilibria from proposition 3.7
do not require that r′ ≤ r. However, r′ ≤ r is a condition that is not too far fetched.
One might expect rH , the return level of high ability funds to be reasonably larger than
r′, which could be interpreted as the risk free rate, and rL to be at worst around the risk
free rate. If one assumes that r′ is also going around the risk free rate, then r′ ≤ r is
likely to be satisfied or almost satisfied, which will ensure proposition 3.7 holds. Given
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that sIr
′
α
and sIrf
α
cannot be too small (due to proposition 3.8), the conditions from
proposition 3.7 are likely to be satisfied even if r′ > r¯, since r′ is unlikely to be much
more than the risk free rate (which is itself close to rL) . Also, since proposition 3.7 only
provides sufficient conditions for Z > Z∗, there are many more parameter combinations
for which this is true too.
So, for many reasonable parameter values, failure risk is greater when bonus schemes
are used. This is somewhat unsurprising given the setup of the model. The agents have
the power to manipulate their return distributions subject to an ability constraint. This
gives funds the power to move probability mass into the region above r′ where they
receive their incentive bonus at the cost of moving some mass downwards to keep the
ability constraint binding, and since they are risk neutral, they are happy with getting the
possibility of large bonuses at the risk of of failing. In a sense, this is what the incentive
scheme is designed to do: encourage fund managers to deliver high returns. In other
models, the bonus scheme encourages greater effort, leading to higher returns. When
financial engineering allows return distributions to be manipulated costlessly, funds will
be incentivised to move mass to above r′. What this model makes clear is that if the
expected return of funds are constrained by ability, then this mass movement will be
accompanied by an increase in tail risk. This particular assumption is an interesting one
- to what extent are funds in reality constrained by ability rather than effort cost? It
is conceivable that above a certain level of bonus managers will be constrained by their
innate ability, and so bonuses above that level merely induce heavy risk taking.
In addition, the mixture of risk neutrality and the linear incentive bonus means that
there is less mass played above r′ than when there is no incentive bonus. This can be
seen by noting that Pi(ri) is strictly increasing in the amount of probability mass that a
fund plays below ri in expectation (before type determination), and that Pi for ri < r′
is Zri when there is a bonus scheme and Z∗ri where there is not. As stated before,
Z > Z∗ is definitely true under mild conditions. Then, there will be less mass played
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above r′ when there is a bonus, since there is more mass below r′. If the conditions in
proposition 3.7 hold, to ensure that type constraints are binding, the mass above r′ must
contribute more to the mean than without the bonus since there is more mass below
r′. It follows that mass above r′ must be higher variance with the bonus. The reason
for this is the incentive bonus linearly rewarding extremely high return draws, meaning
funds prefer higher return values. The bonus rewards distributions with high expected
value from probability mass above r′, which is exactly what running high variance above
r′ gives. However, since the funds are constrained by their ability, they must offset the
higher expected value of the mass played above r′ with more mass below it. Technically,
the gradient of Pi above r′ is lower than below r′ to compensate for the additional return
due to incentive bonus in this region, which makes the total probability mass above r′
lower but its variance higher, since ku will be higher.
In this simple model, competing for strong relative performance and return distribution
manipulation actually puts a limit to the amount of risk taken. In principle, one might
expect the funds to play mass at extremely high values of ri to maximise sI(ri − r′) if
they are bound by their ability constraints. This is actually limited by the setting of the
model requiring return cdf continuity (proposition 3.1) and proposition 3.5 implying that
mass must be played from rf all the way up to ku. This prevents a distribution being
played that has a lot of mass at zero, with a small amount of mass at a very high r, since
mass must be played all the way up to ku. The is caused by some of the Blotto game like
characteristics of the setting - the types of deviations that make these propositions true
are analogous to moving resources out from battlefields that are losing badly and moving
enough to battlefields that are not winning to swing them. The expected return is like the
resource constraint in this context, and being able to move mass downwards while still
keeping the same Pi for that mass is like being able to move mass away from battlefields
that are losing heavily. Another characteristic that the setting gives is a minimum degree
of tail risk. Like in the model from chapter 1, the rise of tail risk with competition is
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driven by the 1
N−1 power term, which pushes a to one. Z falls with competition, but
not fast enough to offset the rise due to the power term. However, now Z takes a
minimum value of sI
α
from proposition 3.6 (to ensure indifference to moving mass above
r′ anyway), even if say r is very large (this causes Z∗ to be very small, lowering failure
risk when there are no incentive bonuses). Thus, the minimum tail risk/failure risk in
such an equilibrium must be
sI
α
rf
Since failure risk is lowest when N is at a minimum. This is because the ability to move
probability mass around subject to mean constraints implies that Pi, which is related to
how much mass funds play below that ri value, must be high enough to cause funds to
be indifferent to moving mass to above r′, where Pi cannot be less than zero. This is
a detrimental effect due to introducing these incentive bonuses into the environment of
the model in part 1.
There are of course plenty of problems with this approach. It is missing key features like
variable effort, but as mentioned earlier, that would not have eliminated the negative
effects that this analysis finds. Adding variable effort makes the analysis considerably
more complex, weakens the magnitude of the negative effects, but does not remove
them. Likewise, risk aversion would have mitigated the risk taking but not eliminated it.
More fundamental problems with the approach are really the same as the model in part
1: the setting itself may not be the best description of how hedge funds operate. There
is no denying that financial engineering allows return distributions to be manipulated, but
it in reality it does so in a way that trades off risk against mean return. The assumption
that managers’ innate ability restricts mean returns is therefore a strong assumption that
is critical in generating a lot of the results, and as mentioned before is an interesting
assumption that can be debated.
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3.4. Conclusion
This part analysed the effects of adding an incentive bonus scheme similar to the “20”
portion of the common 2 and 20 scheme (where a fund keeps a cut of any profits above
a certain return threshold) to a model like the one introduced in chapter 1. As one
might expect, amongst new hedge funds competing for strong relative performance to
enhance their reputations, under some mild assumptions, failure risk is higher in equilibria
where mass is being played above the bonus threshold when there are bonuses. In an
environment where funds are risk neutral, they are incentivised by the bonuses to use
financial engineering to move probability mass to above the bonus threshold. Critically,
in this setting, funds are constrained by the innate ability of their managers. So, to
play return distributions with probability mass in bonus regions, they must also play tail
risk to keep the return distributions within their ability constraints. This also leads to
less probability mass, but with higher variance being played above the bonus threshold
compared to the case without the incentive scheme due to a combination of the linear
incentive scheme and the ability constrained nature of the funds. A unique feature of this
model is the minimum tail risk that must exist in equilibria where mass is played above
the bonus threshold, which arises due to the need to be indifferent to moving mass to
above the bonus threshold, which at the very least gives some extra return due to the
bonus. The return pdfs must have a minimum steepness below the bonus threshold for
this indifference to hold.
This is a somewhat crude attempt to analyse the effects of bonus schemes in an en-
vironment of new, competing hedge funds. To extend this work further, an alternative,
less extreme framework of return manipulation by financial engineering will need to be
developed, since that is the most controversial part of this model. The assumption that
funds have their mean returns restricted by their ability is a very strong one that is critical
in driving the results of the model, and this framework does not allow return manipulation
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equivalent to changing leverage to happen, which would be a desirable feature to have.
Overall, this is merely a first step to analysing the effects of incentive bonuses on a world
of competing hedge funds.
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Appendix 3
Deriving Forms of FH and FL and Equilibrium Equations. The form of Pi,
3.2.8, can be used together with 3.2.3 to derive the form of FH and FL when one of the
types is assumed to have a free choice of return distribution. As stated in section 2.4, a
number of different cases that give different forms for FH and FL need to be analysed,
and they are done here case by case.
Case 1. ku = kH . Assume the H type is playing a cumulative distribution function
with a mass atom aH at zero, and a function G above that. G(rf ) must be zero at rf
to comply with proposition 3.2, i.e. FH and FL must be continuous apart from at zero.
Assume that for now kL ≥ r′. Because Pi must be linear up to ku (equation 3.2.8) and
kL < ku, FH must take on a different form between kL and ku since FL is set at one
and can no longer be picked to give the correct form for Pi there. So, FH must have the
following form:
FH(ri)

aH ri ∈ [0, rf )
G(ri) + aH ri ∈ [rf , kL]
(Z′ri+c′)
1
N−1
β
− 1−β
β
ri ∈ [kL, ku]
1 ri ≥ ku
Where Z ′ = Z − sI
α
from 3.2.6. It follows from 3.2.8 that FL must be:
FL(ri)

(Zrf )
1
N−1
1−β − β1−βaH ri ∈ [0, rf )
(Zri)
1
N−1
1−β − β1−β (G(ri) + aH) ri ∈ [rf , r′]
(Z′ri+c′)
1
N−1
1−β − β1−β (G(ri) + aH) ri ∈ [r′, kL]
1 ri ≥ kL
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From proposition 3.1, the type/ability constraints 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 must be binding. We
can use the derived forms for FH and FL above to find expressions for fH and fL,
the pdfs, and substitute these into the ability constraints. This gives the following two
equations:
rH =
kLˆ
rf
rg(r)dr +
kuˆ
kL
r
Z ′(Z ′ri + c′)
1
N−1−1
β(N − 1)
rL =
ˆ r′
rf
r[
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
(1− β)(N − 1) −
β
1− β g(r)]dr +
ˆ kL
r′
r[
Z ′(Z ′r + c′)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1)(1− β) −
βg(r)
(1− β) ]dr
Where g = dG
dr
. Combining these two equations allows g to be eliminated, giving a
simplified condition derived from the type constraints. r = βrH + (1− β)rL.
r =
ˆ r′
rf
r
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1) dr +
ˆ ku
r′
r
Z ′(Z ′r + c′)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1) dr
If kL < r′, using 3.2.8 and the same reasoning, FH must be
FH(ri)

aH ri ∈ [0, rf )
G(ri) + aH ri ∈ [rf , kL]
(Zri)
1
N−1
β
− 1−β
β
ri ∈ [kL, r′]
(Z′ri+c′)
1
N−1
β
− 1−β
β
ri ∈ [r′, ku]
1 ri ≥ ku
And FLmust be:
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FL(ri)

(Zrf )
1
N−1
1−β − β1−βaH ri ∈ [0, rf )
(Zri)
1
N−1
1−β − β1−β (G(ri) + aH) ri ∈ [rf , kL]
1 ri ≥ kL
Using FL and FH to derive fH and fL and substituting these into the binding ability
constraints 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 gives:
rH =
kLˆ
rf
rg(r)dr +
ˆ r′
kL
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
β(N − 1) dr +
kuˆ
r′
r
Z ′(Z ′ri + c′)
1
N−1−1
β(N − 1) dr
rL =
ˆ kL
rf
r[
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
(1− β)(N − 1) −
β
1− β g(r)]dr
The condensed condition with g eliminated is the same as when kL ≥ r′:
r =
ˆ r′
rf
r
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1) dr +
ˆ ku
r′
r
Z ′(Z ′r + c′)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1) dr
Case 2. ku = kH , but the L type has the freedom to pick a G function now. Assume
that kL ≥ r′. Applying the same logic as case 1 gives:
FL(ri)

aL ri ∈ [0, rf )
G(ri) + aL ri ∈ [rf , kL]
1 ri ≥ kL
And therefore FH must be:
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FH(ri)

(Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− 1−β
β
aL ri ∈ [0, rf )
(Zri)
1
N−1
β
− 1−β
β
(G(ri) + aL) ri ∈ [rf , r′]
(Z′ri+c′)
1
N−1
β
− 1−β
β
(G(ri) + aL) ri ∈ [r′, kL]
(Z′ri+c′)
1
N−1
β
− 1−β
β
ri ∈ [kL, ku]
1 ri ≥ ku
Using FL and FH to derive fH and fL and substituting these into the binding ability
constraints 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 gives:
rL =
kLˆ
rf
rg(r)dr
rH =
ˆ r′
rf
r[
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
β(N − 1) −
1− β
β
g(r)]dr+
ˆ kL
r′
r[
Z ′(Z ′r + c′)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1)β −
1− β
β
g(r)]dr
+
ˆ ku
kL
r
Z ′(Z ′r + c′)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1)β dr
Eliminating g gives the same condition as in case 1:
r =
ˆ r′
rf
r
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1) dr +
ˆ ku
r′
r
Z ′(Z ′r + c′)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1) dr
If kL < r′, then FL must be:
FL(ri)

aL ri ∈ [0, rf )
G(ri) + aL ri ∈ [rf , kL]
1 ri ≥ kL
And from 3.2.8, FHcan be obtained:
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FH(ri)

(Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− 1−β
β
aL ri ∈ [0, rf )
(Zri)
1
N−1
β
− 1−β
β
(G(ri) + aL) ri ∈ [rf , kL]
(Zri)
1
N−1
β
− 1−β
β
ri ∈ [kL, r′]
(Z′ri+c′)
1
N−1
β
− 1−β
β
ri ∈ [kL, ku]
1 ri ≥ ku
Using FL and FH to derive fH and fL and substituting these into the binding ability
constraints 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 gives:
rL =
kLˆ
rf
rg(r)dr
rH =
ˆ kL
rf
r[
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
β(N − 1) −
1− β
β
g(r)]dr +
ˆ r′
kL
r
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1)β dr
+
ˆ ku
r′
r
Z ′(Z ′r + c′)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1)β dr
Eliminating g once again gives the same condition as case 1.
r =
ˆ r′
rf
r
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1) dr +
ˆ ku
r′
r
Z ′(Z ′r + c′)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1) dr
Cases 3 and 4. These are very similar to cases 1 and 2 respectively, but with ku =
kL > kH . The H type has the freedom to choose the G function in case 3, while the
L type has the ability to choose the G function in case 4. The calculations will not be
gone over in detail, since case 3 is highly similar to case 2, but with the H type playing
the role of the L type. In both scenarios, the fund type that has a support upper bound
less than ku is playing G. To get the forms of the cdfs and equations, take the cdfs and
equations from case 2, switch FH with FL and rL with rH , replace kL with kH , switch
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β with 1− β, and replace aL with aH . The resulting equations give the same equation
involving Z, Z ′ and ku 3.2.9 as cases 1 and 2, as required.
Likewise, case 4 is highly similar to case 1, but with the L type playing the role of the H
type in case 1. The type that has the freedom to choose the G function is the type that
has the greatest support upper bound in both cases. The cdfs and equations are obtained
in an identical manner to the other cases, and the forms of the cdfs and equations can
be obtained from the case 1 cdfs and equations by switching FL with FH and rH with
rL, replacing kH with kL, switching 1− β with β, and replace aH with aL. Once again,
the final equation that results is 3.2.9, the same equation as in cases 1 and 2.
The analysis of the above four cases still applies exactly when ku = kH = kL. The
intervals such as [kL, ku] and [kH , ku] vanish and when considering the ability con-
straints, the integrals over these intervals are zero. Simply replace kL and kH with ku.
The resulting equation from the ability constraints is still 3.2.9, as required. All these
different cases generate the same equation with Z, Z ′ and ku.
Proof of Proposition 3.6. We want to prove that sIr
′
α
∈ (0, 1) and 2r¯ ≥ r′ > rf
are sufficient conditions for equation 3.2.11 to give Z > sI
α
. Take equation 3.2.11:
Z =
sI
α
+
1
rN + (ZrNf )
1
N−1
[1 + (N − 1)sI
α
Z
1
N−1 r′
1
N−1+1 − NsIr
′
α
]
To simplify things, denote Z − sI
α
= Zˆ. Then rearrange the above equation into the
following form:
(3.4.1) Zˆr¯N + Zˆ(Zˆ +
sI
α
)
1
N−1 r
N
N−1
f − (N − 1)
sI
α
(Zˆ +
sI
α
)
1
N−1 r′
N
N−1 = 1− NsIr
′
α
Denote the LHS of the above expression as
f(Zˆ) = Zˆr¯N + Zˆ(Zˆ +
sI
α
)
1
N−1 r
N
N−1
f − (N − 1)
sI
α
(Zˆ +
sI
α
)
1
N−1 r′
N
N−1
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so that equation 3.4.1 becomes
f(Zˆ) = 1− NsIr
′
α
Lemma. If , 2r¯ ≥ r′ > rf and sIr′α ∈ (0, 1), then satisfying the inequality
0 < (1− sIr
′
α
)− (N − 1)[sIr
′
α
− (sIr
′
α
)
N
N−1 ]
ensures equation 3.4.1 gives a unique Zˆ > 0.
Proof. For the lemma to be true, we need f to cross the horizontal line 1− NsIr′
α
once in the region Zˆ > 0. Firstly prove that df
dZˆ
≥ 0 for all Zˆ ≥ 0.
Take the first and second derivative of f wrt to Zˆ:
df
dZˆ
= r¯N + (Zˆ +
sI
α
)
1
N−1 r
N
N−1
f +
Zˆ(Zˆ + sI
α
)
1
N−1−1
N − 1 r
N
N−1
f −
sIr′
N
N−1
α
(Zˆ +
sI
α
)
1
N−1−1
d2f
dZˆ2
=
2(Zˆ + sI
α
)
1
N−1−1r
N
N−1
f
N − 1 −
(N − 2)
(N − 1)2 Zˆ(Zˆ+
sI
α
)
1
N−1−2r
N
N−1
f +
sIr′
N
N−1
α
(N − 2)
(N − 1)(Zˆ+
sI
α
)
1
N−1−2
Consider when d
2f
dZˆ2
= 0. There is a unique value of Zˆ where this is true is given by
Zˆ =
[− sIr′
N
N−1
α
(N−2)
(N−1) −
2sIr
N
N−1
f
α(N−1) ](N − 1)2
Nr
N
N−1
f
< 0
This is clearly (all parameters are positive numbers) at a value of Zˆ < 0. Also, note
that Zˆ = 0, d
2f
dZˆ2
> 0 since the only negative term is zero. It follows from continuity of
d2f
dZˆ2
that d
2f
dZˆ2
≥ 0 for all Zˆ ≥ 0. This is because there are no discontinuities in d2f
dZˆ2
for
Zˆ ≥ 0, and the only Zˆ where d2f
dZˆ2
crosses the zero line is at a value of Zˆ < 0.
Now, consider df
dZˆ
evaluated at Zˆ = 0:
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df
dZˆ
|Zˆ=0 = r¯N + (
sIrf
α
)
1
N−1 rf − (sIr
′
α
)
1
N−1 r′
Given that it was assumed that sIr
′
α
∈ (0, 1), rf < r′ and N ≥ 2, 0 < ( sIrfα ) < ( sIr
′
α
) < 1
and thus ( sIrf
α
)
1
N−1 < 1 and ( sIr
′
α
)
1
N−1 < 1. Also, since N ≥ 2 and, we can write
df
dZˆ
|Zˆ=0 = r¯N + (
sIrf
α
)
1
N−1 rf − (sIr
′
α
)
1
N−1 r′ > 2r¯ + (
sIrf
α
)
1
N−1 rf − r′
It is clear that 2r¯ ≥ r′ is sufficient to ensure df
dZˆ
|Zˆ=0 > 0. Given that d
2f
dZˆ2
≥ 0 for all
Zˆ ≥ 0 as well, it follows that df
dZˆ
> 0 for all Zˆ ≥ 0 given our assumptions.
This assures that if there is a solution in the region Zˆ > 0, it will be unique since f(Zˆ)
is strictly increasing in Zˆ ∈ [0,∞). Furthermore, df
dZˆ
≥ 0 for all Zˆ ≥ 0 and df
dZˆ
being
infinite at as Zˆ →∞ implies that equation 3.4.1
f = Zˆr¯N + Zˆ(Zˆ +
sI
α
)
1
N−1 r
N
N−1
f − (N − 1)
sI
α
(Zˆ +
sI
α
)
1
N−1 r′
N
N−1 = 1− NsIr
′
α
will have a unique solution in Zˆ ∈ (0,∞) providing that f(0) < 1− NsIr′
α
. This condition
is:
(3.4.2) 0 < (1− sIr
′
α
)− (N − 1)[sIr
′
α
− (sIr
′
α
)
N
N−1 ]
This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Now, the next lemma will complete the proof of the proposition:
Lemma. sIr
′
α
∈ (0, 1) is a sufficient condition for
0 < (1− sIr
′
α
)− (N − 1)[sIr
′
α
− (sIr
′
α
)
N
N−1 ]
to be true for N ≥ 2.
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Proof. Let the RHS of inequality 3.4.2 be denoted by
g(N) = (1− sIr
′
α
)− (N − 1)[sIr
′
α
− (sIr
′
α
)
N
N−1 ]
. The first step is to prove that dg
dN
< 0 for N ≥ 2.
Calculate the first and second derivatives of the function g wrt to N :
dg
dN
= (
sIr′
α
)
N
N−1 [1− 1
N − 1 ln(
sIr′
α
)]− sIr
′
α
d2g
dN2
=
1
(N − 1)3 (
sIr′
α
)
N
N−1 (ln(
sIr′
α
))2
The second derivative of g wrt to N is clearly always positive for N ≥ 2.
Consider the limit of dg
dN
as N tends to infinity. Write dg
dN
as:
dg
dN
= (
sIr′
α
)[(1− ln(
sIr′
α
)
N − 1 )(
sIr′
α
)
1
N−1 − 1]
We can see that limN→∞ dgdN → 0 from the negative side since ( sIr
′
α
)
1
N−1 → 1. Given
that d
2g
dN2
> 0 for N ≥ 2, it must the case that dg
dN
< 0 for N ≥ 2.
Given dg
dN
< 0 for N ≥ 2, the minimum value of g is attained when N →∞. It follows
that given dg
dN
< 0 for N ≥ 2, we only require g > 0 for N → ∞ to ensure g > 0 for
N ≥ 2. Rearranging condition 3.4.2 and noting that sIr′
α
∈ (0, 1) ⇒ sIr′
α
−( sIr′
α
)
N
N−1 > 0,
we get
(3.4.3) 1 <
(1− sIr′
α
)
N−1
sIr′
α
− ( sIr′
α
)
N
N−1
We can use L’Hôpital’s rule to evaluate the limit of the RHS of this expression asN →∞:
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lim
N→∞
(1− sIr′
α
)
N−1
sIr′
α
− ( sIr′
α
)
N
N−1
=
(1− sIr′
α
)
− sIr′
α
ln( sIr
′
α
)
Note that this is indeed positive as expected, since sIr
′
α
∈ (0, 1) ⇒ ln( sIr′
α
) < 0. So the
as N →∞, inequality 3.4.3 becomes:
sIr′
α
− 1
sIr′
α
< ln(
sIr′
α
)
To simplify things, write K = sIr
′
α
. The above inequality is then
K − 1
K
< ln(K)
This can be shown to be true for sIr
′
α
∈ (0, 1). Note that at K = 1, K−1
K
= ln(K). The
derivative of the LHS of this expression is 1
K2
, while the derivative of the RHS is 1
K
. So
for sIr
′
α
= K ∈ (0, 1), the LHS must increase faster than the RHS. Given that they cross
at K = 1, it must be the case that K−1
K
< ln(K) for sIr
′
α
= K ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, given
sIr′
α
∈ (0, 1), condition 3.4.2 must hold for N →∞ and dg
dN
< 0 for N ≥ 2 ensures that
it will also hold for N ∈ [2,∞). 
The first lemma states that if sIr
′
α
∈ (0, 1) and 2r¯ ≥ r′ > rf , satisfying 3.4.2 ensures
that 3.4.1 gives a unique Zˆ > 0 if it has a solution there. The second lemma states
that sIr
′
α
∈ (0, 1) and 2r¯ ≥ r′ > rf are sufficient to ensure 3.4.2 is satisfied for N ≥ 2,
making equation 3.4.1 give a unique Zˆ > 0. This is exactly the same as 3.2.11 giving a
Z > sI
α
, which completes the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3.7.
Proof. Rearrange 3.2.11 into:
Z(rN + (ZrNf )
1
N−1 ) =
sI
α
(rN + (ZrNf )
1
N−1 ) + 1 + (N − 1)sI
α
Z
1
N−1 r′
1
N−1+1 − NsIr
′
α
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and rearrange 3.2.13 into:
Z∗(rN + (Z∗rNf )
1
N−1 ) = 1
For any rH , rL, β and N , Z(rN + (ZrNf )
1
N−1 ) > Z∗(rN + (Z∗rNf )
1
N−1 ) is a necessary
and sufficient condition for Z > Z∗ given that both functions are increasing in Z and
Z∗ when Z > 0 and Z∗ > 0. The similarity of the expressions and the fact that Z and
Z∗ are the only endogenous variables ensures this. Applying this condition gives:
(3.4.4) N(r¯ − r′) + (ZrNf )
1
N−1 + (N − 1)Z 1N−1 r′ 1N−1+1 > 0
From proposition 3.6, we can obtain a lower bound on Z, that Z > sI
α
. Thus Z
1
N−1 r′
1
N−1 >
( sIr
′
α
)
1
N−1 . Then, given that sIr
′
α
∈ (0, 1) and N ≥ 2, then ( sIr′
α
)
1
N−1 > sIr
′
α
. Noting that
sIrf
α
< sIr
′
α
, we can write
N(r¯− r′) + (ZrNf )
1
N−1 + (N − 1)Z 1N−1 r′ 1N−1+1 > N(r¯− r′) + (N − 1)sIr
′
α
r′ +
sIrf
α
rf
Consider the conditions needed for N(r¯ − r′) + (N − 1) sIr′
α
r′ + sIrf
α
rf > 0 for N ≥ 2.
A necessary condition is that the LHS of the expression increases with N , which gives
2r¯ + 2 sIr
′
α
r′ > 2r′. We also need this expression to be true for N = 2, which gives
2r¯+ sIr
′
α
r′+ sIrf
α
rf > 2r
′. Given that r′ > rf , 2r¯+ sIr
′
α
r′+ sIrf
α
rf < 2r¯+ 2
sIr′
α
r′. Thus
only the second condition needs to be met to satisfy 3.4.4:
(3.4.5) 2r¯ +
sIr′
α
r′ +
sIrf
α
rf > 2r
′
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Now consider the initial condition for proposition 3.6 to hold: 2r¯ ≥ r′ > rf . Taking the
condition 2r¯ ≥ r ⇒ 2r¯ + r′ ≥ 2r′ and comparing this with the above condition 3.4.5
leads to two scenarios:
Case 1. sIr
′
α
r′+ sIrf
α
rf ≥ r′, then 2r¯ ≥ r′ ⇒ 2r¯+ sIr′α r′+
sIrf
α
rf ≥ 2r′. So the required
condition is:
2r¯ > r
Case 2. sIr
′
α
r′ + sIrf
α
rf < r
′, then 2r¯ + sIr
′
α
r′ + sIrf
α
rf > 2r
′ ⇒ 2r¯ > r′ . So the
required condition is:
2r¯ +
sIr′
α
r′ +
sIrf
α
rf > 2r
′
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3.8. Use a similar strategy to that employed in chapter 1.
Assume the cdf FL(r) played by the L type is:
(3.4.6) FL(r)

1 r ∈ [ku,∞)
A[(Z − sI
α
)r + sIr
′
α
]
1
N−1 − A(Zrf ) 1N−1 + CL r ∈ [r′, ku]
A(Zr)
1
N−1 − A(Zrf ) 1N−1 + CL r ∈ [rf , r′]
CL r ∈ [0, rf ]
We pick AL and CL so that the ability constraint for the L type is binding and the
probability mass integrates to 1:
A[(ku − sI
α
)r +
sIr′
α
]
1
N−1 − A(Zrf ) 1N−1 + CL = 1
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ˆ ku
r′
rA(Z − sI
α
)[(Z − sI
α
)r + sIr
′
α
]
1
N−1−1
(N − 1) dr +
ˆ r′
rf
rAZ
1
N−1 r
1
N−1−1
(N − 1) dr = rL
By noting that (Z− sI
α
)ku +
sIr′
α
= 1 from the definition of Pi(ri) (equation3.2.8), these
two equations can be simplified to:
(3.4.7) 1 = A− A(Zrf ) 1N−1 + CL
(3.4.8)
rL = A[(ku − (Zr′) 1N−1 r′)− (N − 1
N
)
(1− (Zr′) 1N−1+1)
(Z − sI
α
)
] +
AZ
1
N−1 (r′
1
N−1+1 − r
1
N−1+1
f )
N
We can divide the two equations to get
1− CL = rL(1− (Zrf )
1
N−1 )
[(ku − (Zr′) 1N−1 r′)− (N−1N ) (1−(Zr
′)
1
N−1+1)
(Z− sI
α
)
] +
Z
1
N−1 (r′
1
N−1+1−r
1
N−1+1
f )
N
And then rearrange 3.4.7 and sub in the expression for 1− CL to get
A =
rL
[(ku − (Zr′) 1N−1 r′)− (N−1N ) (1−(Zr
′)
1
N−1+1)
(Z− sI
α
)
] +
Z
1
N−1 (r′
1
N−1+1−r
1
N−1+1
f )
N
Fortunately, this can be greatly simplified. Noting that ku =
1− sIr′
α
Z− sI
α
from 3.2.10 and
simplifying, we get
A =
rL
[
1−NsIr′
α
−(Zr′)
1
N−1+1+NsI
α
Z
1
N−1 r′
1
N−1+1
N(Z− sI
α
)
] +
Z
1
N−1 (r′
1
N−1+1−r
1
N−1+1
f )
N
We can write this as
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(3.4.9) A =
rL
[
1−NsIr′
α
+(N−1)(Zr′)
1
N−1 r′+( sI
α
−Z)(Zr′)
1
N−1 r′
N(Z− sI
α
)
] +
Z
1
N−1 (r′
1
N−1+1−r
1
N−1+1
f )
N
Recalling the equation for Z from 3.2.11:
Z − sI
α
=
1
rN + (ZrNf )
1
N−1
[1 + (N − 1)sI
α
Z
1
N−1 r′
1
N−1+1 − NsIr
′
α
]
and substituting this into 3.4.9 gives
(3.4.10) A =
rL
r¯
To see that FLmust be a valid cdf, note that proposition 3.6 ensures that Z > sIα > 0
given sIr
′
α
∈ (0, 1) and r¯ > r′ > rf . Then, it is clear that the pdf fL = dFLdr is
positive or zero for r > 0. From the expression for P (equation 3.2.8), it is clear that
Zrf ∈ (0, 1), since Z > sIα . From 3.4.7 and the expression for A, we can obtain
1 − CL = rLr¯ (1 − (Zrf )
1
N−1 ) . Zrf ∈ (0, 1) ⇒ (Zrf ) 1N−1 ∈ (0, 1), and rLr¯ ∈ (0, 1) by
definition. This implies that CL ∈ (0, 1) as well. Therefore FL is a valid cdf.
Given the form of FL and the requirement that Pi(ri) must be of the form given in 3.2.8,
FH must be given by the following expression in symmetric equilibrium:
(3.4.11)
FH(r)

1 r ∈ [ku,∞)
([Z− sI
α
]r+ sIr
′
α
)
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
(A[(Z − sI
α
)r + sIr
′
α
]
1
N−1 − A(Zrf ) 1N−1 + CL) r ∈ [r′, ku]
(Zr)
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
[A(Zr)
1
N−1 − A(Zrf ) 1N−1 + CL] r ∈ [rf , r′]
(Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
CL r ∈ [0, rf ]
Now, what needs to be done is to show that this is a valid cdf:
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Lemma. Given that proposition 3.6 holds and the form for FH 3.4.11, the following
condition on the exogenous parameters is sufficient for fH(r) ≥ 0 for N ≥ 2:
sIrf
α
≥ (1− β)(rH − rL)
rH
Proof. There are two parts to the pdf fH implied by FH , a delta function corre-
sponding to the mass atom at r = 0, and a finite density elsewhere. We need to find
conditions on the parameters so that fH ≥ 0 for r > 0 and the mass atom at r = 0 is
between zero (inclusive) and one, i.e.
0 ≤ (Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1− β)
β
CL < 1
Begin by considering r > 0. Differentiate the expression for FH , 3.4.11, over r > 0 to
get:
fH(r)

0 r ∈ [ku,∞)
(Z− sI
α
)([Z− sI
α
]r+ sIr
′
α
)
1
N−1−1
β(N−1) − (1−β)β A
(Z− sI
α
)([Z− sI
α
]r+ sIr
′
α
)
1
N−1−1
(N−1) r ∈ [r′, ku]
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
(N−1)β − (1−β)β AZ(Zr)
1
N−1−1
(N−1) r ∈ [rf , r′]
0 r ∈ (0, rf ]
From this, the conditions forfH(r) ≥ 0 are:
(Z − sI
α
)([Z − sI
α
]r + sIr
′
α
)
1
N−1−1
β(N − 1) −
(1− β)
β
A
(Z − sI
α
)([Z − sI
α
]r + sIr
′
α
)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1) ≥ 0
and
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1)β −
(1− β)
β
A
Z(Zr)
1
N−1−1
(N − 1) ≥ 0
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Given that Z > sI
α
from proposition 3.6 and N ≥ 2, it is straightforward to show that
these both simplify to
A ≤ 1
1− β
Given A = rL
r¯
from 3.4.10, this is clearly true. What remains to be done is to show that
the mass atom at zero played by the H type is between zero and one:
0 ≤ (Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1− β)
β
CL < 1
First, consider (Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
CL < 1. Substituting in CL = 1− rLr¯ [1− (Zrf )
1
N−1 ] and
simplifying gives:
0 < (1− (Zrf ) 1N−1 )[1− rL
r¯
(1− β)]
Given that Zrf ∈ (0, 1)⇒ (Zrf ) 1N−1 ∈ (0, 1), then this always holds. It is also possible
to see that (Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
CL < 1 because if this was not the case, then fH < 0
somewhere for r > 0, since that is the only way for the probability mass to integrate to
1. The fact that fH(r) ≥ 0 for r > 0 means that (Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
CL > 1 is impossible.
The possibility of (Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
CL = 1 is ruled out by the fact that A < 11−β always,
which means that fH > 0 from the expression derived previously.
Finally, consider (Zrf )
1
N−1
β
− (1−β)
β
CL > 0. Subbing in CL = 1 − rLr¯ [1 − (Zrf )
1
N−1 ] and
simplifying gives:
(Zrf )
1
N−1 [1− rL
r¯
(1− β)] ≥ (1− β)(1− rL
r¯
)
Note that the RHS of this inequality is strictly increasing in (Zrf )
1
N−1 . Thus, to find
conditions on the parameters such that this is true for N ≥ 2, we just need to find a
version of this expression with the lowest possible value of (Zrf )
1
N−1 for N ≥ 2. Note
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that (Zrf )
1
N−1 is increasing in Z. Since it is assumed that the conditions required for
proposition 3.6 hold, we can use it to form a lower bound for Z, which is Z > sI
α
. Thus
(Zrf )
1
N−1 > ( sI
α
rf )
1
N−1 . Given that 0 < rf < r′ and that sIr
′
α
∈ (0, 1), sIrf
α
∈ (0, 1)
too. Then, note that ( sI
α
rf )
1
N−1 is increasing in N . Thus, the lowest bound of ( sI
α
rf )
1
N−1
must be when N is its minimum value, i.e.N = 2. Thus we can write (Zrf )
1
N−1 >
sIrf
α
,
and that a sufficient condition for equilibria to exist for N ≥ 2 is:
(3.4.12)
sIrf
α
≥ (1− β)(rH − rL)
rH
Thus the mass atom at r = 0 will be between zero and one in size, and therefore the
density fH(r) ≥ 0 everywhere. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
The proof of this lemma immediately implies that FH is a valid cdf since Z and ku
are solved such that
´
fH(r)dr = 1. In addition, the choice of Z and ku ensure that´
rfH(r)dr = rH . Therefore, as long as the previous lemma holds, it will be possible
to construct a pair of cdfs FL and FH of the form given in this proof that constitute
an equilibrium for any N of interest (N ≥ 2): they are valid cdfs that make the ability
constraints binding and also ensure that Pi(ri) is of the form required by 3.2.8.
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